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EXPARTE YOUNG AND FEDERAL REMEDIES FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY VIOLATIONS
David Sloss*
Abstract. The doctrine of Ex parte Young is typically described as an exception to the
immunity granted by the Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. This Article contends
that the Young doctrine also stands for the proposition that the Supremacy Clause creates an
implied right of action for injunctive relief against state and local government officers who violate
federal statutes or treaties. That right of action is available to plaintiffs who seek to enforce
federal statutes or treaties against government officers unless Congress foreclosed the availability
of a Young remedy when it enacted the statute, or the treaty makers foreclosed the availability of a
Young remedy when they adopted the treaty. A Young remedy is therefore available to plaintiffs
who raise treaty-based human rights claims against state or local government officers, because the
treaty makers did not foreclose the availability of a Young remedy when they ratified human
rights treaties.
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Federal Remedies for Human Rights Treaty Violations
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article's central thesis is that, under the doctrine of Ex parte
Young,' the Supremacy Clause creates an implied right of action for
injunctive relief against state and local government officers who violate
federal statutes or treaties. Moreover, plaintiffs should be able to utilize this
implied right of action to obtain judicial remedies for human rights treaty
violations by state and local government officers.
This thesis has significant implications for three different areas of recent
scholarship. First, some scholars have expressed concern that the U.S.
Supreme Court's decisions in Seminole Tribe v. Florida2 and Idaho v.
Coeur d'Alene Tribe may foreshadow a significant and unwarranted
curtailment of the Ex parte Young doctrine.4 This Article distinguishes
among three distinct elements of the Young doctrine: an Eleventh
Amendment element, a jurisdictional element, and an implied-cause-of-
action element. This Article shows that the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions
in Shaw v. Delta Airlines5 and post-Shaw statutory preemption cases have
extended all three elements of the Young doctrine to encompass statutory
1. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
2. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
3. 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
4. See Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, The Eleventh Amendment, and the Potential Evisceration of
ExParte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 495,543-44 (1997) (noting that Seminole Tribe "casts doubt on the
federal courts' authority to vindicate federal law through equitable relief against state officers. It is thus
fundamentally inconsistent with the tradition behind Marbury v. Madison's assertion that the existence
of a right implies a remedy"); Carlos Manuel Vgzquez, Eleventh Amendment Schizophrenia, 75 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 859, 908-12 (2000) (stating that Court's increasingly narrow reading of Eparte Young
suggests that further contraction may soon occur). For more sympathetic accounts of the Court's
decisions, see David Currie, Exparte Young After Seminole Tribe, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 547,547 (1997)
("Exparte Young is alive and well and living in the U.S. Supreme Court."); John C. Jefflies, In Praise of
the Eleventh Amendment andSection 1983, 84 Va. L. Rev. 47,49 (1998) (contending that criticisms of
U.S. Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence are exaggerated, because "[t]he Eleventh
Amendment almost never matters"). For additional commentary on Seminole Tribe, see Daniel J.
Meltzer, The Seminole Decision andState Sovereign Immunity, 1996 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1 (1996), and Henry
P. Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity Exception, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 102 (1996). For additional
commentary on Coeur d'Alene, see Vicki C. Jackson, Coeur d'Alene Federal Courts and the
Supremacy of Federal Law: The Competing Paradigms of Chief Justices Marshall and Rehnquist, 15
Const. Comment. 301 (1998), and Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Night andDay: Coeurd'Alene, Breard. and
the Unraveling ofthe Prospective-Retrospective Distinction in Eleventh Amendment Doctrine, 87 Geo.
L. J. 1 (1998).
5. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
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preemption claims.6 Specifically, the statutory preemption cases support the
thesis that the Supremacy Clause creates an implied right of action against
state officers to enjoin enforcement of state laws that are preempted by
federal statutes.' Inasmuch as treaties and statutes have equal status under
the Supremacy Clause, this Article contends that this implied right of action
applies to at least some treaty-based preemption claims as well.8 The subtext
of this argument is that, notwithstanding the Court's decisions in Seminole
Tribe and Coeur d'Alene, the Young doctrine is alive and well.
This Article's central thesis is also relevant to the recent wave of
revisionist scholarship that has questioned whether customary international
law (CIL) is supreme federal law.9 The debate between revisionists and anti-
revisionists is often cast in terms of CIL generally, but the debate is fueled,
at least in part, by conflicting views about the legitimacy of judicial
decisions upholding plaintiffs' international human rights claims on the
basis of CIL.1" This Article contends that plaintiffs can bring international
6. There has been surprisingly little commentary on the implications of Shaw and its progeny for the
Young doctrine. But see Henry P. Monaghan, Federal Statutory Review Under Section 1983 and the
APA, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 233, 238-41 (1991) (criticizing Shaw).
7. The thesis that the Supremacy Clause creates an implied right of action for statutory preemption
claims is not novel. See 13B Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3566, at 102 (1984)
[hereinafter Wright & Miller] ("The best explanation of Ex parte Young and its progeny is that the
Supremacy Clause creates an implied right of action for injunctive relief against state officers who are
threatening to violate the federal Constitution and laws.").
8. The extension of the Wright & Miller implied-right-of-action thesis to treaty-based preemption
claims is novel. However, Professor Vdzquez has noted the relevance of Shaw to treaty-based claims.
See Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies oflndividuals, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1082,
1150 n.286 (1992) (discussing relationship between Shaw, Declaratory Judgment Act, and primary rights
created by treaties).
9. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common
Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 815, 817 (1997) (contending that "contrary
to conventional wisdom, CIL should not have the status of federal common law"). For a response to
Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, see Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111
Harv. L. Rev. 1824, 1827 (1998) (contending that "even casual reflection compels the conclusion that
Bradley and Goldsmith are utterly mistaken").
10. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, III, The Current lllegitimacy of lnternational Human
Rights Litigation, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 319,320 (1997) (contending that "the legitimacy of human rights
litigation is what is really at stake in debates" about status of CIL as federal common law, and
concluding that "the judicial treatment of international human rights law as federal law" cannot be
justified). For responses, see Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga's Firm Footing: International
Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 463,469 (1997) ("The consensus view
that universally-recognized human rights are federal common law reflects the considered judgment of
the three coordinate branches of government."); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense about
Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 Fordham L. Rev.
371, 371-72 (1997) (defending "the established doctrine that customary international law norms are
incorporated into the U.S. legal system as a form of federal law"), and Beth Stephens. The Law ofOur
1106
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human rights claims in U.S. courts on the basis of human rights treaties that
the United States has ratified. Although the text of the Constitution does not
say whether CIL is supreme federal law, the Constitution states explicitly
that ratified treaties are the "supreme law of the land."" Therefore, if this
Article is correct, and plaintiffs can bring international human rights claims
in U.S. courts on the basis of human rights treaties, the debate about the
legitimacy of CIL-based human rights litigation may lose some of its force,
because the Constitution itself establishes the legitimacy of treating ratified
treaties as supreme federal law. 2
Finally, this Article bears directly on recent scholarship examining the
domestic implications of U.S. ratification of human rights treaties. The
United States ratified three human rights treaties in the first half of the
1990s: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 3
the Torture Convention, 4 and the Race Convention. 5 The conventional
Land: Customary International Law as Federal Lmv afier Erie, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 393, 397 (1997)
("mhe suggestion that Erie tossed the law of nations out of federal court along with the general
common law rests on several misconceptions.").
11. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. This statement must be qualified by the caveat that, under well-
established judicial doctrine, some treaties are not the law of the land. See infra notes 74-79 and
accompanying text.
12. In a recent article, Professor Yoo argues that "courts should obey the presumption that when the
text of a treaty is silent, courts ought to assume that it is non-self-executing," meaning, in his view, that
the treaty is not the supreme law of the land. John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties,
Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1955, 2093 (1999). For
criticisms of Professor Yoo's argument, see Martin S. Flaherty, History Right? Historical Scholarship,
Original Understanding, and Treaties as "Supreme Law ofthe Land", 99 Colum. L. Rev. 2095 (1999),
and Carlos Manuel Vlzquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 2154 (1999). In this author's
view, Professor Yoo's argument is misguided because it mistakenly construes the term "non-self-
executing" to mean "not the supreme law of the land." In fact, the term "non-self-executing" has
multiple meanings, and the failure to distinguish between those multiple meanings is a source of a great
deal of confusion. See infra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
13. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adoptedDec. 19, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-
2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. The United States
deposited its instrument of ratification for the ICCPR on June 8, 1992. See Multilateral Treaties
Deposited with the Secretary-General: Status as at30 Apr. 1999 at 128, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/17,
U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.5 (1999) [hereinafter Multilateral Treaties].
14. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, at 19-30 (1988), 23 I.L.M. 1027
[hereinafter Torture Convention]. The United States deposited its instrument of ratification for the
Torture Convention on October 21, 1994. See Multilateral Treaties, supra note 13, at 212.
15. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, openedfor
signature Mar. 7,1966, S. Exec. Doc. C, 95-2 (1978), 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter Race Convention].
The United States deposited its instrument of ratification on October21, 1994. See Multilateral Treaties,
supra note 13, at 102.
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wisdom is that these treaties are not judicially enforceable in U.S. courts 6
because the treaty makers adopted, 7 for each of the treaties, a declaration
stating that the substantive provisions of the treaty are "not self-
executing.' 8 This Article contends that the conventional wisdom
misconstrues both the meaning and purpose of the non-self-executing
(NSE) declarations. Properly understood, the NSE declarations mean only
that the treaties do not create a private cause of action. However, the treaties
create substantive rights that are judicially enforceable by (1) defendants
who raise treaty-based defenses to civil or criminal actions initiated by the
government, and (2) plaintiffs who invoke other provisions of federal law
that supply a private cause of action to enforce substantive rights protected
by the treaties. 9
Part II describes how the conditions adopted by the United States when it
ratified human rights treaties affect the rights and remedies available under
16. See infra note 72.
17. This Article uses the term "treaty makers" to refer collectively to the President and the Senate,
insofar as they are exercising their constitutional treaty-making powers. The Constitution specifies that
the President "shall have Power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make Treaties,
provided two thirds of the Senators present concur." U.S. Const., art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
18. The non-self-executing declarations are included in the Senate "resolutions of ratification" for all
three treaties. See 140 Cong. Rec. 14,326 (1994) (Race Convention); 138 Cong. Rec. 8070 (1992);
(ICCPR); 136 Cong. Rec. 36192-93 (1990) (Torture Convention). Identical declarations are also
included in the U.S. "instruments of ratification" deposited with the United Nations. See Multilateral
Treaties, supra note 13, at 128 (ICCPR), 98 (Race Convention), 201 (Torture Convention).
19. Some commentators have argued that the treaty makers did not intend to preclude defendants in
civil or criminal actions instituted by the government from invoking the treaties defensively. See Connie
de la Vega, Civil Rights During the 1990s: New Treaty Law Could Help Immensely, 65 U. Cin. L. Rev.
423, 456 & n.206 (1997) (stating that "the concept of self-execution does not apply... to defensive
invocations"); John Quigley, Human Rights Defenses in U.S. Courts, 20 Hum. Rts. Q. 555, 580-82
(1998) ("Even if courts find that a plaintiff cannot claim treaty-based rights, the Senate expressed no
intent to preclude a person from invoking right-guarantee provisions defensively to avert adverse
governmental action."); David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-Self-
Executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 Yale J. Int'l L. 129,210-214 (1999) (contending
that defensive applications of treaties are consistent with treaty makers' intent in adopting NSE
declarations); see also Robin H. Gise, Note, Rethinking McClesky v. Kemp: How U.S. Ratification ofthe
International Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms ofRacial Discrimination Provides a Remedy
for Claims of RacialDisparity in Death Penalty Cases, 22 Fordham Int'l L.J. 2270,2310 (1999) (stating
that NSE declarations do not prevent defendants from invoking treaties "as a defense to criminal or civil
charges brought by the government").
Commentators who have espoused the view that defendants have the right to invoke treaty rights
defensively have paid scant attention to the possibilities for plaintiffs in civil actions to invoke the
treaties offensively. Other commentators, who have explicitly discussed the offensive application of
treaties by plaintiffs in civil actions, have not focused specifically on human rights treaties. See generally
VAzquez, supra note 8. This Article fills a gap in the existing scholarship by focusing specifically on
offensive applications of human rights treaties in civil suits against government officers.
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the treaties. The first section discusses treaty "reservations," which limit the
scope of substantive rights that the United States is obligated to protect
under the treaties. The next section discusses the NSE declarations, which
do not derogate from the substantive rights protected by the treaties, but
which do limit the availability of judicial remedies. Proceeding from the
premise that courts should apply the treaties in a manner that is consistent
with the treaty makers' intent,2" Part II contends that the NSE declarations
were adopted to clarify that the treaty makers did not intend for the human
rights treaties themselves to create a private right of action in U.S. courts."'
However, the NSE declarations were not intended to preclude courts from
providing judicial remedies for human rights treaty violations in cases
where plaintiffs in civil actions properly invoke other provisions of federal
law that do provide a private cause of action.' Just as 42 U.S.C. § 1983'
provides a damages remedy for violations of substantive rights protected by
constitutional provisions lacking an express remedy, certain remedial
provisions of federal law can supply a private cause of action for violations
of substantive rights protected by human rights treaties that do not
themselves contain an express remedy.
Part III examines three federal statutes that could potentially provide
plaintiffs a private right of action for human rights treaty violations by
government officers: the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),24 which provides
a right of action against federal officers for money damages; the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA),2 which provides a right of action
against federal officers for specific relief; and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which
20. To some extent, there is a tension between the intent of the treaty drafters, as manifested in the
language of the treaties, and the intent of the Senate and executive branch, as manifested in the Senate
record associated with treaty ratification. The intent of both sets of "treaty makers" is relevant in
interpreting the treaty. However, this Article assumes that, in the event of a conflict between treaty
drafters and treaty ratifiers, the intent of the ratifiers is controlling as a matter of domestic law.
21. Portions of the material presented in Part II borrow liberally from this author's previous article,
which developed this argument in much greater detail. See Sloss, supra note 19.
22. It is also possible that state law may provide a cause of action that would enable plaintiffs to
obtain judicial remedies for violations of unique treaty rights. See Vkzquez, supra note 8, at 1144-46
(discussing use of common law rights of action as bases for judicial remedies for violations of treaty-
based substantive rights). However, this Article focuses on the availability of a federal cause of action
that would enable plaintiffs to bring claims in either federal or state court.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
24. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1998) (establishingjurisdiction offederal courts forFTCA
claims); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1994) (establishing procedure for bringing FTCA claims).
25. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1994).
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provides a right of action against state and local government officers for
both money damages and specific relief. The analysis first shows that the
FTCA does not provide a cause of action for treaty violations per se, but
that treaty rights could still affect the outcome of an FTCA suit by
providing plaintiffs a reply to a defense of official authority. Second, the
APA does provide plaintiffs a private cause of action for injunctive relief
against federal officers who violate their treaty rights. Third, § 1983, as
currently interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, does not provide plaintiffs
a cause of action against state or local officers who violate their treaty
rights. The final section of Part III contends that, insofar as the APA
provides a federal cause of action for injunctive relief against federal
officers who violate treaty rights, there is no persuasive policy justification
for denying plaintiffs a federal cause of action for injunctive relief against
state and local officers who violate their treaty rights.
Part IV contends that, under the doctrine of Ex parte Young,26 the
Supremacy Clause creates an implied right of action for injunctive relief
against state and local government officers who violate federal statutes or
treaties. The first section briefly summarizes the scope of the Eleventh
Amendment and jurisdictional aspects of the Young doctrine. The second
section defends Shaw's extension of Young's Eleventh Amendment and
jurisdictional principles to statutory preemption claims. The third section
contends that the Supremacy Clause creates an implied private right of
action for claims within the jurisdictional scope of Young and Shaw. The
final section advances the thesis that the implied private right of action
extends to treaty-based preemption claims, including alleged human rights
treaty violations.
II. U.S. RATIFICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
The Carter Administration first submitted the ICCPR and the Race
Convention to the Senate in 1978,27 but both treaties remained dormant
there for more than a decade. Meanwhile, the Reagan Administration
26. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
27. See Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Four Treaties Pertaining to
Human Rights, S. Exec. Docs. C, D, E, and F, 95-2 (1978) [hereinafter Carter Message].
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submitted the Torture Convention to the Senate in 1988,28 and the Senate
consented to ratification in 1990, during the Bush presidency.2 9
Subsequently, in 1991, President George Bush urged the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee to renew its consideration of the ICCPR,30 and the
Senate consented to ratification in 1992.3" Then, in 1994, President Bill
Clinton sought Senate approval of the Race Convention,32 which the Senate
provided that same year.33 The United States ratified the ICCPR in 199214
and the Torture and Race Conventions in 1994. 3"
Part II analyzes the conditions adopted by the United States when it
ratified these treaties. The first section addresses treaty "reservations,"
which limit the scope of substantive rights that the United States is
obligated, as a matter of international law, to protect. 6 The second section
discusses the NSE declarations, which do not modify U.S. obligations under
international law. The NSE declarations do not directly affect the
28. See Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Report on Convention.Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, S. Exec. Rep. No. 101-30, at 2 (1990) [hereinafter
Torture Report].
29. See 136 Cong. Rec. 36,192-93 (1990).
30. See Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
Report, S. Exec. Rep. No. 102-23, at 25 (1992) [hereinafter ICCPR Report].
31. See 138 Cong. Rec. 8070-71 (1992)
32. See Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Report on International Convention on the Elimination
ofAllForms ofRacial Discrimination, S. Exec. Rep. No. 103-29, at 2 (1994) [hereinafterRace Report].
33. See 140 Cong. Rec. 14,326-27 (1994).
34. See Multilateral Treaties, supra note 13, at 128. Colloquially, people often speak about Senate
"ratification" of a treaty. Technically, though, the President ratifies a treaty after obtaining Senate
consent. See Jordan Paust et al., International Law and Litigation in the U.S. 170 (2000). The human
rights treaties that are the subject of this Article stipulate that ratification shall be accomplished by
depositing an instrument of ratification with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. See Torture
Convention, supra note 14, art. 25, 2; Race Convention, supra note 15, art. 17, 2; ICCPRsupra note
13, art. 48, 2.
35. See id. at212 (Torture Convention); id. at 102 (Race Convention). Although the Senate consented
to ratification of the Torture Convention in 1990, the executive branch postponed ratification pending
Congressional deliberations on implementing legislation, which was enacted in 1994. See Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-236, § 506, 108 Stat. 382,
463 (1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340B (1994)).
36. Under international law, reservations adopted at the time ofratification permit a state to become a
party to a treaty while simultaneously limiting its obligations under the treaty, as a matter ofinternational
law, to a subset of the full range of obligations imposed by the treaty. See Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 2, l(d), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 333 (entered into force Jan. 27,1980)
[hereinafter Vienna Convention].
1111
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substantive rights protected by the treaties, but they do limit the availability
of judicial remedies.37
A. Substantive Rights and Treaty Reservations
Many international-law scholars agree that the scope of substantive rights
protected under international human rights treaties is broader, in certain
respects, than the scope of substantive rights protected by federal
constitutional and statutory law.38 For example, some scholars have argued
that the ICCPR's freedom of religion provision is stronger than the federal
constitutional guarantee as currently interpreted by the U.S. Supreme
Court.39 This Article uses the term "redundant treaty rights" to refer to
rights protected under international human rights treaties that are accorded
equal or greater protection under federal statutory or constitutional law. The
term "unique treaty rights" refers to rights protected under international
human rights treaties that receive less protection under federal statutory and
constitutional law.40
Every administration from Carter to Clinton proposed to the Senate a set
of "reservations" to be included in the U.S. instrument of ratification.4'
37. A strict believer in the maxim that "there are no rights without remedies" might argue that any
limitation on the availability ofjudicial remedies is also, necessarily, a limitation on substantive rights.
This author readily concedes that, as a practical matter, a supposed right for which there is no
conceivable remedy is not worth the paper it is written on. However, this Article argues below that there
is at least a limited range of remedies available for most violations of the substantive rights protected
under human rights treaties the United States has ratified. Moreover, it is analytically useful to retain the
distinction between rights and remedies to help explain the legal effect of the conditions adopted by the
United States.
38. See infra notes 53-64 and accompanying text for further discussion.
39. See Daniel 0. Conkle, Congressional Alternatives in the Wake ofCity of Boeme v. Flores: The
(Limited) Role of Congress in Protecting Religious Freedom from State and Local Infringement, 20 U.
Ark. Little Rock L.J. 633, 661 (1998) (stating that ICCPR "appears to demand more protection of
religious freedom than is required by [recent] U.S. Supreme Court[] decisions"); Gerald L. Neuman, The
Global Dimension ofRFRA, 14 Const. Commentary 33, 43 (1997) (stating that Article 18 of ICCPR
expresses broader conception of religious liberty than U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of free
exercise).
40. One could hypothesize a right that is protected by the treaty and state law, but is not protected by
federal constitutional or statutory law. Under the definition adopted herein, the treaty right would be
considered unique because it is not protected by other provisions of federal law, even though it is
protected by the laws of some states.
41. In fact, every administration proposed a set of "reservations," "understandings," and
"declarations." See Carter Message, supra note 27; Torture Report, supra note 28, at 7-28; ICCPR
Report, supra note 30, at 6-21; Race Report, supra note 32, at 7-32. According to the U.S. Senate,
"reservations" are generally used to modify a party's international legal obligations under a treaty,
whereas "understandings" are used to interpret or clarify those obligations. See Senate Comm. on
1112
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Although different reservations serve different objectives, the main purpose
of most of the reservations was to ensure that the United States would not
be obligated under the treaties to protect unique treaty rights. For example,
Article 6 of the ICCPR obligates parties not to impose the death penalty for
crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age.42 This is a unique
treaty right, because the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Constitution
permits imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by persons
who are sixteen or older.43 Hence, the U.S. adopted a reservation to preserve
its right, under international law, to impose capital punishment for crimes
committed by minors.'
The United States could have chosen among three distinct options for
handling treaty provisions, such as Article 6, that create unique treaty rights.
One option would have been to modify domestic law, by statute or
otherwise, to give domestic legal effect to unique treaty rights. This
approach would ensure U.S. compliance with its treaty obligations, but
would require changes in domestic law.45 A second option would have been
to ratify the treaties without reservations, but to refuse to give domestic
effect to unique treaty rights. This option would avoid changes in domestic
Foreign Relations, Report on The International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, S. Exec. Rep. No. 99-2, at 16 (1985). The Vienna Convention defines the term
"reservation" to mean "a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when
signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to
modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State." Vienna
Convention, supra note 36, at 333. Some of the so-called "understandings" adopted by the United States
arguably constitute "reservations" under international law. This Article uses the term "reservation" in
accordance with the definition in the Vienna Convention.
42. ICCPR, supra note 13, at art. 6, 5.
43. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (holding that imposition of capital
punishment for murders committed at age sixteen or seventeen "does not offend the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment").
44. 138 Cong. Rec. 8070 (1992) ("[T]he United States reserves the right, subject to its Constitutional
constraints, to impose capital punishment on any person (other than a pregnant woman) duly convicted
under existing or future laws permitting the imposition of capital punishment, including such
punishment for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age.").
45. For example, the United States could have enacted a statute to prohibit states from imposing the
death penalty for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age. The U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416,432-33 (1920), appears to authorize Congress to enact
such a statute as an incident to the treaty power, even if Congress could not enact such a statute in the
absence of a treaty. However, recent scholarship has raised questions about the reach of the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Missouri v. Holland, and whether it is still good law. See e.g., Curtis A.
Bradley, The Treaty Power andAmerican Federalism, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 390,458-59 (1998). For a reply
to Professor Bradley, see David M. Golove, Treaty-Makingand the Nation: The HistoricalFoundations
of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 1075 (2000).
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law, but would result in U.S. noncompliance with its treaty obligations.46
Since the treaty makers wanted to ensure U.S. compliance with its treaty
obligations without modifying domestic law, they chose the third option.
They attempted to identify every unique treaty right, and adopted a
reservation for each such provision stating, in effect, that the United States
agreed to be bound by that provision under international law only to the
extent that it protected rights already protected under other provisions of
federal law.47
Thus, the U.S. ratification strategy can be explained as an effort to
harmonize two potentially conflicting policy objectives: (1) ensuring U.S.
compliance with its treaty obligations,48 and (2) ensuring that treaty
ratification would not expand the scope of domestic legal protection for
individual rights.49 During the ratification process, the executive branch
repeatedly assured the Senate that-because the reservations lowered the
level of the United States's international legal obligations under the treaties
to conform to pre-existing federal law-the United States could comply
fully with its treaty obligations without having to change domestic law."
Or, to state the point differently, individuals would be able to vindicate all
the rights protected under the treaties (as modified by U.S. reservations)
without having to invoke the treaties directly, because the reservations
eliminated the U.S. obligation to protect unique treaty rights, leaving only
46. For example, if the United States did not adopt a death penalty reservation, and then executed
someone for a crime committed at age seventeen, the United States would be guilty of a treaty violation.
47. Several other commentators have also noted this aspect of the U.S. approach to ratification of
human rights treaties. See Louis Henkin, US. Ratification ofHuman Rights Conventions: The Ghost of
Senator Bricker, 89 Am. J. Int'l L. 341,342 (1995) ("By its reservations, the United States apparently
seeks to assure that its adherence to a convention will not change, or require change, in U.S. laws,
policies, or practices, even where they fall below international standards."); John Quigley, The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Supremacy Clause, 42 DePaul L. Rev.
1287, 1287 (1993) ("When President George Bush urged the U.S. Senate to consent to the ratification of
the [ICCPR] ... Bush assured the Senate that ratification would require no change in U.S. practice.").
48. See Sloss, supra note 19, at 178-83 (examining Senate record associated with treaty ratification,
and contending that Senate record demonstrates that President and Senate placed a high value on
ensuring U.S. compliance with its treaty obligations).
49. David Stewart, the State Department's Assistant Legal Adviser for Human Rights and Refigees,
affirmed that the executive branch purposefully sought to prevent human rights treaties from altering
domestic law. See David P. Stewart, United States Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights: The Significance of the Reservations, Understandings and Declarations, 42 DePaul L. Rev.
1183, 1206 (1993). In his words, policy makers were guided by the principle "that the United States
would not commit itself to do anything that would require a change in present U.S. law or practice." Id.
50. See Sloss, supra note 19, at 183-88 (examining Senate record associated with treaty ratification to
show that executive branch "sold" treaties to Senate by promising that United States could achieve full
compliance with its treaty obligations without having to make changes in domestic law).
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the obligation to protect redundant treaty rights.5' The Senate consented to
ratification on the basis of those assurances, believing that the reservations,
by eliminating U.S. obligations to protect unique treaty rights, resolved any
potential conflict between the twin goals of treaty compliance and avoiding
changes in domestic law.52
Despite the treaty makers' best efforts to eliminate U.S. obligations to
protect unique treaty rights, there are several human rights treaty provisions
to which the United States did not attach reservations that are more
protective of rights than federal constitutional or statutory law. For
example, Article 17 of the ICCPR protects the right to privacy. 3 The United
States did not adopt any reservation with respect to Article 17; it is therefore
binding on the United States as a matter of international law.' The Human
Rights Committee, an international body established by the ICCPR, has
held that Article 17 protects the right of adult homosexuals to engage in
private consensual sexual activity and that state criminal sodomy laws
violate that right.55 The Committee's interpretation of Article 17 is
supported by the fact that the European Convention on Human Rights also
51. The terms "unique treaty rights" and "redundant treaty rights" are this author's terms. To the best
of this author's knowledge, these terms do not appear in the Senate record associated with treaty
ratification.
52. Senator Moynihan propounded this interpretation of the treaty reservations:
Others have raised the legitimate concern that the number of reservations in the administration's
package might imply to some that the United States does not take the obligations of the covenant
seriously .... [I]t is possible to place a wholly different interpretation on the administration's
package of reservations. The administration has.., undertaken a meticulous examination of U.S.
practice to ensure that the United States will in fact comply with the obligations that it is assuming.
138 Cong. Rec. 8070 (1992) (statement of Sen. Moynihan); see also Sloss, supra note 19, at 183-88.
53. ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 17, 1 ("No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and
reputation.").
54. Although the NSE declaration limits the availability of domestic judicial remedies for violations
of Article 17, the NSE declaration does not affect the United States's international legal obligation to
comply with Article 17. See infra note 97.
55. See Toonen v. Australia, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/
CI5O1D/48811992 (1994), reprinted in Int'l Hum. Rts. Rep., Sept. 1994, at 97. The Human Rights
Committee's interpretation of the ICCPR is not binding on theUnited States. However, the Committee's
decisions "'are recognized as a major source for interpretation of the ICCPR.' United States v. Duarte-
Acero, 208 F.3d 1282, 1287-88 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Maria v. McElroy, 68 F. Supp. 2d 206,232
(E.D.N.Y. 1999)).
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protects the right to privacy,56 and the European Court of Human Rights has
also ruled that state criminal sodomy laws violate the right to privacy under
that Convention. 7 These rulings stand in sharp contrast to the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision upholding Georgia's criminal sodomy statute and
declining to "extend a fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts
of consensual sodomy." 58
Article 1 0(1) of the ICCPR is another example of a unique treaty right
for which the United States did not adopt a reservation. It states, "All
persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person."59 On its face, the
language of Article 1 0(1) is more far-reaching than the Eighth Amendment
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The Human Rights
Committee has construed Article 10(1) to accord greater protection for
detainees than is provided by Article 7 of the ICCPR, which prohibits
"cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."6 Moreover, the
56. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222,230. Paragraph 1 of Article 8 provides the following: "Everyone has the right to
respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence." Id. at art. I, T 8.
57. See Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988); Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) (1981).
58. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986). The disparity between U.S. constitutional law and
international human rights law in this area has received a good deal of scholarly attention. See William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Hardwick and Historiography, 99 U. Ill. L. Rev. 631, 676-77 (1999); Elizabeth
McDavid Harris, Intercourse Against Nature: The Role of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and the Repeal ofSodomy Laws in the United States, 18 Hous. J. Int'l L. 525,555-56 (1996); Laurence
R. Heifer & Alice M. Miller, Sexual Orientation and Human Rights: Toward a United States and
Transnational Jurisprudence, 9 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 61, 78 (1996); Brenda Sue Thornton, The New
International Jurisprudence on the Right to Privacy: A Head-On Collision with Bowers v. Hardwick, 58
AIb. L. Rev. 725, 730-33 (1995); James D. Wilets, Using International Law to Vindicate the Civil
Rights of Gays and Lesbians in United States Courts, 27 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 33, 41 (1995);
Edward H. Sadtler, Note, A Right to Same-Sex Marriage Under International Law: Can It Be Vindicated
in the United States?, 40 Va. J. Int'l L. 405,418-23 (1999).
59. ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 10, 1.
60. ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 7. The Human Rights Committee has stated that Article 10(l)
"imposes on States parties a positive obligation towards persons who are particularly vulnerable because
of their status as persons deprived of liberty, and complements for them the ban on torture or other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment contained in article 7 of the Covenant." U.N. Doc.
HRI\GEN\ 1\Rev. 1, at 33 (1994). There are cases in which the Human Rights Committee has found that
certain conduct violates both Article 7 and Article 10(1). See John Wight v. Madagascar, U.N. GAOR,
Hum. Rts. Comm., 40th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 171, U.N. Doc. A/40/40 (1985). However, there are also
cases in which the Committee has found a violation ofArticle 10(1) without a corresponding violation of
Article 7, thereby indicating that Article I0(1) provides heightened protection for detainees beyond the
rights protected by Article 7. See Teresa Gomez de Voituret v. Uruguay, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts.
Comm., 39th Sess., Supp. 40, at 164, U.N. Doc. A/39/40 (1984) (noting solitary confinement violates
Article 10(1), but not Article 7); Jorge Manera Lluberas v. Uruguay, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm.,
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United States has recognized that Article 7 is more rights-protective than
the U.S. Constitution." Since Article 10(1) accords greater protection than
Article 7, and Article 7 accords greater protection than the U.S.
Constitution, it follows that Article 10(1) protects rights that do not receive
comparable protection under the U.S. Constitution. Indeed, the U.N. Human
Rights Committee has stated that the conditions of detention in certain U.S.
prisons (which may or may not conform to constitutional standards) are
"incompatible with article 10."62 The United States did not adopt any
reservation with respect to Article 10(1); it is therefore binding on the
United States as a matter of international law.63
The above examples do not exhaust the list of unique treaty rights that
the United States has an international legal obligation to protect. 4 Even so,
these examples illustrate the point that human rights treaties ratified by the
United States may be more rights-protective in certain respects (even with
the attached reservations) than other provisions of federal law. The treaty
39th Sess., Supp. 40, at 175, U.N. Doe. No. A/39140 (1984) (noting conditions of detention violate
Article 10(1), but notArticle7); LuyeyeMagana ex-Philibertv. Zaire, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm.,
38th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/38/40 (1983) (same).
61. The United States adopted a reservation to Article 7, stating that "the United States considers itself
bound by Article 7 to the extent that 'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment' means the
cruel and unusual treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments to
the Constitution of the United States." 138 Cong. Rec. 8070 (1992). The treaty makers' choice to label
this a "reservation," rather than an "understanding," indicates their beliefthat the rights protected under
Article 7 exceed the scope of constitutional protections. That belief is probably correct. See David
Heffeman, America the Cruel and Unusual? An Analysis ofthe Eighth Amendment Under International
Law, 45 Cath. U. L. Rev. 481, 560 (1996) (comparing U.S. Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence with international decisions construing Article 7 and concluding that there are "significant
areas ofprotection under the international standard that are not available under the Eighth Amendment").
62. U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 53d Sess., 1413th mtg. at 4, 20, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/79/Add. 50
(1995); see also Human Rights Watch & American Civil Liberties Union, Human Rights Violations in
the United States 98-113 (1993) (analyzing prison conditions in United States in terms of compliance
with international standards).
63. Although the NSE declaration limits the availability ofdomestic judicial remedies for violations
ofArticle 10(1), the NSE declaration does not affect the United States's international legal obligation to
comply with Article 10(1). See infra note 97.
64. As noted above, commentators have argued that human rights treaties provide broader protection
for religious freedom than comparable provisions of U.S. constitutional and statutory law. See supra
note 39 and accompanying text In addition, several commentators have argued that the ICCPR provides
greater protection against international kidnapping than does federal constitutional or statutory law. See,
e.g., Paul Michell, English-Speaking Justice: EvolvingResponses to Transnational ForcibleAbduction
After Alvarez-Machain, 29 Cornell Int'l LI. 383,404-10, 440-42 (1996); John Quigley, Our Men in
Guadalajara nd theAbduction ofSuspects Abroad: A Comment on United States v. Alvarez-Machain,
68 Notre Dame L. Rev. 723,744-46 (1993); Timothy D. Rudy, Did We Treaty Away Ker-Frisbie?, 26
St. Mary's L.J. 791, 811-17 (1995).
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makers' failure to adopt reservations for all unique treaty rights poses a
dilemma for the judiciary. Judicial enforcement of unique treaty rights
would be inconsistent with the treaty makers' policy goal of avoiding
changes in domestic law.65 But in a properly presented case, judicial refusal
to enforce a unique treaty right for which the U.S. did not adopt a
reservation would be inconsistent with the goal of ensuring U.S. compliance
with its international legal obligations.' Resolution of this dilemma requires
consideration of the NSE declarations.
B. Judicial Remedies and the Non-Self-Executing Declarations
A few commentators have argued that the NSE declarations are or may
be unconstitutional.67 Others contend that the NSE declarations are not
legally binding, because they are not part of the treaties.68 This section
assumes that, even if the NSE declarations are not legally binding,69 courts
should apply (or not apply) the treaties in a manner that is consistent with
65. If the judiciary enforces unique treaty rights, then judges could, for example, invalidate a state
statute on the grounds that it conflicts with a treaty provision, which is supreme federal law. That would
be inconsistent with the policy objective of ensuring that treaty ratification would not modify domestic
law.
66. If some other branch of state or federal government takes appropriate steps to remedy violations
of unique treaty rights, then judicial enforcement is unnecessary. But in cases where the treaties do
protect unique rights and the political branches fail to make changes in statutory law to protect those
unique rights, judicial enforcement of the treaties is necessary to ensure U.S. compliance with its treaty
obligations.
67. See, e.g., Thomas Buergenthal, Modern Constitutions and Human Rights Treaties, 36 Colum. J.
Transnat'l L. 211, 222 ("U.S. declarations making human rights treaties non-self-executing are ill-
advised and probably unconstitutional."); Henkin, supra note 47, at 346 ("Whatever may be appro-priate
in a special case, as a general practice such a [non-self-executing] declaration is against the spirit of the
Constitution; it may be unconstitutional."); Jordan Paust, Customary International Law and Human
Rights Treaties are Law ofthe United States, 20 Mich. J. Int'l L. 301, 324 (1999) ("[A] declaration of
non-self-execution, even if not void under international law, is unconstitutional and void under the
Supremacy Clause."). But see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and
Conditional Consent (manuscript on file with author) (contending that NSE declarations are consistent
with Supremacy Clause); Vdzquez, supra note 12, at 2186-88 (contending that treaty makers have
power to deprive treaties of domestic legal force).
68. See Quigley, supra note 19, at 582-85 (contending that NSE declaration attached to ICCPR is
"not part of the treaty, hence not part of what, according to the Supremacy Clause, is the supreme law of
the land"); Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, Foreword: Symposium on Parliamentary
Participation in the Making and Operation of Treaties, 67 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 293, 296-97 (1991)
(contending that NSE declaration, like one attached to Torture Convention, "is not part of a
treaty... [but] is merely an expression of an interpretation or of a policy or position," and that U.S.
courts "are not bound to apply expressions of opinion adopted by the Senate").
69. The author expresses no view as to whether the NSE declarations are or are not legally binding.
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the treaty makers' intent in adopting the NSE declarations.7" Additionally,
this section suggests that courts can and should avoid the constitutional
issue by interpreting the NSE declarations narrowly.7' Thus, this section
focuses on the meaning and purpose of the NSE declarations.
Most commentators have assumed that the purpose and legal effect of the
NSE declarations adopted by the United States is to prevent U.S. courts
from providing judicial remedies for violations of unique treaty rights.72
Under this view, the treaty makers resolved the dilemma described above by
70. The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States states:
A condition imposed by the Senate that does not seek to modify the treaty and is solely of domestic
import, is not part of the treaty and hence does not partake of its character as 'supreme Law of the
Land.' .. . The effectiveness of such a Senate proviso, however, does not depend on its becoming
law of the land as part of the treaty. Such a proviso is an expression of the Senate's constitutional
authority to grant or withhold consent to a treaty, which includes authority to grant consent subject
to a condition. The authority to impose the condition implies that it must be given effect in the
constitutional system.
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law ofthe United States § 303 n.4 (1987). Of course, if a
binding provision of law requires one result, and a non-binding declaration expresses the treaty maker's
intent to achieve a contrary result, the binding provision of law would take precedence.
71. See infra note77.
72. See, e.g., Buergenthal, supra note 67, at 220-21 (stating that NSE declarations prevent American
courts from applying these treaties as domestic law); Conkle, supra note 39, at 661-62 (stating that
ICCPR "is not yet enforceable as part of domestic law of the United States, because-according to
Senate declaration-the ICCPR is not self-executing"); Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United
States Senate Concerning "Self-Executing " and "Non-Self-Executing" Treaties, 67 Chi.-Kent L. Rev.
515, 516 (1991) (noting that NSE declarations mean that treaties "require implementing action by the
political branches of government or ... are otherwise unsuitable for judicial application"); Henkin,
supra note 47, at 346 (arguing NSE declarations are designed to prevent U.S. "judges from judging the
human rights conditions in the United States by international standards"); Gay J. McDougall, Towarda
Meaning/ul International Regime: The Domestic Relevance of International Efforts to Eliminate All
Forms ofRacialDiscrimination, 40 How. L.L 571,588 (1997) (stating that NSE declaration attached to
Race Convention "stripped the U.S. judiciary of any meaningful role in interpreting" it); Neuman, supra
note 39, at 43 (stating that NSE declaration attached to ICCPR means that treaty is "not directly
enforceable in the courts"); Stewart, supra note 49, at 1202 (noting that NSE declaration attached to
ICCPR means that ICCPR "does not, by itself, create private rights enforceable in U.S. courts"); Nkechi
Taifa, Codification or Castration? The Applicability of the International Convention to Eliminate All
Forms ofRacial Discrimination to the U.S. Criminal Justice System, 40 How. L.J. 641,642-43 (1997)
(stating that Race Convention "has consciously been rendered impotent due to U.S. insertion of a non-
self-executing declaration"); David Weissbrodt, United States Ratification of the Human Rights
Covenants, 63 Minn. L. Rev. 35, 67 (1978) (concluding that effect of NSE declarations "is to deprive
American courts of their most potent technique for contributing meaningfully to the interpretation [of the
human rights treaties]"); Barbara MacGrady, Note, Resort to International Human Rights Law in
Challenging Conditions in U.S. Immigration Detention Centers, 23 Brook. J. Int'l L. 271,300 (1997)
("Since Congress has made its intent clear [by adopting NSE declarations], it is certain that the courts
will not enforce these treaties in a domestic action.").
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commanding the judiciary, through the NSE declarations, not to provide
remedies for violations of treaty rights, even in cases where judicial refusal
to enforce unique treaty rights would result in U.S. non-compliance with its
international legal obligations.73 This interpretation misconstrues both the
meaning and the purpose of the NSE declarations.
1. The Meaning of the Non-Self-Executing Declarations
The term "non self-executing" has multiple meanings.74 For present
purposes, though, it will suffice to distinguish three possible meanings of
the term, as applied to human rights treaties. One possible meaning of the
NSE declarations is that human rights treaties ratified by the United States
have no status as domestic law in the absence of implementing legislation.75
Because the United States has not enacted implementing legislation for the
treaties,76 this interpretation suggests that the treaties do not create any
substantive rights, as a matter of domestic law, much less provide for
73. Mostjudicial opinions that have discussed the legal effect ofthe NSE declarations have construed
those declarations as expressions of the treaty makers' intent to preclude judicial remedies and have
accordingly refused to provide such remedies. See Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8, 10 n. I
(1st Cir. 1994) (rejecting Puerto Rican voting-rights claim based on Article 25 of ICCPR); Hawkins v.
Comparet-Cassani, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1257 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (rejecting claim by prisoner based on
ICCPR and Torture Convention); White v. Paulsen, 997 F. Supp. 1380, 1387 (E.D. Wash. 1998)
(rejecting claims by former prisoners based, inter alia, on Torture Convention and ICCPR); In re
Extradition of Cheung, 968 F. Supp. 791, 803 n.17 (D. Conn. 1997) (rejecting defense to extradition
based on Article 3 of Torture Convention). But see Ralk v. Lincoln County, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1380
(S.D. Ga. 2000) (stating that plaintiff "could bring a claim under the Alien Tort Claims Act for violations
of the ICCPR").
74. Several scholars have noted the ambiguity in the term "non self-executing" as applied to treaties.
John H. Jackson, United States, in The Effect of Treaties in Domestic Law 147-56 (Francis G. Jacobs&
Shelley Roberts eds., 1987) (discussing implementation and application of treaties in U.S. law); Yuji
Iwasawa, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties in the United States: A Critical Analysis, 26 Va. J.
Int'l L. 627, 635-42 (1986) (summarizing various meanings of term "self-executing"); Jordan J. Paust,
Self-Executing Treaties, 82 Am. J. Int'l L. 760, 766-68,783 (1988) (contending that almost all treaties
are self-executing); Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and U.S. v. Postal:
Win at Anv Price?, 74 Am. J. Int'l L. 892, 896-97, 900 (1980) (criticizing Fifth Circuit's decision in
United States v. Postal and analyzing methods used to determine if treaty is self-executing); Carlos
Manuel Vizquez, The Four Doctrines ofSelf-Executing Treaties, 89 Am. J. Int'l L. 695,695-96,704-05
(1995) (contending that there are four distinct doctrines of self-execution and analyzing those doctrines).
75. See Restatement (Third) ofthe Foreign Relations Law ofthe United States § 111 (1987) (stating
that treaty is non-self-executing if it "manifests an intention that it shall not become effective as
domestic law without the enactment of implementing legislation").
76. There is no implementing legislation for the ICCPR or the Race Convention. There is
implementing legislation for the Torture Convention, see supra note 35, but it merely addresses one
narrow aspect of that Convention. It is not designed to implement the Torture Convention as a whole.
See Sloss, supra note 19, at 160-61.
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judicial remedies. This interpretation raises a potential constitutional
problem because the treaties were made under the authority of the United
States, and the Supremacy Clause states explicitly that all treaties made
"under the authority of the United States" are the supreme law of the land."
Even assuming that the NSE declarations could deprive the treaties of
domestic legal status, that was not the treaty makers' intention. Executive
branch officials repeatedly told the Senate during the ratification process
that, even with the NSE declarations, the ratified treaties would be the
supreme law of the land under the Supremacy Clause.78 Thus, the NSE
declarations notwithstanding, the treaties do create substantive domestic
legal rights (as modified by treaty reservations).7 9
A second possible interpretation is that the NSE declarations prevent
U.S. courts from providing any judicial remedies for violations of treaty
rights. This "no judicial remedies" interpretation is consistent with case law
that distinguishes between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties on
the basis of separation-of-powers principles.8" Under this interpretation, the
77. U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2. This author does not wish to suggest that the NSE declarations, under
this interpretation, would necessarily be unconstitutional. That is an open question. See supra note 67.
However, "if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the
other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter."
Aswhander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288,347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). This well-established principle
supports a construction of the NSE declarations that is consistent with the proposition that the treaties
have domestic legal status as supreme law of the land.
78. See International Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms ofRacial Discrimination: Hearing
Before the Sen. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 103d Cong. 103-659, at 18 (1994) [hereinafter Race
Hearing] (statement of Conrad Harper, State Department Legal Adviser) (stating that, although Race
Convention is not self-executing, "[u]nderArticle VI, Clause 2 of the Constitution, duly ratified treaties
become the supreme law of the land, equivalent to a federal statute"); International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 102d Cong. 102-478, at 80
(1992) [hereinafter ICCPR Hearing] (containing executive branch response to written questions
submitted by Senator Helms) ("Under the Supremacy Clause, ratified treaties are the law of the land,
equivalent to federal statutes .... Consequently, properly ratified treaties can and do supersede
inconsistent domestic law."); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment orPunishment, HearingBefore the Sen. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 101st Cong. 101-718,
at42 (1990) [hereinafter Torture Hearing], at42 (statement ofAbraham Sofaer, State Department Legal
Adviser) ("If you adopt this treaty, it is not just international law. The standard becomes part of our
law.').
79. See United States v. Duarte-Acero, 208 F.3d 1282, 1284 (1 th Cir. 2000) (stating that ICCPR is
"the supreme law of the land, despiteNSE declaration); Maria v. McElroy, 68 F. Supp. 2d 206, 231-32
(E.D.N.Y. 1999) ("Although the ICCPR is not self-executing, it is an international obligation of the
United States and constitutes a law of the land.") (citations omitted).
80. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (noting NSE treaties are addressed "to the
political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the [treaty] before it can become a
rule for the Court").
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treaties create substantive domestic legal rights, but treaty implementation is
strictly an executive branch function (absent implementing legislation), and
the judicial branch is not authorized to provide remedies for treaty
violations.8 There are some statements in the Senate record that support this
construction of the NSE declarations.82 However, this interpretation also
poses a potential constitutional problem, insofar as it ostensibly bars judicial
remedies for defendants in state courts.
A third possible interpretation is that the NSE declarations merely
preclude litigants from relying on the treaties to establish a private right of
action. This is the "no private right of action" concept. This interpretation is
consistent with judicial opinions that distinguish between self-executing and
non-self-executing treaties on the grounds that non-self-executing treaties
do not create a private cause of action.84 There are also statements in the
81. The "no judicial remedies" interpretation does not mean that there are no remedies for treaty
violations. For example, consider a hypothetical alien in an INS removal proceeding who claims that
deportation would violate his right, under Article 3 of the Torture Convention, not to be deported to a
"[s]tate where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected
to torture." Torture Convention, supra note 14, art. 3, 1. Assuming that the alien, as a factual matter,
has a valid treaty claim, the presiding immigration judge, who is an executive branch officer, see 8
C.F.R. §§ 1.1 (l), 3.0 (1998), would have the authority under the "no judicial remedies" concept to block
deportation to carry out the U.S. treaty obligation. More broadly, the "no judicial remedies" concept is
consistent with administrative enforcement of U.S. treaty obligations. See Frank C. Newman, United
Nations Human Rights Covenants and the United States Government: Diluted Promises. Foreseeable
Futures, 42 DePaul L. Rev. 1241, 1244-47 (1993) (contending that NSE declaration does not preclude
administrative enforcement of ICCPR).
82. See Sloss, supra note 19, at 157-67.
83. Assuming that human rights treaties are the "Law ofthe Land" under the Supremacy Clause, that
Clause, which specifies that "judges in every state shall be bound" by treaties, U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2,
may require state courtjudges to provide remedies for defendants whose treaty rights have been violated.
See John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 Yale L.J. 87, 88 (1999)
("Indeed, it may be that the only constitutionally mandatory... remedial scheme is the right of a target
ofgovemment prosecution or enforcement to defend against that action on the ground that it violates the
superior law of the Constitution."). Although Professor Jeffries is concerned primarily with
constitutional rights, the point applies with equal force to state court defendants who allege that state
laws violate superior federal statutory or treaty law because statutues and treaties, like the Constitution,
are supreme federal law.
84. See In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 503 (9th Cir. 1992)
("[N]o private cause of action can ever be implied from a non-self-executing treaty."); Goldstar
(Panama) S.A. v. United States, 967 F.2d 965, 968 (4th Cir. 1992) ("Courts will only find a treaty to be
self-executing if the document, as a whole, evidences an intent to provide a private right of action.");
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) ("Absent
authorizing legislation, an individual has access to courts for enforcement of a treaty's provisions only
when the treaty is self-executing, that is, when it expressly or impliedly provides a private right of
action"); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1298 (3d Cir. 1979) ("[U]nless a
treaty is self-executing, it must be implemented by legislation before it gives rise to a private cause of
action"); see also Sloss, supra note 19, at 151 n. 119.
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Senate record that support this interpretation." Under this interpretation,
courts can provide judicial remedies for violations of treaty rights when
litigants invoke the treaties defensively in civil or criminal actions initiated
by the government.86 Moreover, courts can provide judicial remedies to
plaintiffs who rely on federal statutes to provide a right of action forjudicial
enforcement of treaty rights. 7 This interpretation is not problematic from a
constitutional standpoint.
Executive branch explanations of the NSE declarations changed over
time from a "no judicial remedies" concept to a "no private right of action"
concept.8 The Carter Administration, which first proposed the NSE
declarations, said that the declarations precluded any judicial remedies for
violations of treaty rights. 9 But the Senate did not act on the treaties during
the Carter Administration. The Senate consented to ratification of the Race
Convention during the Clinton Administration, which explained the NSE
declaration to the Senate in terms of the "no private right of action"
concept.9" The Senate consented to ratification of the ICCPR and the
Torture Convention during the Bush Administration.9' The Bush
Administration's explanation of the NSE declarations shifted between a "no
judicial remedies" concept and a "no private right of action" concept.92
Because executive branch explanations of the meaning of the NSE
declarations were not wholly consistent, it is necessary to consider the
purpose of the NSE declarations.
85. See Race Report, supra note 32, at 25-26 ("The intent [of the NSE declaration] is to clarify that
the treaty will not create a new or independently enforceable private cause of action in U.S. courts.");
ICCPRReport, supra note 29, at 19 ("The intent [oftheNSE declaration] is to clarify that the Covenant
will not create a private cause of action in U.S. courts.").
86. See Vfzquez, supra note 8, at 1143-44 (contending that right of action is not necessary to invoke
treaty as defense).
87. See id. at 1146-48 (contending that federal statutes can provide right of action to authorize
judicial remedies for violations of treaty rights). A variant of the "no private right of action" concept
would permit litigants to invoke the treaties defensively, but not offensively. See infra notes 468-77 and
accompanying text.
88. Executive branch explanations are key because the executive branch proposed the NSE
declarations. See Sloss, supra note 19, at 152-71. The Senate merely acquiesced, generally without
commenting on the NSE declarations. See id..
89. See Sloss, supra note 19, at 157-59.
90. See id. at 169-71.
91. See supra notes 29-31.
92. See Sloss, supra note 19, at 161-69.
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2. The Purpose of the Non-Self-Executing Declarations
As noted above, the treaty makers' failure to adopt reservations for all
unique treaty rights poses a dilemma for the judiciary. Ajudicial decision to
provide a remedy for violation of a unique treaty right would be
inconsistent with the treaty makers' policy goal of avoiding changes in
domestic law. But refusal to provide a remedy would be inconsistent with
the goal of ensuring U.S. compliance with its international legal obligations.
Advocates of the "no judicial remedies" interpretation of the NSE
declarations might argue that the treaty makers resolved this dilemma in the
following manner. The treaty makers recognized that-despite their best
efforts to eliminate, by means of reservations, all U.S. obligations to protect
unique treaty rights-they might have failed to adopt a reservation for one
or more unique treaty rights. Recognizing this possibility, and recognizing
the dilemma this would pose for the judiciary, they adopted the NSE
declarations as a means of instructing the judiciary not to provide remedies
for violations of unique treaty rights.93 The treaty makers recognized that
failure to remedy a violation of a unique treaty right would be inconsistent
with the goal of ensuring U.S. compliance with its international legal
obligations.94 But, according to this view, the treaty makers weighed the
trade-offs between the policy goal of ensuring treaty compliance, and the
policy goal of avoiding changes in domestic law, and made a conscious
decision that, in the event of a conflict between the two goals, the goal of
avoiding changes in domestic law should take precedence. The NSE
declarations, construed in accordance with the "no judicial remedies"
concept, manifest this policy choice to preclude judicial remedies for
violations of unique treaty rights.95
93. Implicit in this argument is the assumption that many unique treaty rights would be judicially
enforceable if the United States had not adopted the NSE declarations. That assumption is generally
accurate. See Damrosch, supra note 72, at 516-17 ("It is the assumption of this essay that in [NSE]
declarations of this kind, the Senate has attempted to switch self-executing treaty provisions into the
non-self-executing category."); Sloss, supra note 19, at 153-57.
94. The United States has a general obligation, under each of the treaties, to provide effective
remedies for violations of treaty rights. See Sloss, supra note 19, at 142-44; see also infra notes 465-62
and accompanying text.
95. An alternative defense of the "no judicial remedies" concept is that the NSE declarations were
intended to compel the judiciary to interpret the treaties in accordance with the treaty makers'
understanding that the treaties, as modified by U.S. reservations, do not protect any unique rights. The
central difficulty with this explanation is that treaty interpretation is primarily ajudicial function, not a
legislative or executive function. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803) ("It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."); Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law ofthe United States § Ill cmt. e(1987). Moreover, insofaras this
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There are several problems with this explanation. First, nothing in the
Senate record associated with any of the three treaties indicates that the
executive branch, or the Senate, anticipated the possibility that they might
have failed to adopt a reservation for one or more unique treaty rights. To
the contrary, the executive branch repeatedly assured the Senate that the
reservations successfully eliminated any and all obligations to protect
unique treaty rights,96 and the Senate concurred in this assessment.97 The
"no judicial remedies" concept, insofar as it assumes that the NSE
declarations were intended to preclude judicial remedies for violations of
unique treaty rights, cannot be reconciled with the treaty makers' stated
view that the reservations successfully eliminated any obligation to protect
unique treaty rights. It makes no sense to argue that the treaty makers
intended to preclude remedies for violations of unique treaty rights when
the treaty makers stated repeatedly that there were no such rights under the
treaties, as modified by the reservations.
Second, nothing in the Senate record indicates either that the executive
branch or the Senate believed that the NSE declarations were inconsistent
with the goal of ensuring U.S. compliance with its treaty obligations. To the
contrary,-the executive branch emphasized that the NSE declarations would
not affect treaty compliance.98 Moreover, nothing in the Senate record
explanation relies on the political branches to make a generalized assessment of the relationship between
treaty rights and U.S. law, it is also inconsistent with the treaty obligation to ensure that each person who
claims a right to a remedy for an alleged treaty violation receives an individual hearing before an
impartial tribunal. See infra note 465.
96. See Race Report, supra note 32, at 25-26 (stating that "existing U.S. law provides extensive
protections and remedies sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the present Convention" as modified by
reservations); ICCPR Report, supra note 30, at 10 (suggesting that United States can rely on preexisting
domestic law to fulfill its obligations under treaty provisions for which Administration did not propose
reservation); Torture Report, supra note 28, at 13-28 (explaining in detail how pre-existing U.S. law
satisfies virtually every provision of Convention, and how U.S. reservations would eliminate any
discrepancies between treaty requirements and U.S. law); Carter Message, supra note 27, at vi (stating
that proposed reservations "are designed to harmonize the treaties with existing provisions of domestic
law"); see also Sloss, supra note 19, at 183-88 (analyzing Senate record).
97. See ICCPR Report, supra note 30, at4 (expressing Senate Foreign Relations Committee's view
that the Administration's proposed reservations successfully harmonized the ICCPR requirements with
preexisting domestic law); Torture Report, supra note 28, at 4 (expressing Senate Foreign Relations
Committee's belief that reservations "resolve fully any potential conflicts between the Convention and
U.S. law"); see also supra note 52 (statement of Senator Moynihan).
98. See ICCPR Hearing, supra note 78, at 71 (statement of William T. Lake, Member, Board of
Directors, International Human Rights Law Group) (explaining, in response to question from Senator
Sarbanes, that non-self-executing declaration "is not a matter of our international obligation, it ... is a
domestic matter"); International Human Rights Treaties: Hearings Before the Sen. Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 96th Cong. 29-30 (1979) [hereinafter Carter Hearings] (statement of Roberts B. Owen, Legal
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indicates that the treaty makers made a conscious choice to elevate the goal
of avoiding changes in domestic law above the goal of treaty compliance."
In fact, there is at least some evidence in the Senate record to support the
opposite inference: that treaty compliance was the most important goal."°
Advisor, U.S. Department of State) (saying that NSE declarations "would not derogate from or diminish
in any way our international obligations under the treaties"); Race Report, supra note 32, at 26
("Declaring the Convention to be non-self-executing in no way lessens the obligation of the United
States to comply with its provisions as a matter of international law.").
99. Executive branch explanations ofthe NSE declarations that conform to the "nojudicial remedies"
concept were provided in conjunction with assurances that the reservations eliminated all U.S.
obligations to protect unique treaty rights. See supra note 96. Therefore, those statements do not support
an inference that the treaty makers purposefully downgraded the goal of treaty compliance.
100. Both the ICCPR and the Race Convention contain "hate speech" provisions that obligate the
United States to ban speech that is protected by the First Amendment. See ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 20,
] 2 (obligating parties to ban "advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred"); Race Convention, supra
note 15, art. 4(b) (obligating parties to ban organizations "which promote and incite racial
discrimination"). The United States adopted reservations for both provisions. See 140 Cong. Rec. 14326
(1994) (Race Convention); 138 Cong. Rec. 8070 (1992) (ICCPR). Because the Constitution takes
precedence over a treaty, see Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ Ill cmt. a (1987), treaties could not, as a matter of domestic law, authorize the United States to ban
speech that is protected by the First Amendment. Thus, even if the United States had not adopted
reservations for the hate speech provisions, those provisions would not have had any domestic legal
effect, because they would have been trumped by the First Amendment. Therefore, unlike most of the
other reservations, which were designed to satisfy the twin goals of treaty compliance and avoiding
changes in domestic law, see supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text, the hate speech reservations are
relevant only to the goal of treaty compliance, not to the goal of avoiding changes in domestic law.
Even so, the Carter, Bush, and Clinton administrations all characterized the hate speech reservations as
being essential. See Race Hearing, supra note 78, at 17 (statement of Conrad K. Harper, Legal Advisor,
U.S. Department of State) (saying that hate speech reservation "is required by the First Amendment")
(emphasis added); ICCPR Hearing, supra note 78, at 18 (statement of Richard Schifter, Assistant
Secretary of State For Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs) (saying that "[i]t is axiomatic that the
United States cannot agree in a treaty to an unconstitutional obligation" and that "[iv]e must" reserve on
the hate speech provision) (emphasis added); Carter Hearings, supra note 98, at 42 (statement of Roberts
B. Owen, Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State) (calling hate-speech reservations "absolutely
essential in order to avoid conflicts with our own Constitution") (emphasis added). In fact, the hate-
speech reservations are neither "essential" nor "required," nor is it "axiomatic" that they are needed,
unless one assumes that the goal of treaty compliance is sacrosanct.
Whereas every administration characterized the hate speech reservations as being essential, they
typically characterized the other reservations as merely desirable. See Race Hearing, supra note 78, at 18
(statement of Conrad K. Harper, Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State) (characterizing one other
proposed reservation as "prudent," but not necessary); Carter Hearings, supra note 98, at 42 (statement
of Roberts B. Owen, Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State) (stating that free-speech reservations
were essential, then adding: "As to the other reservations, if the Senate should decide that they are not
necessary, I think the administration would be willing to dispense with them. Then we would be, in
effect, bringing about a more rigorous civil rights regime."). The characterization of other reservations as
merely desirable is significant because failure to adopt the other reservations, unlike the hate-speech
reservations, could have compromised the goal of avoiding changes in domestic law. See supra note 65
and accompanying text. Thus, executive branch statements about the reservations support the inference
that the goal of treaty compliance was paramount.
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Insofar as the "no judicial remedies" concept assumes that the NSE
declarations manifest the treaty makers' intent to subordinate the policy
goal of treaty compliance, that concept cannot be reconciled with the
evidence from the Senate record showing that treaty compliance was of
paramount concem.'0 '
Third, there is no evidence to support the proposition that the treaty
makers weighed the trade-offs between the policy goal of ensuring treaty
compliance and the policy goal of avoiding changes in domestic law, or that
they made a conscious policy choice to accord priority to the latter goal by
precluding judicial remedies for violations of unique treaty rights. Indeed,
the treaty makers had no reason to decide whether to permit judicial
remedies for violations of unique treaty rights, because they consistently
maintained that the reservations eliminated any obligation to protect unique
treaty rights."0 2 Moreover, any explicit decision to allow or not to allow
judicial remedies for violations of unique treaty rights would have upset the
delicate political balance that permitted ratification to proceed. On the one
hand, an explicit decision not to permit such judicial remedies would have
been inconsistent with the goal of treaty compliance and would have
jeopardized the support of senators who believed, as a matter of principle,
that the United States should not ratify any treaty with which it is not
prepared to comply. On the other hand, an explicit decision to permit such
judicial remedies would have been inconsistent with the goal of avoiding
changes in domestic law and would have jeopardized the support of
senators who believed, as a matter of principle, that human rights treaties
should not be used to effect domestic legal reform. So the treaty makers
ducked the issue. They refused to decide whether to permit judicial
remedies for violations of unique treaty rights, because any explicit decision
might have doomed the prospects for ratification.'0 3
For a more detailed examination of the Senate record as it relates to this point, see Sloss, supra note
19, at 178-83.
101. The treaty makers' intent to comply fully with human rights treaties is also manifest in an
executive order adopted in 1998. See Implementation of Human Rights Treaties, Exec. Order No.
13,107, 3 C.F.R. § 234, (1998) ("It shall be the policy and practice of the Government of the United
States, being committed to the protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms,
fully to respect and implement its obligations under the international human rights treaties to which it is
a party .... ").
102. See supra notes 50-52, 96-97 and accompanying text.
103. It has been widely observed that Congress uses purposeful ambiguity as a tool for building
consensus in support of controversial legislation. See Kristy L. Carroll, Whose Statute Is It Anyway?:
Why and How Courts Should Use Presidential Signing Statements when Interpreting Federal Statutes,
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If the NSE declarations were not intended to preclude judicial remedies
for violations of unique treaty rights, one might ask, what possible purpose
could they serve? To understand the purpose of the NSE declarations, one
must view the declarations from the perspective of the treaty makers, who
believed, or acted as if they believed,"° that the reservations had success-
fully extinguished all U.S. obligations to protect unique treaty rights. If that
belief was accurate, then the distinction between the "no judicial remedies"
concept and the "no private right of action" concept would be a distinction
without a difference, because the NSE declarations would have no practical
effect."5 Even under the "no judicial remedies" concept, the NSE
declarations would merely preclude judicial remedies for violations of
redundant treaty rights, which would be protected by other provisions of
federal law. And that is precisely how the executive branch explained the
effect of the NSE declarations to the Senate. The executive branch told the
Senate that the NSE declarations were entirely consistent with U.S. treaty
46 Cath. U. L. Rev. 475, 486 (1997) (noting that statutory ambiguity is often result of deliberate
compromise); Miriam R. Jorgensen & Kenneth A. Shepsle,A Comment on the Positive Canons Project,
57 Law & Contemp. Probs. 43,45 (1994) (noting that deliberate inconsistencies in statutes are "evidence
of the absence of coherence among members of the enacting coalition... [that give] the courts a free
shot at policymaking"); Abner J. Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr's Observations, 1987 Duke L.J. 380,
380-81 (1987) (contending that statutory ambiguity results from trying to get 535 "prima donnas ... to
agree on a single set of words"); see also Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467
U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (suggesting that statutory ambiguity in environmental statute may have resulted
from Congress' inability "to forge a coalition on either side of the question"). Thus, it should not be
surprising that the Senate and the executive branch, acting in their treaty making roles, would adopt a
strategy of deliberate ambiguity to build a consensus in favor of treaty ratification.
104. The treaty makers' statements consistently expressed the view that the reservations had
eliminated any and all U.S. obligations to protect unique treaty rights, thereby enabling the United States
to fulfill its treaty obligations without changing domestic law. See supra notes 50-52 and 96-97 and
accompanying text. Whether they actually believed those statements is a different matter. But the
possibility that they may not have believed their own statements simply reinforces the point that to
obtain a consensus in favor of ratification it was necessary to maintain the fiction of complete harmony
between treaty obligations and pre-existing domestic law, along with its logical corollary: the fiction that
there was no conflict between the goal of treaty compliance and the goal of avoiding changes in
domestic law.
105. One could argue that a key difference between the "no judicial remedies" concept and the "no
private right of action" concept is that the former enables courts to avoid protracted litigation over
redundant and frivolous treaty-based claims, whereas the latter requires expenditure ofjudicial resources
to resolve such claims. Hence, the distinction between the two concepts does have an impact on the
courts. However, if all treaty rights were truly redundant, the NSE declarations would not affect the
outcome of litigation because plaintiffs with meritorious treaty claims could prevail on the basis of
redundant federal rights. Moreover, even under the "no private right of action" concept, this author is
confident that courts will be able to filter out redundant and frivolous treaty-based claims with only a
minimal expenditure ofjudicial resources.
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obligations,' 6 because redundant provisions of federal law ensured the
protection of treaty rights.'07 Thus, the message implicit in executive branch
statements to the Senate was that the NSE declarations were not intended to
have any practical effect.0 8
This does not mean, however, that courts are free to disregard the NSE
declarations. '09 In construing the declarations, courts should recognize that
the treaty makers refused to decide, as a general matter, whether to permit
judicial remedies for violations of unique treaty rights. By ducking the
issue, the treaty makers effectively delegated to the judiciary the task of
deciding, on a more particularized basis, whether to provide judicial
remedies in specific types of cases. Ultimately, the "no judicial remedies"
construction of the NSE declarations is untenable, because it is inconsistent
with the treaty makers' tacit delegation of authority to the judicial branch.
In contrast, the "no private right of action" concept is consistent with the
treaty makers' intent, because it enables the judiciary to decide, on a more
particularized basis, when to provide judicial remedies for violations of
unique treaty rights.
The "no private right of action" construction of the NSE declarations
gives ample guidance to the judiciary about how to proceed. Courts should
not provide remedies in cases where plaintiffs seek to invoke the treaties to
provide a private right of action because that would be inconsistent with the
NSE declarations. However, in cases where plaintiffs invoke other remedial
provisions of federal law to provide a cause of action for violations of
unique treaty rights, the courts must examine the particular remedial
provision to determine whether the right of action it provides is sufficiently
broad to encompass suits for violations of unique treaty rights. Executive
branch statements to the Senate indicating that the United States would rely
106. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
108. The executive branch never stated this explicitly because any such explicit statement might have
thwarted the overriding political purpose oftheNSE declarations: to forestall conservative opposition to
treaty ratification.
109. As noted above, some commentators have argued that courts should disregard the NSE
declarations either because they are unconstitutional or because they are not legally binding. See supra
notes 67-68 and accompanying text. This author's conclusion that courts cannot disregard the NSE
declarations assumes (1) that theNSE declarations, construed in accordancewith the"no private rightof
action" interpretation, are constitutional, and (2) that courts should apply the treaties in a manner that is
consistent with the treaty makers' intent, as manifest in the NSE declarations, regardless of whether
those declarations are legally binding. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
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on other provisions of federal law to ensure compliance with its treaty
obligations " ' support this overall approach.
The remainder of this Article assumes that the "no private right of
action" concept is the best interpretation of the NSE declarations." ' Part III
analyzes particular federal statutes to determine whether, and to what
extent, they provide an express right of action against government officers
for violations of unique treaty rights. Part IV considers whether the doctrine
associated with Ex parte Young provides an implied right of action for
prospective relief against state and local government officers who commit
violations of unique treaty rights.
III. EXPRESS STATUTORY RIGHTS OF ACTION AGAINST
GOVERNMENT OFFICERS
Part III examines three federal statutes that could potentially provide
plaintiffs a private right of action to obtain judicial remedies for violations
of unique treaty rights by government officers: the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA)"' the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)," 3 and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. '4 The first three sections of Part III do not criticize current
interpretations of these statutes, nor do they advocate changes to existing
judicial doctrine. Rather, the first three sections analyze how these statutes,
110. See, e.g., Race Report, supra note 32, at 25 (stating that it is unnecessary to create new private
cause of action because "existing U.S. law provides extensive protections and remedies sufficient to
satisfy the requirements of the present Convention. Moreover, federal, state and local laws already
provide a comprehensive basis for challenging discriminatory statutes, regulations and other
governmental actions in court.").
111. Part IV.D.3 distinguishes three different versions ofthe "no private right ofaction" concept, and
considers the pros and cons of each version.
112. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1998) (establishing jurisdiction of federal courts for FTCA
claims); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1994) (establishing procedure for bringing FTCA claims).
113. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1994).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). There are other federal statutes that could also potentially provide
plaintiffs a private right of action for violations of unique treaty rights by government officers. For
example, a prisoner may obtain a writ of habeas corpus if "[h]e is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (c)(3) (1994) (emphasis added).
The Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994), may provide a right of action for aliens to sue U.S.
officials who commit human rights treaty violations. See infra note 218. The Declaratory Judgment Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994), may also provide a remedy in some cases. See infra note 377. It is beyond the
scope of this Article to consider every possible federal statute that might provide a private cause of
action for individual victims of human rights treaty violations. This Article focuses on the FTCA, the
APA, and § 1983 because these are the three principal federal statutes available to U.S. citizens who
seek a judicial remedy for unlawful conduct by government officers.
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as currently interpreted, would apply to claims alleging human rights treaty
violations by government officers.
The analysis shows, first, that the FTCA does not provide a cause of
action for treaty violations per se, but that unique treaty rights could still
affect the outcome of an FTCA suit by providing plaintiffs with a reply to a
defense of official authority. Second, the APA does provide plaintiffs a
private cause of action for injunctive relief against federal officers who
violate their unique treaty rights. Third, § 1983 does not provide plaintiffs a
cause of action against state or local officers who violate their unique treaty
rights. The final section of Part III contends that, insofar as the APA
provides a federal cause of action for injunctive relief against federal
officers who violate treaty rights, there is no persuasive policy justification
for denying plaintiffs a federal cause of action for injunctive relief against
state and local officers who violate their unique treaty rights.
A. The Federal Tort Claims Act
The FTCA provides a right of action for plaintiffs to obtain money
damages from the United States for torts committed by federal government
officers." 5 The FTCA is the principal remedial mechanism available to
plaintiffs who seek money damages for non-constitutional torts committed
by federal officers; plaintiffs generally utilize actions for constitutional torts
derived from Bivens v. Six Unknown NamedAgents of the Federal Bureau
of Narcotics."6 In an FTCA action, the substantive law governing the
defendant's liability is "the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred.."".7 Torts committed outside the United States are not actionable
under the FTCA."8 Thus, in FTCA suits, plaintiffs cannot raise international
115. See generally Shepard's Editorial Staff, CivilActions Against the United States, Its Agencies,
Officers, and Employees §§ 2.1-2.128 (2d ed. 1992) [hereinafter CivilActions].
116. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In Bivens, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a cause of action for money
damages against individual federal officers who violate a plaintiff's constitutional rights. See generally
Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 567-89 (3d ed. 1999); Richard H. Fallon et al., Hart &
Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 849-77 (4th ed. 1996) [hereinafter Hart &
Wechsler]. The Bivens cause ofaction is available only for constitutional torts. See Chemerinsky, supra,
at 569. Therefore, plaintiffs cannot utilize Bivens actions to raise international human rights claims, as
such. Ofcourse, plaintiffs can raise analogous claims underBivens, insofar as the alleged international
human rights violation is also a constitutional violation.
117. 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1994).
118. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1994).
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human rights claims per se, because courts must look to state tort law to
determine liability.
Even so, there are cases in which human rights treaties could determine
the outcome of an FTCA suit. Suppose that a male guard at an INS
detention facility conducted a visual strip search of a female detainee." 9 In
this hypothetical case, the female detainee brought an FTCA claim for
invasion of privacy. 20 Since invasion of privacy is now a recognized tort in
most states,' 2' the male guard's conduct was probably tortious, disregarding
defenses, under "the law of the place where the act or omission occurred."'1
2
Assume that the plaintiff complied with the various procedural requirements
imposed by the FTCA.12 The claim is not barred by the intentional tort
exception to the FTCA. 24 Nor is it barred by the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (PLRA),15 because INS detainees are not "prisoners," as defined by the
PLRA, unless they have been accused of a crime.'26
119. See Jama v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 22 F. Supp. 2d 353, 359-60 (D.N.J. 1998)
(involving suit by INS detainees who alleged, inter alia, that guards "performed strip searches and body
cavity searches in a manner designed to degrade and humiliate plaintiffs").
120. A Bivens claim may or may not succeed in such a case. Courts have not specifically addressed
the legality of cross-gender strip searches in INS facilities, but they have addressed the issue in the
prison context. See generally Karoline E. Jackson, Note, The Legitimacy of Cross-Gender Searches and
Surveillance in Prisons: Defining an Appropriate and Uniform Review, 73 Ind. L.J. 959 (1998). Judicial
authority is divided on the issue, but at least some courts have indicated that allegations of cross-gender
strip searches, without more, are insufficient to state a claim for a constitutional violation. See Peckham
v. Wisconsin Dep't ofCorrections, 141 F.3d 694,697 (7th Cir. 1998) (upholding summary judgment for
defendants where female prisoner was strip-searched by female guard in presence of male guard and
stating that "it is difficult to conjure up too many real-life scenarios where prison strip searches of
inmates could be said to be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment"); Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d
144, 150 (7th Cir. 1995) (affirming dismissal for failure to state claim of lawsuit based on monitoring of
naked male prisoners by female guards and stating that "[tihe fourth amendment does not protect privacy
interests within prisons").
121. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A cmt. a (1977) (stating that "a right of privacy is now
recognized in the great majority of the American jurisdictions that have considered the question"); id.
§ 652B ("One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of
another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if
the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.").
122. 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1994).
123. See generally Civil Actions, supra note 115, §§ 2.74-2.94.
124. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1994) (barring FTCA claims for "assault, battery, false imprisonment, false
arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference
with contract rights").
125. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995,42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (Supp. IV 1998) ("No Federal civil
action may be brought by a prisoner confined in ajail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or
emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.").
126. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h) (Supp. IV 1998) (defining
"prisoner" to mean "any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of,
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A defendant would presumably claim official authority as a defense.'27
The plaintiff could then argue, in reply to the defense, that the male guard
lacked authority to conduct the search, because cross-gender strip searches
violate her treaty right under the ICCPR to "be treated with humanity and
with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person."'28 If the court
agreed with the plaintiffs interpretation of the treaty, then the ICCPR
would effectively determine the outcome of the case. The plaintiffs
invocation of the ICCPR in reply to a defense would not be inconsistent
with the treaty makers' intent in adopting the NSE declarations, because the
plaintiff would not be relying on the ICCPR to establish a private cause of
action.
In short, plaintiffs cannot raise international human rights claims per se
under the FTCA. Nevertheless, where a federal officer commits a violation
of a unique treaty right, and where the officer's conduct is tortious under
state tort law, plaintiffs may be able to utilize the FTCA to obtain ajudicial
remedy for the treaty violation by invoking the unique treaty right as a reply
to a defense of official authority.
B. The Administrative Procedure Act
U.S. citizens who allege that federal officers have violated rights
protected by human rights treaties, and who seek relief other than money
damages, could bring a claim under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA).'29 The APA provides a cause of action for relief other than money
damages for any "person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of
parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program").
127. A defendant might also argue that plaintiffs claim is barred because the male guard was
"exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation," or because he was performing a
"discretionary function." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). This hypothetical assumes that these arguments would be
rejected, although one or both of the arguments might succeed in some cases.
128. ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 10, 1. The legality of cross-gender strip searches under Article
10(1) is not altogether clear. However, the Human Rights Committee has criticized the United States for
allowing "male prison officers access to women's detention centres," and has indicated that Article 10 of
the ICCPR may require amendment of "[e]xisting legislation that allows male officers access to
women's quarters." See U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 53d Sess., 1413th mtg. 1 20,34, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add. 50 (1995); see also Martin A. Geer, Human Rights and Wrongs in Our Own
Backyard: IncorporatingInternational Human Rights Protections UnderDomestic Civil Rights Law-A
Case Study of Women in United States Prisons, 13 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 71, 111-14 (2000).
129. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1994).
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adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
relevant statute."'
30
Consider a group of inmates in a federal maximum security prison who
have been placed in solitary confinement for an indefinite period due to
gang-related activity.' 3' In this hypothetical case, the prisoners concede that
their solitary confinement does not violate the Eighth Amendment,3 2 but
they seek declaratory and injunctive relief against prison officials under the
APA, claiming that prolonged solitary confinement, under the conditions in
U.S. maximum-security prisons, would be a violation of their treaty right to
"be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the
human person.' ' 3  Assume that the prisoners exhausted their administrative
remedies,'34 and that the Federal Bureau of Prisons issued an order
constituting "final agency action,"'35 which denied the relief the prisoners
sought. Insofar as they seek only declaratory and injunctive relief, and not
money damages, their claim is not barred by the Prison Litigation Reform
Act.
136
130. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (emphasis added); see Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478
U.S. 221, 230 n.4 (1986) (stating that APA creates private right of action).
131. See, e.g., Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1227-28 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (describing
assignment of 600 inmates affiliated with prison gang to special security unit "indefinitely up to the
maximum length of their sentence which, for some prisoners, may mean 10 or 15 years, or the duration
of their life").
132. Although solitary confinement may, in some cases, be unconstitutional, U.S. courts have
generally held "that the imposition of solitary confinement, without more, does not violate the Eighth
Amendment." Michael B. Mushlin, Rights of Prisoners § 2.02 (2d ed. 1993).
133. ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 10, $ 1. Due to the stringent standards imposed under Article 10(1),
see supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text, solitary confinement conditions that would pass
constitutional muster might well be deemed a violation of U.S. treaty obligations. See U.N. GAOR,
Hum. Rts. Comm., 53d Sess., 1413th mtg. 20, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 50 (1995) (stating, in
reference to practice of solitary confinement in United States, that "the conditions ofdetention in certain
maximum security prisons... are incompatible with article 10 of the Covenant."); see also Nan D.
Miller, International Protection ofthe Rights of Prisoners: Is Solitary Confinement in the United States
a Violation ofInternational Standards?, 26 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 139, 155-60, 168 (1995) (describing
practice of solitary confinement in super maximum-security prisons in United States, and concluding
that "solitary confinement as used in the United States... [is] a violation of the international
standards").
134. "A plaintiffgenerally must exhaust all prescribed administrative remedies before seekingjudicial
review of agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act." CivilActions, supra note 115, § 6.26.
135. Agency action is subject to judicial review under the APA only if it is "made reviewable by
statute" or if it is "final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court." 5 U.S.C.
§ 704 (1994). Since there is no statute that makes international human rights claims by U.S. citizens
reviewable, plaintiffs who seek APA review must plead and prove "final agency action."
136. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (Supp. IV 1998) ("No Federal civil action may be brought by a
prisoner confined in jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered
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To state a claim under the APA, the prisoners must show, inter alia, that
violation of a treaty right constitutes a "legal wrong" within the meaning of
the APA.'37 A treaty is essentially equivalent to a federal statute.'38
Therefore, there are strong grounds for contending that violation of a treaty
right also constitutes a legal wrong within the meaning of the APA.
Although there is scant judicial authority directly on point, the few courts
that have addressed the issue agree that a violation of a treaty right is a
cognizable legal wrong under the APA. 3 9
Assuming that violation of a treaty right constitutes a "legal wrong"
within the meaning of the APA, there are three distinct arguments that the
defendant prison officials in the preceding hypothetical might raise against
while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury."). Every federal appellate court that has
addressed the issue has concluded that this provision limits damages remedies, but does not impair a
prisoner's right to seek declaratory or injunctive relief. See infra notes 476-74 and accompanying text.
137. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994) (referring to a "person suffering legal wrong because of agency action.").
Alternatively, the hypothetical prisoners might argue that they are "adversely affected or aggrieved by
agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute." 5 U.S.C. § 702. However, since the substantive
law that they claim has been violated is a treaty, not a statute, the argument that they have suffered a
"legal wrong" is more persuasive.
138. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) ("By the Constitution a treaty is placed on
the same footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of legislation. Both are declared by that
instrument to be the supreme law of the land, and no superior efficacy is given to either over the other.").
The statement that treaties and statutes are equivalent is often qualified by the caveat that the treaty must
be self-executing. Although human rights treaties are not self-executing, in the sense that they do not
create a private cause of action, they are still equivalent to statutes because they are the law of the land
under the Supremacy Clause. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
139. See Sohappy v. Hodel, 911 F.2d 1312, 1316-20 (9th Cir. 1990) (reversing district court's grant
of summary judgment in favor of defendants where Indian plaintiffs claimed that Bureau of Indian
Affairs regulation was "invalid because it contradicts the 1855 treaties" and other laws); Makah Indian
Tribe v. Verity, 910 F.2d 555, 557, 561 (9th Cir. 1990) (upholding judicial review under APA where
Indian tribe challenged federal regulations that allegedly interfered with treaty-protected fishing rights);
Rainbow Navigation, Inc. v. Department ofNavy, 686 F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1988) (granting preliminary
injunction to U.S. company that raised APA claim that Navy procurement violated bilateral treaty
between United States and Iceland); see also Vlzquez, supra note 8, at 1148 ("[T]he APA has been read
by the courts to authorize judicial review of federal agency action that allegedly violates a treaty.").
In Haitian Refugee Center, Inc v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498 (11 th Cir. 1992), the Eleventh Circuit rejected
an APA claim by Haitian refugees who alleged violations of Article 33 of the United Nations Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees. The Court held that judicial review was unavailable under the APA,
see id. at 1505-09, because "statutes preclude judicial review" and because the challenged action was
"committed to agency discretion by law." Id. at 1505 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1), (2) (1994)).
However, the court's opinion is consistent with the proposition that a violation of Article 33 is a "legal
wrong" within the meaning of the APA. See Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, The "Self-Executing" Character
of the Refugee Protocol's Nonrefoulement Obligation, 7 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 39, 64 (1993) ("Because
Article 33 is the law of the land, agency action that violates that provision inflicts a 'legal wrong' and
entitles persons 'adversely affected or aggrieved by such action' to judicial review thereof").
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judicial review of the prisoners' claims under the APA: (1) the NSE
declarations preclude judicial review, 4 ' (2) agency action is committed to
agency discretion by law, 4 ' or (3) the prisoners are not within the zone of
interests protected by the treaty. 
142
1. Non-Self-Executing Declarations Do Not Preclude Judicial Review
Judicial review of agency action is prohibited under the APA if "statutes
preclude judicial review."'43 Defendants might argue that the NSE
declarations are part of the treaties, that they are therefore legally equivalent
to a statute, and that they manifest the treaty makers' intent to preclude
judicial review of alleged violations of unique treaty rights. There are two
distinct problems with such arguments. First, several commentators have
noted that the NSE declarations are not part of the treaties and therefore do
not have the force of law.'" Second, even assuming that the NSE
declarations do have the force of law, they do not manifest an intention to
preclude judicial review of alleged violations of unique treaty rights.
In evaluating claims under the APA, there is a "strong presumption that
Congress intends judicial review of administrative action."' 145 When it
adopted the APA, the House Judiciary Committee said that, to preclude
judicial review under the APA, "a statute, if not specific in withholding
such review, must upon its face give clear and convincing evidence of an
intent to withhold it. The mere failure to provide specially by statute for
judicial review is certainly no evidence of intent to withhold review."' 4 6 The
Senate record provides clear and convincing evidence that the NSE
declarations were intended to preclude reliance on the treaties to establish a
private right of action. '47 But careful review of the Senate record associated
with treaty ratification shows that the NSE declarations were not intended
140. See infra notes 143-50 and accompanying text.
141. See infra notes 151-60 and accompanying text.
142. See infra notes 161-66 and accompanying text.
143. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(l) (1994).
144. See supra note 68.
145. Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986).
146. H.R. Rep. No. 79-1980, at 41 (1946) (emphasis added).
147. See supra note 85. That the treaties do not create a private right of action cannot, without more,
preclude judicial review under the APA. Plaintiffs routinely rely upon the APA to provide a remedy for
violations of rights founded upon federal statutes that do not, themselves, create a private right ofaction.
See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1994) (authorizing judicial review of "final agency action for which there is no other
adequate remedy").
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as a complete bar to judicial review of alleged violations of unique treaty
rights' 48 At a minimum, the ostensible evidence that the NSE declarations
were intended to preclude judicial review is not sufficiently clear and
convincing to overcome the presumption in favor ofjudicial review.'49
Apart from the NSE declarations, there are no other "statutes [that]
preclude judicial review"'50 of the hypothetical prisoners' APA claim for
relief from solitary confinement. Therefore, the hypothetical defendants'
argument that "statutes preclude judicial review" should be rejected.
2. Committed to Agency Discretion by Law
Section 701(a)(2) of the APA precludes judicial review of agency action
that "is committed to agency discretion by law."'' This provision has been
construed, for example, to preclude judicial review under the APA of an
agency decision not to institute an enforcement proceeding. 15 2 Thus, despite
the U.S. treaty obligation to prosecute individuals who commit acts of
torture,' a federal prosecutor's decision not to prosecute an alleged torturer
would not be subject to judicial review, because that decision is committed
to agency discretion by law.
The U.S. Supreme Court has construed § 70 1(a)(2) to bar judicial review
"in those rare instances where 'statutes are drawn in such broad terms that
in a given case there is no law to apply.""5 4 The defendants in the preceding
hypothetical might argue that implementation of the treaty obligation to
treat prisoners "with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of
the human person'  is "committed to agency discretion by law," because
148. See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
149. Litigants opposed to judicial review under the APA could certainly find isolated statements in
the Senate record suggesting that the treaty makers intended, by means of the NSE declarations, to
preclude judicial review of treaty-based human rights claims. However, the Senate record, viewed as a
whole, suggests that the treaty makers did not intend to preclude judicial review of alleged violations of
unique treaty rights. See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
150. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (1994).
151. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1994).
152. See Heckler v. Chancy, 470 U.S. 82 1, 828-31 (1985) (holding that decision by Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) not to undertake enforcement actions to prevent alleged violations of Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act was committed to agency discretion by law).
153. See Torture Convention, supra note 14, art. 7.
154. Websterv. Doe, 486 U.S. 592,599 (1988) (quoting S. Rep. No. 79-752, at 26 (1945)); see also
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,410 (1971) (same).
155. ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 10, 1 1.
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the treaty provision is drawn in such broad terms that there is "no law to
apply." This argument is not persuasive. There are dozens of cases in which
the U.N. Human Rights Committee has found violations of the Article 10(1)
obligation to treat prisoners with humanity and respect for their dignity.'56
These include several cases where the violation was based upon conditions
in solitary confinement. 5 7 Hence, the law to apply to the prisoners' claims
in the preceding hypothetical includes not only Article 10(1), which is
admittedly vague, but also the Human Rights Committee's decisions
interpreting that article, which help clarify the scope of the obligation. 5
Because there is law to apply, placing the hypothetical prisoners in solitary
confinement is not an action committed to agency discretion by law, and is
therefore subject to judicial review.
The defendants in the preceding hypothetical might argue that judicial
review is prohibited because responsibility for ensuring U.S. compliance
with its human rights treaty obligations is primarily an executive branch
function, which is committed to agency discretion by law. Granted,
separation of powers principles support the notion that treaty compliance is,
first and foremost, an executive branch responsibility. However, the treaties
themselves do not grant the executive branch sole responsibility for
ensuring treaty compliance. To the contrary, the treaties envision a role for
the judiciary in ensuring that individuals who allege violations of their
treaty rights have an opportunity to be heard.t59 Apart from the treaties,
there is no law that commits responsibility for treaty compliance exclusively
to the executive branch.16 Therefore, it is untenable to claim, as a general
156. See Manfred Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary 186-87
(1993) (citing cases).
157. See id.; see also Miller, supra note 133, at 152-54.
158. Lower federal courts have recognized the Committee's decisions as a source of persuasive
authority for interpreting the ICCPR. See United States v. Duarte-Acero, 208 F.3d 1282, 1287-88 (11 th
Cir. 2000); Maria v. McElroy, 68 F. Supp. 2d 206, 232 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
159. See Torture Convention, supra note 14, art. 13 (obligating parties to "ensure that any individual
who alleges he has been subjected to torture... has the right to complain to, and to have his case
promptly and impartially examined by, its competent authorities"); ICCPRsupra note 13, art. 2,$ (3)(b)
(obligating parties to "ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto
determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities ... and to develop the
possibilities of judicial remedy").
160. Indeed, the Constitution specifically provides that "[t]he judicial power shall extend to all
Cases ... arising under... Treaties made" under the authority of the Constitution. U.S. Const. art. Ill,
§ 2, cl. 2. Although human rights treaties do not create the cause of action for treaty-based human rights
claims brought pursuant to the APA, see American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S.
257, 260 (1916) ("A suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action."), human fights claims
brought pursuant to the APA do "arise under" the treaties in a broader constitutional sense, see Osbom v.
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proposition, that agency action to ensure treaty compliance is "committed to
agency discretion by law."
3. Zone of Interests
To establish standing to sue under the APA, plaintiffs must show that
they are arguably within the zone of interests protected by the statute (or
treaty) establishing the rights they seek to vindicate. 6 ' Defendants in the
preceding hypothetical might argue that the federal prisoners are not within
the zone of interests protected by the ICCPR because the United States
ratified the treaty to advance its foreign policy interests, not to augment
protection for the rights of U.S. citizens. There is no doubt that the primary
rationale offered in favor of U.S. ratification of the human rights treaties
related to U.S. foreign policy interests. 62 Moreover, as noted above, the
executive branch "sold" the treaties to the Senate, in part, by assuring the
Senate that the treaties would not have any impact on domestic law."
Even so, the prisoners in the above hypothetical have standing to sue
under the APA:
[The zone-of-interest test] denies a right of review if the plaintiff's
interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes
implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that
Congress intended to permit the suit. The test is not meant to be
Bank of theUnited States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 738,823 (1824) (holding that claims"arise under" federal
law, for constitutional purposes, whenever federal law "forms an ingredient of the original cause").
Therefore, the contention that treaty compliance is exclusively an executive branch function is contrary
to Article III.
161. See, e.g., National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 488
(1998) ("For a plaintiff to have prudential standing under the APA, 'the interest sought to be protected
by the complainant [must be] arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by
the... statute in question."') (quoting Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 152 (1970)); Air Courier Conference ofnAm. v. American Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517,523
(1991); Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 395-96 (1987).
162. See ICCPR Report, supra note 30, at 25 (stating, in letter from President Bush to Senator Pell,
that U.S. ratification of ICCPR would "strengthen our ability to influence the development of
appropriate human rights principles in the international community and provide an additional and
effective tool in our efforts to improve respect for fundamental freedoms in many problem countries
around the world").
163. See supra notes 50, 51, 96-97 and accompanying text.
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especially demanding; in particular, there need be no indication of
congressional purpose to benefit the would-be plaintiff."6
In short, to satisfy the zone-of-interests test, the hypothetical prisoners need
not show that they were intended beneficiaries of the ICCPR. They need
only show that their interests are not "marginally related to or inconsistent
with the purposes implicit" in the ICCPR.' 65 That criterion is easily
satisfied, because the treaty drafters established a specific right for
individuals, like the hypothetical prisoners, to "be treated with humanity
and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person."1 66 Moreover,
those who ratified the treaty intended that this right would be fully
protected, as evidenced by the fact that they did not adopt a reservation for
Article 10(1). 167 Since their claims are not marginally related to or
inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the ICCPR, the prisoners in the
above hypothetical have standing to sue under the zone-of-interests test.
The Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Cornejo-Barreto v. Seifert 68
supports the conclusion that the APA provides a right of action against
federal officers for violations of unique treaty rights. During an extradition
proceeding, Cornejo-Barreto introduced evidence that he would likely be
tortured if he was extradited to Mexico. 69 He argued, therefore, that
extradition would violate Article 3 of the Torture Convention, which
obligates the United States not to extradite anyone to a country where he is
likely to be tortured. 7 Congress enacted implementing legislation for
Article 3 in 1998 under the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act
(FARR Act).' 7 ' The legislation directed "appropriate agencies" to prescribe
164. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399-400 (emphasis added); see also National Credit Union Admin., 522 U.S.
at 488-92 (emphasizing that it is not necessary to establish legislative intent to benefit plaintiffin order
to pass zone-of-interests test); id. at 505 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that, under majority's
approach, "every litigant who establishes injury in fact under Article III will automatically satisfy the
zone-of-interests requirement").
165. See National Credit Union Admin., 522 U.S. at 505.
166. ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 10, $ 1.
167. As a general matter, the treaty makers intended for the United States to comply with all
provisions for which reservations were not adopted. See Sloss, supra note 19, at 178-83.
168. 218 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2000).
169. See id. at 1007-08.
170. See Torture Convention, supra note 14, art. 3.
171. See Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-
761 [hereinafter FARR Act] (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. and 22 U.S.C.).
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implementing regulations.'72 In 1999, the Secretary of State published the
requisite regulations concerning Article 3's anti-extradition provision. 73
The FARR Act specifically states that "nothing in this section shall be
construed as providing any court jurisdiction to consider or review claims
raised under the Convention."'74 The regulations state explicitly that
"[d]ecisions of the Secretary concerning surrender of fugitives for
extradition are matters of executive discretion not subject to judicial
review."'75 Even so, the Ninth Circuit held that the APA "allows an
individual facing extradition who is making a torture claim to
petition.., for [judicial] review of the Secretary of State's decision to
surrender him."'76 The court reasoned that, although the FARR Act
"prohibits courts from reading an implied cause of action into the statute,"
the Act does not bar judicial review under the APA, because "we can look
to existing jurisdictional statutes to entertain a petition for review under the
APA."'77 The Court held the implementing regulation invalid insofar as it
purported to bar judicial review, concluding that denial of judicial review
"would be contrary to both the statute and the Convention."'
78
Finally, the Court ruled that the NSE declaration was irrelevant in light
of the implementing legislation.179 Implicit in this conclusion is a rejection
of the "no judicial remedies" interpretation of the NSE declaration. If the
NSE declaration is understood to preclude judicial remedies for violations
of the Torture Convention (absent implementing legislation), and Congress
enacts legislation that does not itself provide a judicial remedy, then the
NSE declaration would continue to bar judicial remedies, assuming it is
legally valid. Thus, the court's conclusion that the APA authorizes judicial
review of the Secretary of State's decision to extradite necessarily implies
that the NSE declaration is not a complete bar to judicial remedies for
violations of treaty rights.
172. Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681-822.
173. See 22 C.F.R. § 95 (1999).
174. Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681-822.
175. 22 C.F.R. § 95.4.
176. Comejo-Barreto v. Seifert, 218 F.3d 1004, 1007 (2000).
177. a at 1015.
178. l at 1014.
179. See id. at 1011 n.6 ("Because Congress passed legislation implementing Article 3 of the torture
convention in the extradition context, we need not reach the issue of whether that provision of the treaty
is self-executing.").
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In sum, the APA provides U.S. citizens a right of action against federal
officers for relief other than money damages for violations of unique treaty
rights. A violation of a unique treaty right is a "legal wrong" within the
meaning of the APA. The NSE declarations do not preclude judicial review
of agency action that violates unique treaty rights. In certain cases, such
agency action may be committed to agency discretion by law, but there are
potential cases, such as the preceding hypothetical, in which agency action
is not committed to agency discretion by law. Finally, at least some
plaintiffs whose unique treaty rights are violated are arguably within the
zone of interests protected by the human rights treaties.
C. Section 1983
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs have a right of action for money
damages and specific relief against state and local government officers who
deprive individuals "of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws" of the United States. 8 ' The U.S. Supreme Court has
held that § 1983 provides a right of action not only for violations of federal
constitutional rights, but also for violations of federal statutory rights.' 8' In
so holding, the Court has emphasized that § 1983 "was intended to provide
a remedy, to be broadly construed, against all forms of official violation of
federally protected rights."
'' 82
Treaty rights are federally protected rights, and treaties are supreme
federal law, equivalent to federal statutes.'83 Therefore, there are grounds
for construing the term "laws" in § 1983 to permit a remedy for violations
of at least some treaty rights.'84 Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not
addressed this issue,'85 decisions by lower federal appellate courts are
180. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
18 1. See Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132 (1994); Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S.
498, 508-10 (1990); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of L.A., 493 U.S. 103, 105 (1989); Wright v.
City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418,423 (1987); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1,4-8
(1980).
182. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 4-5 (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 700-01 (1978)).
183. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
184. See Vdzquez, supra note 8, at 1146-47 & n.272 (contending that § 1983 confers fight of action
for violations of treaty-based rights).
185. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998), provides indirect support for the proposition that some
treaty rights are enforceable under § 1983. In Breard, the Consul General of Paraguay brought a § 1983
claim to enforce treaty rights. See id. at 374. The district court rejected defendants' motion to dismiss
that claim, concluding that the Consul General had standing to bring his claim. See Republic of Paraguay
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consistent with the view that § 1983 provides remedies for violations of at
least some treaty rights.186
Not all federal laws, though, create rights that are enforceable under
§ 1983. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized two exceptions to the
general rule that § 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal
statutory rights. First, § 1983 may not be used to remedy federal statutory
violations "where Congress has foreclosed such enforcement of the statute
in the enactment itself."'87 Second, § 1983 does not provide a remedy for
violations of federal statutes "where the statute did not create enforceable
rights, privileges or immunities within the meaning of Sec. 1983. ''I88
Assuming that § 1983 provides a remedy for violations of at least some
treaty rights, and assuming that these two exceptions apply to treaties as
well as statutes, one must inquire whether either of these exceptions would
preclude reliance on § 1983 as a remedy for violations of human rights
treaties.
1. Did the Senate Foreclose Enforcement ofHuman Rights Treaties?
Congress may foreclose a remedy under § 1983 either "expressly, by
forbidding recourse to § 1983 in the statute itself, or impliedly, by creating a
comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual
enforcement under § 1983." '' 9 There is no express provision in any of the
human rights treaties ratified by the United States, or in the Senate
v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269,1274-75 (E.D.Va. 1996). TheU.S. Supreme Court disagreed on the narrow
ground that neither Paraguay nor its Consul General is a "person as that term is used in § 1983." Breard,
523 U.S. at 378. Notably, the U.S. Supreme Court did not adopt the position that § 1983 is inapplicable
to treaty rights.
186. See, e.g., Romero v. Kitsap County, 931 F.2d 624, 627 n.5 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that
deprivations of treaty-based rights are cognizable under § 1983 in "specified circumstances"); United
States v. Washington, 813 F.2d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir. 1987) ("If the State of Washington violates these
now known and well-delineated [treaty] rights, [then that] might give rise to a section 1983 action.");
Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Fish & Game Comm'n, Idaho, 42 F.3d 1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating
that claim of damages for violation of treaty rights may be pursued under § 1983). Butsee Hoopa Valley
Tribe v. Nevins, 881 F.2d 657, 662-63 (9th Cir. 1989) (rejecting treaty-based claim brought under
§ 1983); United States v. Washington, 873 F.2d 240, 241-42 (9th Cir. 1989) (same).
187. Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418,423 (1987).
188. Id.; accord Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997); Wilder v. Virginia Hosp.
Assoc., 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103,
105-07 (1989).
189. Blessing, 520 U.S. at341;see also Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 133 (1994); Golden State
Transit, 493 U.S. at 106.
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resolution of ratification for those treaties, 9° that forbids recourse to § 1983.
Nor did the United States enact, incident to treaty ratification, a
comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with enforcement
under § 1983.191 To the contrary, the executive branch told the Senate that it
intended to rely on other provisions of federal law, including § 1983, to
ensure enforcement of treaty-based rights, 192 and the Senate consented to
ratification on that basis. Therefore, the political branches did not foreclose
a remedy under § 1983 for violations of rights protected under human rights
treaties. 193
2. Do the Treaties Create Enforceable Rights?
The U.S. Supreme Court has considered three factors in assessing
whether a statute creates enforceable rights, privileges or immunities within
the meaning of § 1983:
First, Congress must have intended that the provision in question
benefit the plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
right assertedly protected by the statute is not so "vague and
amorphous" that its enforcement would strain judicial competence.
Third, the statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation on
the States. In other words, the provision giving rise to the asserted
right must be couched in mandatory, rather than precatory, terms. 194
190. See 140 Cong. Rec. 14,326-27 (1994) (Race Convention); 138 Cong. Rec. 8070-71 (1992)
(ICCPR); 136 Cong. Rec. 36,192-93 (1990) (Torture Convention).
191. The United States did not adopt any implementing legislation for the ICCPR or the Race
Convention. It did enact implementing legislation for the Torture Convention, but that legislation was
essentially designed to implement one portion of one article of the Convention. See supra note 76.
192. See Race Report, supra note 32, at 15-17 (citing § 1983 and other statutes in support of
proposition that existing federal law already provides remedies for treaty violations); id. at 14 (stating
that "no new implementing legislation is considered necessary to give effect to the Convention" because
"[e]xisting U.S. constitutional and statutory law and practice provide broad and effective protections
against and remedies for" treaty violations).
193. The test for whether Congress, or in this case the treaty makers, foreclosed a remedy under
§ 1983 is similar to the test under section 701(a)(1) of the APA as to whether statutes preclude judicial
review. See supra notes 143-150 and accompanying text. Other commentators have noted this similarity.
See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 6, at 253-60 (comparing § 1983 with APA). Thus, having concluded
above that statutes do not preclude judicial review under the APA, the conclusion that the treaty makers
did not foreclose a remedy under § 1983 should not be surprising.
194. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340-41 (quoting Wright, 431 U.S. at 432); see also Wilder v. Virginia
Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 509 (1990); Golden State Transit, 493 U.S. at 106.
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To determine how these factors apply to human rights treaties, it is helpful
to consider a concrete example.
On August 3, 1982, Atlanta police officers arrested Michael Hardwick
for engaging in consensual sexual activities with another adult male in the
privacy of his own home. t"5 The U.S. Supreme Court held that the
Constitution does not protect the right of adult homosexuals to engage in
private consensual sexual activity.'96 Suppose that state officers arrested
Michael Hardwick in 1999 for engaging in private consensual sexual
activities. In this hypothetical case, Hardwick filed a § 1983 suit against
various state and local government officials, seeking money damages for
the violation of his right to privacy, which is protected under Article 17 of
the ICCPR 97 Does Article 17 create enforceable rights, privileges, or
immunities within the meaning of § 1983?
Article 17 is not "so vague and amorphous that its enforcement would
strain judicial competence."' 98 It states explicitly: "No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family,
home or correspondence.... ."'99 At least with respect to the right to
privacy, this is far less "vague and amorphous" than the Due Process
Clause, which has formed the basis for some privacy rights under the U.S.
Constitution.2" The Human Rights Committee has had little difficulty
applying Article 17 to specific cases it has adjudicated.2"' The European
Court of Human Rights has frequently applied a very similar provision in
the European Convention on Human Rights to resolve specific
195. See Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1204 (1 th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
196. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-96.
197. As noted above, the Human Rights Committee has held that state sodomy laws violate the
Article 17 right to privacy. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text. The Committee's
interpretation of Article 17 is persuasive authority, but is not binding on U.S. courts. Seesupra note 55.
198. Blessing, 520 U.S. at340-41. Note that the § 1983 test for determining whether a right allegedly
protected by a statute is "so 'vague and amorphous' that its enforcement would strain judicial
competence", id. (quoting Wright, 431 U.S. at430), is similar to the APA test for determining whether a
statute is .'drawn in such broad terms that ... there is no law to apply,"' Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592,
599 (1988) (quoting S. Rep. No. 79-752, at 26 (1945)); see also supra notes 154-57 and accompanying
text.
199. ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 17.
200. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
201. See Nowak, supra note 156, at 294-99 (summarizing cases decided by Human Rights
Committee under Article 17).
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controversies. 2°2 One would have to have an exceedingly low opinion of the
U.S. judiciary to claim that enforcement of Article 17 would "strain judicial
competence."
Article 17 also imposes binding obligations on the states. Article 17, like
many human rights treaty provisions, is "couched in mandatory rather than
precatory terms. 20 3 Moreover, the ICCPR provides explicitly that "[t]he
provisions of the present Covenant shall extend to all parts of federal States
without any limitations or exceptions." The United States did not adopt a
reservation for this provision. Rather, it adopted a so-called
"understanding," stating that "this Covenant shall be implemented by the
Federal Government to the extent that it exercises legislative and judicial
jurisdiction over the matters covered therein, and otherwise by the state and
local governments.""2 5 Thus, the treaty makers stated explicitly that the
Covenant shall be implemented by state and local governments. Moreover,
the fact that the condition is labeled an "understanding" rather than a
"reservation" is significant because "reservations" are intended to modify
treaty obligations, whereas "understandings" do not alter a party's legal
obligations under the treaty.20 6 Because the Covenant, by its terms, extends
to all parts of federal states without limitation, and since the United States
did not modify this obligation, Article 17 imposes binding obligations on
the states.
The third criterion-intent to benefit the plaintiff-is more problematic.
Some commentators have equated the intended-beneficiary test under
202. See 1 Peter Kempees, A Systematic Guide to the Case-Law of the European Court of Human
Rights 507-566 (1996) (collecting excerpts ofdecisions by European Court applying Article 8 section I
of European Convention, which protects right to privacy).
203. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340-41 (citations omitted).
204. ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 50.
205. 138 Cong. Rec. 8070-71 (1992)
206. See supra note 4 1. The Reagan and Bush Administrations both proposed a federalism reservation
to the Torture Convention. See Torture Report, supra note 28, at 7-8, 11-13. However, the Senate
designated the proposed condition as an understanding, see 136 Cong. Rec. 36,192-93 (1990),
apparently to clarify that the condition did not modify the United States's international legal obligations
under the Convention. Subsequently, the Bush Administration proposed a federalism "understanding"
for the ICCPR, see ICCPR Report, supra note 30, at 17-18, and the Clinton Administration proposed a
similar federalism understanding for the Race Convention, see Race Report, supra note 32, at 8. The
Senate consented to both proposed understandings. See 138 Cong. Rec. 8070-71 (1992); 140 Cong. Rec.
14,326-27 (1994). The decision to label these conditions understandings suggests that the treaty makers
accepted the principle that the treaties would apply to the states.
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§ 1983 with the APA zone-of-interests test."7 The U.S. Supreme Court,
though, has stated explicitly that a plaintiff need not be an intended
beneficiary of a statute to satisfy the zone-of-interests test under the APA.0 8
In contrast, the Court has consistently held that one must be an intended
beneficiary to bring a federal statutory claim pursuant to § 1983.209 The
intended beneficiary test under § 1983 is different from the test for implied
rights of action under the Cort v. Ash line of cases, 2 " because the plaintiff
who asserts a federal statutory claim under § 1983 need not show that
Congress intended to create a private right of action when it enacted the
statute. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has insisted that plaintiffs who
seek § 1983 remedies for violations of federal statutory rights must produce
affirmative evidence that Congress intended the statutory provision at issue
to benefit the plaintiff.
21
'
Applying the same approach in the context of human rights treaties, it is
clear that no individual person qualifies as an intended beneficiary of the
treaties. When they ratified the human rights treaties, the treaty makers
believed that the rights specified in the treaties, as modified by U.S.
reservations, would be accorded to all U.S. citizens because they believed
that U.S. citizens already had those rights under pre-existing domestic
law.' Thus, the treaty makers had a general intent that the rights of U.S.
citizens, as specified in the treaties, would be protected. On the other hand,
207. See Monaghan, supra note 6, at 254 (stating that APA "zone of interests" test is "substantially
parallel" to § 1983 requirement that "plaintiffimust establish the existence of a duty of which she is an
intended beneficiary").
208. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
209. See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329,340-41 (1997); Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Assoc., 496
U.S. 498,509 (1990); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of L.A., 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989); Wright v.
City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 430 (1987). One could argue that the U.S.
Supreme Court's interpretation is misguided, because the requirements under § 1983 and the APA
should be substantially parallel. However, this Article contends below that the differences between the
APA and § 1983 can be justified on the grounds that § 1983 provides both money damages and
injunctive relief, whereas the APA provides only injunctive relief. See infra notes 436-39 and
accompanying text.
210. See infra notes 412-25 and accompanying text.
211. See, e.g., Blessing, 520 U.S. at 343 ("[T'he requirement that a State operate its child support
program in 'substantial compliance' with Title IV-D was not intended to benefit individual children and
custodial parents, and therefore it does not constitute a federal right.").
212. See, e.g., ICCPR Hearing, supra note 78, at 7 (statement of Richard Schifter, Assistant Secretary
of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs) ("Our adherence to the Covenant will bring no
fundamental changes to the enjoyment of individual human rights by all Americans. Our basic human
rights are secure in America, through the incorporation of the Bill of Rights, and other provisions of the
Constitution of the United States, as well as our State consitutions.).
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the political branches did not intend, by means of ratification, to accord
anyone any protection that was not already available under other provisions
of domestic law.213 Indeed, the central purpose of the U.S. reservations was
to ensure that the treaties would not accord U.S. citizens any greater
protection than pre-existing domestic law.214 Therefore, under current U.S.
Supreme Court jurisprudence, § 1983 does not provide plaintiffs a right of
action against state or local government officers who commit violations of
unique treaty rights, because the right of action extends only to the intended
beneficiaries of a statute or treaty, and there are no intended beneficiaries of
the human rights treaties that the United States ratified."1 5
D. Policy Considerations
The preceding sections have shown that plaintiffs whose unique treaty
rights are violated by federal government officers can potentially obtain
judicial remedies under either the FTCA (for money damages) or the APA
(for relief other than money damages). In contrast, plaintiffs whose unique
treaty rights are violated by state or local government officers cannot obtain
judicial remedies under § 1983, either for money damages or for specific
relief. Is there any valid policy justification for this asymmetry?
First, it is important to emphasize that the majority of the substantive
rights protected by human rights treaties are redundant rights, not unique
treaty rights. Because redundant rights are, by definition, protected by other
provisions of federal constitutional or statutory law, plaintiffs whose
redundant treaty rights are violated by state or local government officers can
obtain judicial remedies under § 1983 by establishing violations of their
constitutional or statutory rights. Therefore, the asymmetry noted above
affects only unique treaty rights, not redundant rights.
Second, claims for money damages that can be asserted against federal
officers in federal court under the FTCA can be brought as state tort claims
213. The main justification offered for ratification was a foreign policy rationale, not a domestic
policy rationale. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
215. If one focuses on the intent of the treaty drafters, then there are numerous intended beneficiaries
of the treaties. However, for the reasons stated above, the President and the Senate, when they agreed to
ratify the human fights treaties, did not manifest an affirmative intent to benefit any particular class of
potential plaintiffs in the United States. This Article assumes that, in the event of a conflict between the
intent of the treaty drafters, and the intent of the treaty ratifiers, the intent of the ratifiers controls the
domestic judicial application of the treaties.
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against state and local government officers in state court." 6 Moreover, just
as unique treaty rights can be enforced under the FTCA by raising them in
reply to a defense of official authority,2" 7 unique treaty rights can also be
enforced in a state tort case by raising them in reply to a defense of official
authority. Thus, with respect to money damages, the asymmetry between
claims against federal officers and claims against state and local officers is
entirely procedural, not substantive: claims against federal officers can be
asserted in federal court, whereas claims against state and local government
officers must be brought in state court. This procedural asymmetry is not
especially problematic." 8 It appears to strike a reasonable accommodation
between (a) Congress's insistence that claims for money damages for torts
committed by federal officers must be brought in federal court; 9 and (b)
respect for state sovereignty, which has traditionally meant, inter alia, that
state tort claims against state and local government officers are brought in
state courts. 220
216. Recall that state tort law provides the underlying cause of action for an FTCA claim. See supra
notes 115-18 and accompanying text. Hence, any claim that could be asserted against a federal officer
under the FTCA could also be asserted against a state officer under state tort law. On the other hand, an
alleged treaty violation that did not constitute a tort under the law of the relevant state would not provide
the basis of a claim for money damages against either state or federal officers.
217. See supra notes 119-28 and accompanying text.
218. What is potentially more problematic is a possible disparity between damages remedies available
to U.S. citizens and damages remedies available to aliens. See Curtis A. Bradley, Customary
InternationalLmv andPrivate Rights ofAction, I Chi. J. Int'l L. (forthcoming fall 2000) (manuscript on
file with author). There may be conduct by government officers that violates unique treaty rights, but
that does not constitute a tort under state tort law. There is no apparent remedial mechanism that would
enable U.S. citizens to obtain money damages for actions by federal, state, or local government officers
that violate unique treaty rights, but that are not tortious under state law. In contrast, the Alien Tort
Claims Act (ATCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994), may provide aliens a right of action for money damages
against federal, state, and local government officers who commit violations of unique treaty rights,
regardless of whether their conduct is tortious under state law. See Beth Stephens & Michael Ratner,
International Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts 104-08 (1996) (discussing claims against U.S.
officers under ATCA); see also Jama v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 22 F. Supp. 2d 353,
362-63 (D.NJ. 1998) (noting that ATCA provides aliens right of action for money damages against INS
contractors who commit international human rights violations). This possible disparity betweenjudicial
remedies available to aliens and judicial remedies available to U.S. citizens is the subject of a current
work in progress by this author.
219. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (1994) (stating that FTCA remedy is exclusive remedy for injury
"arising or resulting from the negligent orwrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government
while acting within the scope of his office or employment').
220. Ofcourse, state tort claims can be brought in federal court under diversityjurisdiction. But state
tort claims against state and local officers do not create federal question jurisdiction.
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With respect to claims for specific relief, though, the asymmetry between
suits against federal officers and suits against state and local officers is more
problematic. As an initial matter, all fifty states may not have remedial
mechanisms comparable to the APA that provide plaintiffs a state law cause
of action for specific relief against state and local government officers who
violate their unique treaty rights. Moreover, even assuming the availability
of such remedial mechanisms in all fifty states, there are three reasons why
plaintiffs should have access to federal court in cases where they seek
injunctive relief against state and local officers who violate federal law.
First, the general equitable powers of federal courts have traditionally been
understood to include the power to grant specific relief against state and
local officers who violate federal law.22' Second, federal jurisdiction is
necessary to promote the federal interest in ensuring U.S. compliance with
its treaty obligations."' Third, under the doctrine of Exparte Young,"3 the
U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized that, when plaintiffs seek
prospective relief for ongoing violations of federal law by state officers,
federal jurisdiction is needed to vindicate the federal interest in the
supremacy of federal law. 2
22 1. See Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 Harv. L.
Rev. 1, 21-29 (1963); see also infra note 349.
222. The ICCPR, the Race Covention, and the Torture Convention obligate parties to provide an
effective remedy for any person whose treaty rights are violated. See Torture Convention, supra note 14,
art. 13 (obligating parties to "ensure that any individual who alleges he has been subjected to
torture... has the right to complain to, and to have his case promptly and impartially examined by, its
competent authorities"); Race Convention, supra note 15, art. 6 (obligating parties to "assure to
everyone within their jurisdiction effective protection and remedies.., against any acts of racial
discrimination which violate his human rights and fundamental freedoms contrary to this Convention");
ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 2, 3(a) (obligating parties "[t]o ensure that any person whose rights or
freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy"). Therefore, failure to
provide prospective relief for a victim of an ongoing violation of a unique treaty right would be a breach
of the United States's international legal obligations.
In contrast, failure to provide compensatory damages to a past victim of a treaty violation would not
necessarily be a breach of the United States's international legal obligations, because the treaties do not
obligate parties, as a general matter, to provide compensatory damages for all violations. Rather, the
ICCPR and the Torture Convention impose specific requirements to provide compensatory damages for
certain types of violations. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 9, 5 ("Anyone who has been the victim
of an unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation"); Torture
Convention, supra note 14, arts. 14 & 16 (noting that right to compensation applies to victims of torture,
but not to victims of other acts of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment). The Race
Convention, though, does appear to impose a general obligation to provide compensatory damages for
past treaty violations. See Race Convention, supra note 15, art. 6 (requiring "just and adequate
reparation or satisfaction for any damage suffered as a result of' a treaty violation).
223. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
224. See infra note 244 and accompanying text.
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Part IV considers whether an individual whose unique treaty rights are
violated by a state officer has an implied federal cause of action for
injunctive relief against that officer under the Exparte Young doctrine. If
so, the aforementioned asymmetry between suits for injunctive relief against
federal officers and suits for injunctive relief against state officers would, as
a practical matter, be irrelevant, because plaintiffs could obtain injunctive
relief against state officers who violate their unique treaty rights by bringing
an Exparte Young action.
IV. EXPARTE YOUNG AND TREATY-BASED PREEMPTION
CLAIMS
The doctrine ofExparte Young' is commonly described as an exception
to the Eleventh Amendment.226 However, the Young doctrine is also a basic
principle of federal jurisdiction, which authorizes federal courts to
adjudicate private suits against state government officers to enjoin
threatened or ongoing violations of federal law. 7
In Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc.," s the U.S. Supreme Court extended the
Young jurisdictional principle to include statutory preemption claims229-- in
other words, private suits against state government officers to enjoin
enforcement of state laws that are allegedly preempted by federal statutes.
Shaw is similar to Young in that both cases involved private suits for
injunctive relief against state officers. Shaw differs from Young, though, in
two key respects. First, the substantive law at issue in Shaw was a federal
225. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
226. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 116, at 412.
227. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 293-94 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("We have frequently acknowledged the importance of having federal courts open to enforce and
interpret federal rights.... [O]ur modem Young cases... establish... that a Young suit is available
where a plaintiff alleges an ongoing violation offederal law, and where the relief sought isprospective
rather than retrospective.").
228. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
229. The court stated,
[i]t is beyond dispute that federal courts have jurisdiction over suits to enjoin state officials from
interfering with federal rights. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). A plaintiff who seeks
injunctive relief from state regulation, on the ground that such regulation is pre-empted by a federal
statute which, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, must prevail, thus presents a
federal question which the federal courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to resolve.
Young, 463 U.S. at 96 n.14.
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statute,23° whereas Young involved a constitutional claim. 3 Second, the
Court frequently characterizes the Young doctrine as applying to cases
where plaintiffs seek prospective relief to enjoin ongoing violations of
federal law,232 whereas the Shaw court enjoined enforcement of a state
statute that was preempted by federal law. 3
Leading commentators have stated that "[t]he best explanation of Ex
parte Young and its progeny is that the Supremacy Clause creates an
implied right of action for injunctive relief against state officers who are
threatening to violate the federal Constitution and laws. 234 Several lower
federal courts have also endorsed this view.235 One could infer such an
implied right of action from several U.S. Supreme Court cases, 236 but the
U.S. Supreme Court has never explicitly endorsed such an implied cause of
action. If the Supremacy Clause does create such an implied right of action,
and if Shaw's extension of Young to statutory preemption claims is also
correct, then the Supremacy Clause arguably creates an implied right of
action to enjoin enforcement of state laws that are preempted by treaties,
because the Supremacy Clause accords equal status to treaties and
statutes.237
This statement requires one important caveat relating to the preceding
distinction between the no-judicial-remedies concept of non-self-execution
230. The substantive right at issue in Shaw derived from the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461. See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 90-92.
231. The substantive right at issue in Young derived from the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause. See Young, 209 U.S. at 129-30.
232. See Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 281 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion) (stating that Young applies
to "[a]n allegation of an on-going violation of federal law where the requested relief is prospective"); id.
at 288 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that Young applies "[w]here a plaintiffseeks prospective relief
to end a state officer's ongoing violation of federal law"); id. at 298-99 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating
that Young applies to "an individual's action against state officers" where the plaintiffseeks "prospective
relief to address an ongoing violation" of federal law).
233. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 108 (holding that New York's Human Rights Law is partially pre-empted by
ERISA).
234. 13B Wright & Miller, supra note 7, § 3566; see also Thomas E. Baker, A Catalogue ofJudicial
Federalism in the United States, 46 S.C. L. Rev. 835, 861 (1995) ("Essentially, the Supremacy Clause
creates an implied right of action for injunctive relief against state officers who are violating the U.S.
Constitution."); Jackson, Seminole Tribe, supra note 4, at 515 (stating that Young doctrine stands "for
the proposition that an implied cause of action for injunctive relief to enforce federal law [against state
officers] will be available when a court otherwise has jurisdiction over the case.").
235. See infra note 354.
236. See infra notes 346-93 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. Supreme Court cases that
support implied right of action under Supremacy Clause).
237. See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; supra note 138.
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and the no-private-right-of-action concept." If a treaty is not self-executing
in the sense that it does not permit judicial remedies, then the Supremacy
Clause cannot supply a judicial remedy, because the core principle of the
no-judicial-remedies concept is the separation of powers notion that certain
treaties are enforceable only by the political branches and not by the judicial
branch. However, if a treaty is not self-executing in the more limited sense
that it is judicially enforceable but does not create a private right of action,
then the Supremacy Clause might create an implied right of action against
state officers to enjoin enforcement of state laws that the treaty preempts.
Part IV contends that the Supremacy Clause creates such an implied right
of action. The argument is divided into four sections. The first section
briefly summarizes the scope of the Young doctrine. The second section
defends Shaw's extension of Young's jurisdictional principle to statutory
preemption claims. The third section contends that the Supremacy Clause
creates an implied private right of action for claims within the jurisdictional
scope of Young and Shaw. The final section advances the thesis that both
the jurisdictional principle and the implied private right of action extend to
preemption claims based on non-self-executing treaties that are judicially
enforceable but that do not create a private right of action.
A. The Young Doctrine
The Young doctrine has three distinct but interrelated elements. First, the
Eleventh Amendment aspect of the Young doctrine stands for the
proposition that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against state
officers in which plaintiffs seek prospective relief to enjoin an officer's
threatened or ongoing violation of federal law. 9 Second, the jurisdictional
aspect of the Young doctrine holds that federal courts can exercise federal
question jurisdiction over suits that fall within the Young exception to the
Eleventh Amendment.24 Third, the "implied right of action" element of the
238. See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
239. See Chemerinsky, supra note 116, at 412-13. The Court has occasionally stated that Young
applies to "ongoing" violations of federal law. See supra note 232. However, the Court has also
acknowledged that Young applies to threatened violations. See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504
U.S. 374, 381 (1992) ("In Exparte Young, we held that.., federal courts [may] enjoin state officers
'who threaten and are about to commence proceedings, either of a civil or criminal nature, to enforce
against parties affected an unconstitutional act....") (quoting Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 156
(1908)).
240. See infra notes 253-264 and accompanying text.
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Young doctrine provides plaintiffs an implied federal cause of action for
injunctive relief against state officers who violate federal law."4
The Young doctrine promotes two central policy objectives. First, the
Young doctrine has been called "'indispensable to the establishment of
constitutional government and the rule of law."' '242 If the judiciary lacks the
power to enjoin an ongoing violation of the law, then executive branch
officials can disobey the law with impunity, and the government becomes a
government of men, not of laws.243 Second, the Young doctrine is necessary
to vindicate the federal interest in the supremacy of federal law over state
law, an interest that has its constitutional basis in the Supremacy Clause.2"
These policy objectives are pertinent, regardless of whether the federal law
at issue is constitutional, statutory, or treaty law.
1. Young and the Eleventh Amendment
The Eleventh Amendment states "The Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by citizens or subjects of any Foreign State., 245 Although
the text of the Amendment does not address suits against a State by its own
citizens, the principle of sovereign immunity that underlies the Eleventh
Amendment also precludes federal courts from adjudicating such suits
against non-consenting States.246 The Young doctrine is an exception to the
241. See infra Part IV.C.
242. Seminole Tribev. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 174 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Charles Alan
Wright, Law of Federal Courts 292 (4th ed. 1983)).
243. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) ("The government of the United
States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to
deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.").
244. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) ("[T]he availability of prospective relief of the
sort awarded in Ex parte Young gives life to the Supremacy Clause. Remedies designed to end a
continuing violation of federal law are necessary to vindicate the federal interest in assuring the
supremacy of that law."); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984) ("[Ihe
Young doctrine has been accepted as necessary to permit the federal courts to vindicate federal rights and
hold state officials responsible to 'the supreme authority of the United States."') (quoting Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 160 (1908)).
245. U.S. Const. amend XI.
246. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890). Moreover, despite the fact that the Amendment
refers to the "judicial power of the United States," the U.S. Supreme Court recently held that the
principle of state sovereign immunity, which "neither derives from nor is limited by the terms of the
Eleventh Amendment," precludes Congress, when acting under Article I, from subjecting
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principle of state sovereign immunity. As such, Young stands for the
proposition that neither the Eleventh Amendment, nor the principle of
sovereign immunity it expresses, bar suits against state officers in which
plaintiffs seek prospective relief to end an officer's threatened or ongoing
violation of federal law.247
There are four key limitations on the scope of the Young exception to
state sovereign immunity. First, the relief sought must be prospective, not
retrospective.248 Second, the plaintiff's claim must be based on federal law,
not state law. 249 Third, "where Congress has prescribed a detailed remedial
scheme for the enforcement against a State of a statutorily created right, a
court should hesitate before casting aside those limitations and permitting
an action against a state officer based upon Exparte Young."' 0 Fourth, the
Court held Young inapplicable to a suit by the Coeur d'Alene Tribe seeking
"declaratory and injunctive relief precluding Idaho officials from regulating
or interfering with [the Tribe's] possession of submerged lands beneath
Lake Coeur d'Alene."'" In light of the Court's splintered decision in Coeur
d'Alene, the impact of this decision on the scope of the Young exception
remains unclear. 2
"nonconsenting States to private suits for damages in state courts." Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712
(1999) (emphasis added).
247. See Chemerinsky, supra note 116, at 412-16; Hart & Wechsler, supra note 116, at 1073-77.
248. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,664-71 (1974). Although the Edelman holding is frequently
described in terms of a distinction between prospective and retrospective relief, one commentator has
recently argued that the original Edelman holding excluded only retrospective monetary relief from the
scope of the Young doctrine. See Vzquez, Night andDay, supra note 4, at 22-25. Under this view, the
Eleventh Amendment should be construed to permit retrospective non-monetary relief against state
officers who violate federal law. See id. at 100-01. Although Professor Vizquez makes a persuasive
argument, this Article will refer simply to the distinction between prospective and retrospective relief,
because the issues raised by the distinction between retrospective monetary relief and retrospective non-
monetary relief are tangential to the central concerns of this Article.
249. See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 104-06.
250. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,74 (1996).
251. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261,288 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
252. Justice Kennedy wrote the lead opinion for himself and Chief Justice Rehnquist, which would
have severely restricted the scope of the Young exception. See id. at 270-80. Justice O'Connor wrote a
separate concurring opinion for herself and two other Justices, which casts Coeur d'Alene as a very
narrow exception to Young. See id at 288-97 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The four dissenters contended
that Coeur d'Alene is within the scope of the Young exception. See id. at 297-319 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). For commentary on Coeur d'Alene, see Jackson, Coueur D'Alene, supra note 4 and
V~luez, Night and Day, supra note 4.
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2. Young and Federal Question Jurisdiction
To obtain relief in federal court, a plaintiff's complaint must, inter alia,
satisfy the requirements of the well-pleaded complaint rule253 and state a
valid (usually federal) cause of action."' Although the two requirements are
closely linked, it is analytically useful to treat them separately. Accordingly,
this section addresses the relationship between Young and the well-pleaded
complaint rule, which this Article will refer to as the jurisdictional aspect of
the Young doctrine. Section IV.B. discusses Shaw, statutory preemption
claims, and the well-pleaded complaint rule. Section IV.C. addresses the
"implied cause of action" element of the Young doctrine, as it relates to both
constitutional and statutory preemption claims. 55
253. To satisfy the well-pleaded complaint rule, the federal element of plaintiff's complaint must be
an essential part ofplaintiff's well-pleaded claim for relief, not merely a federal defense to an anticipated
state law claim, or a reply to an anticipated federal defense. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v.
Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (holding that "defensive" federal claim does not give rise to federal
question jurisdiction); see also Hart & Wechsler, supra note 116, at 909-13.
254. In a famous passage, Justice Holmes said that "[a] suit arises under the law that creates the cause
of action," American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257,260 (1916), implying that
the plaintiffmust state a federal cause of action to bring a claim in federal court. The Smith exception to
the Holmes formula holds that, in cases where state law creates the cause of action, the case may still
arise under federal law for purposes of federal question jurisdiction if"the right to relief depends upon
the construction or application of the Constitution or laws of the United States." Smith v. Kansas City
Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199 (1921). Smith, however, is a fairly narrow exception to the Holmes
formula. See Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808-10 (1986).
255. This Article's distinction between the jurisdictional and cause-of-action elements of the Young
doctrine follows the conceptual approach that the U.S. Supreme Court adopted in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S.
678 (1946), where the Court said that lower courts must address the jurisdictional issue before
determining whether a plaintiffhas a valid cause ofaction. See id. at 682 ("Jurisdiction, therefore, is not
defeated as respondents seem to contend, by the possibility that the averments might fail to state a cause
of action on which petitioners could actually recover. For it is well settled that the failure to state a
proper cause of action calls for ajudgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want ofjurisdiction.
Whether the complaint states a cause of action on which relief could be granted is a question of law and
just as issues of fact it must be decided after and not before the court has assumed jurisdiction over the
controversy."). For a summary ofsubsequent cases that have adopted the Bell approach to distinguishing
between the concepts ofjurisdiction and cause of action, see Hart & Wechsler, supra note 116, at 933-
37.
There is an obvious tension between the Bell approach and the Holmes approach. The Holmes
approach suggests that a plaintiffmust show that there is a federal cause of action in order to establish
federal question jurisdiction. Bellstates that a court must first assume subject matterjurisdiction before it
can determine whether the plaintiff has a valid cause of action. However, the apparent discrepancy
between Belland the Holmes formula is purely formal. If the plaintiff fails to assert a valid federal cause
of action, the claim will usually be dismissed-either for lack ofjurisdiction (under the Holmes test) or
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (under the Bell approach). Cases falling
within the Smith exception to the Holmes formula could proceed in federal court under either the Bell
approach or the Holmes approach. Moreover, under either approach, cases raising a state law cause of
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In Ex parte Young, stockholders of various railroad companies were
advised that the Minnesota attorney general had threatened to institute civil
or criminal enforcement proceedings against the companies in state court if
they failed to comply with state statutes and administrative orders that set a
ceiling on the rates the railroad companies could charge. 2 6 Before the
attorney general instituted enforcement proceedings in state court, the
stockholders sued the attorney general (and others) in federal court to enjoin
enforcement of the state statutes and orders. Their complaint alleged, and
the Court agreed, that the state laws were invalid insofar as they conflicted
with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 Thus, Young
can be viewed as a preemption case. The logic of the Young decision was
that the Minnesota attorney general could not enforce the state statutes
because they conflicted with the Fourteenth Amendment, and under the
Supremacy Clause, the U.S. Constitution preempts conflicting state laws,
thereby rendering them unenforceable.
Before Young, the courts construed similar cases as raising state tort
claims, to which state officials would raise a statutory defense, also based
on state law. The federal constitutional issue, under this view, arose only as
a reply to the statutory defense. 8 But if the claim is conceived in this way,
it cannot give rise to federal question jurisdiction, because it runs afoul of
the well-pleaded complaint rule. "9 Young, however, squarely held that the
plaintiffs' claim arose under federal law for purposes of federal question
jurisdiction.2" Thus, as commentators have noted, the Young court clearly
understood the federal constitutional question to be offensive, not defensive,
action that do not fall within the Smith exception could be litigated in state court. In short, there is no
substantial difference between the Bell approach and the Holmes approach. Therefore, this Article's use
of the Bell approach to distinguish between the jurisdictional and cause-of-action elements of the Young
doctrine promotes analytic clarity but does not affect the substance of the analysis.
256. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 129-31 (1908).
257. See ial at 130, 148-49.
258. See Michael G. Collins, Economic Rights, Implied Constitutional Actions, and the Scope of
Section 1983, 77 Geo. LJ. 1493, 1510-13 (1989); Henry M. Hart, The Relations Between State and
FederalLaw, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489,523-24 (1954); Alfred Hill, ConstitutionalRemedies, 69 Colum.
L. Rev. 1109, 1128-29 (1969).
259. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908), was decided about eight
months after Young. However, the well-pleaded complaint rule that is typically associated with the
Mottley decision was "fully in force" before Young was decided. See Collins, supra note 258, at 1512-
13.
260. Young, 209 U.S. at 143-45.
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for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.26 ' Therefore, Young's
jurisdictional holding means that a claim is offensive, for purposes of the
well-pleaded complaint rule, if an individual sues a state officer for
prospective relief to enjoin the threatened enforcement of a state law on the
grounds that the state law conflicts with the U.S. Constitution.
Ten years after Young, the Court applied Young's jurisdictional holding
to a case in which the constitutionality of the state law was uncontested, but
the plaintiffs alleged that state officers were administering the law in an
unconstitutional manner.262 Since then, the Young doctrine has been applied
to two types of constitutional claims: (1) constitutional preemption claims,
like Young, in which the plaintiff alleges that a state law is invalid because
it conflicts with the U.S. Constitution; and (2) claims where the plaintiff
concedes the constitutionality of the state law, but alleges that a state
officer's actions are unconstitutional. 63 Inasmuch as the enforcement of a
state law that conflicts with the U.S. Constitution is, itself, a constitutional
violation, both categories are included within the general formulation that
the Young doctrine applies to claims for prospective relief to enjoin
constitutional violations by state officers. Thus, modem Young cases tend to
describe the scope of the Young doctrine in terms of the more general
formulation.2 4
261. See Collins, supra note 258, at 1512-14; Hart, supra note 258, at 523-24; Hill, supra note 258,
at 1124-27.
262. See Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R.R. Co., 244 U.S. 499, 506-08 (1917) (stating that
Young's jurisdictional "principle is not confined to the maintenance of suits for restraining the
enforcement of statutes which as enacted by the state legislature are in themselves unconstitutional" and
holding that plaintiffs' allegations "conferred jurisdiction upon the Federal court").
263. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 118 (1984) (noting that Greene
"held that Exparte Young applied to all allegations challenging the constitutionality of official action,
regardless of whether the state statute under which the officials purported to act was constitutional or
unconstitutional").
264. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73 (1996) ("[S]ince our decision in Exparte Young,
we often have found federal jurisdiction over a suit against a state official when that suit seeks only
prospective injunctive relief in order to end a continuing violation of federal law.") (internal citations
and quotations omitted); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (stating that Young allows federal
courts to grant "prospective injunctive relief to prevent a continuing violation of federal law");
Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 102-03 ("[W]hen a plaintiff sues a state official alleging a violation of federal
law, the federal court may award an injunction that governs the official's future conduct, but not one that
awards retroactive monetary relief."); see also supra note 232.
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B. Shaw, Statutory Preemption Claims, and the Well-Pleaded
Complaint Rule
Recall that Shaw extended Young's jurisdictional holding to statutory
preemption claims.265 One could distinguish Shaw from Young by saying
that the Young doctrine authorizes courts to enjoin violations of federal law,
whereas Shaw authorizes courts to enjoin enforcement of state statutes that
are preempted by federal law. However, it should be apparent from the
preceding discussion of the Young doctrine that this is a distinction without
a difference. The Young court itself enjoined enforcement of state statutes
that were preempted by federal law, precisely because enforcement of the
statutes would have been a violation of federal law. Therefore, the crucial
distinction between Young and Shaw is that the federal law at issue in
Young was constitutional, whereas the federal law at issue in Shaw was
statutory. This section contends that both the Eleventh Amendment and the
jurisdictional elements of the Young doctrine apply equally to constitutional
and statutory preemption claims.
1. The Eleventh Amendment and Statutory Preemption Claims
As noted above, the Young exception to the Eleventh Amendment
prohibition against suing non-consenting states is typically justified in terms
of the need to vindicate the supremacy of federal law and to promote the
rule of law.2" If individuals cannot obtain a judicial remedy for
constitutional violations by state officers, the rule of law is undermined, and
the supremacy of federal law is threatened. Similarly, when state officers
attempt to enforce state laws that are preempted by federal statutes, their
actions also implicate the rule-of-law and federal supremacy concerns
underlying the Young doctrine. Therefore, it should not be surprising that
the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently upheld federal jurisdiction over
federal statutory claims for injunctive relief against state officers, without
interposing an Eleventh Amendment bar.267
Prior to Shaw, the U.S. Supreme Court decided several preemption cases
involving federal statutory rights where no substantive constitutional rights
265. See supra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 242-44 and accompanying text.
267. See infra notes 268-87 and accompanying text.
1159
Washington Law Review Vol. 75:1103, 2000
were at issue,268 and where the Court affirmed an award of prospective
injunctive relief against state government officers. In one pre-Shaw
statutory preemption case, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed an injunction
against the Governor of Washington to prevent enforcement of a state
statute that was preempted by a federal statute. The Court explicitly relied
on Young to reject an Eleventh Amendment challenge to the suit.269 In two
other pre-Shaw statutory preemption cases, the Court upheld injunctions
against state officers without explicitly relying on Young. 270 Although
neither case mentions the Eleventh Amendment, they implicitly rely on the
Young doctrine to overcome what would otherwise be a valid Eleventh
Amendment defense.
2 71
Since Shaw, the U.S. Supreme Court has decided at least seventeen cases
in which private plaintiffs sued state officers2 72 in federal court to obtain
268. The Court occasionally describes statutory preemption claims as constitutional because the
Supremacy Clause establishes the preemptive effect of federal law in cases where plaintiffs assert
substantive rights based upon federal statutes. See S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic
Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 685, 722-26 (1991). However, that terminology is unnecessarily
confusing because cases in which plaintiffs assert substantive constitutional rights also rely upon the
Supremacy Clause to establish the preemptive effect of federal law. See id. at 723 ("[Tlhe ultimate
power to strike down a state law repugnant to the federal Constitution always implicitly derives from the
supremacy clause."). Accordingly, this Article refers to claims where the substantive right derives from a
federal statute as "statutory preemption claims" rather than "constitutional claims."
269. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 156 n.6 (1978). The plaintiffs in Ray also raised a
federal constitutional claim, alleging that the state statute was invalid under the Commerce Clause. Id. at
156. However, the Court rejected the constitutional claim, see id. at 179-80, and awarded injunctive
relief on the basis of the federal statutory claim, see id. at 174-78. Therefore, the statutory claim must
have been the basis for invoking the Young exception to sovereign immunity.
270. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,236 (1947) (affirming order enjoining Illinois
Attorney General from instituting enforcement proceedings against respondents, on grounds that the
state law to be enforced was preempted by federal statute); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 73-74
(1941) (affirming order enjoining Pennsylvania Secretary of Labor from enforcing Pennsylvania statute
on grounds that it was preempted by federal statute).
271. There is no suggestion in either Rice or Hines that Congress abrogated the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity when it enacted the federal statutes at issue in those cases. One could argue that,
in each case, defendants waived their Eleventh Amendment defense by not raising it. However, the fact
that the defendants apparently did not raise such a defense indicates that it was broadly assumed that the
Young doctrine would defeat any such defense.
272. Excluded from this set are (a) cases in which plaintiffs sued local government officers, and (b)
cases in which the United States intervened as a plaintiff. See United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000)
(United States intervened as plaintiffin statutory preemption claim for injunctive relief against Governor
of Washington); New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350 (1989)
(regarding statutory preemption claim for injunctive relief against local government officers). The
Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against local governments, see Chemerinsky, supra note 116, at
406, nor does it bar suits by the United States against state governments, see id. at 404.
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prospective relief273 from enforcement of state laws that were allegedly
preempted by federal statutes or regulations. 2 4 Only one of these seventeen
273. The term "prospective relief," as used herein, includes claims for declaratory relief, as well as
those for injunctive relief. For a discussion of Young's application to claims for declaratory relief, see
infra note 300.
274. See Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S.Ct. 2288, 2291-93 (2000) (nonprofit
corporation sued Massachusetts state officer to enjoin enforcement of state statute regulating trade with
Burma that was allegedly preempted by federal statute regulating trade with Burma); Foster v. Love, 522
U.S. 67 (1997) (Louisiana voters sued Governor of Louisiana to enjoin enforcement of state "open
primary" statute that was allegedly preempted by federal election statute); DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Med.
& Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806 (1997) (trustees of trust fund sued New York Commissioner of
Health to enjoin enforcement of state tax law that was allegedly preempted by ERISA); California Div.
of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S. 316 (1997) (contractor on public works
project sued California state agencies and officers for declaratory judgment that state labor law was
preempted by ERISA); Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996) (bank sued Florida Insurance
Commissioner to enjoin enforcement ofstate banking law allegedly preempted by federal banking law);
Dalton v. Little Rock Family Planning Servs., 516 U.S. 474 (1996) (Medicaid providers and physicians
sued Arkansas state officials to enjoin enforcement of state constitutional amendment that was allegedly
preempted by Title XIX of Social Security Act); New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995) (commercial insurers and trade associations sued
New York state officials to enjoin enforcement of New York statute that was allegedly preempted by
ERISA); Anderson v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 143 (1995) (recipients of federal funds sued Director of
California Department of Social Services to enjoin enforcement of state regulation that was allegedly
preempted by federal statute governing benefits under Aid to Families with Dependent Children
program); Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1994) (employee who was fired sued California Labor
Commissioner to invalidate provision of California Labor Code that was preempted by National Labor
Relations Act); Gade v. National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992) (trade association sued
Director of Illinois Environmental Protection Agency to enjoin enforcement of state law that was
allegedly preempted by Occupational Safety and Health Act); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S.
374 (1992) (airlines sued state attorneys general to enjoin enforcement of state regulations that were
allegedly preempted by Airline Deregulation Act); Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293
(1988) (natural gas companies sued Michigan state officials for declaratory judgment that state statute
was preempted by the Natural Gas Act); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988) (handicapped students sued
California Superintendent ofPublic Instruction to enjoin enforcement ofschool district expulsion orders
that were allegedly preempted by Education of Handicapped Act); California Coastal Comm'n v.
Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572 (1987) (mining company sued officials of California Coastal
Commission to enjoin enforcement ofstate permit requirement that was allegedly preempted by various
federal mining and environmental statutes and regulations); California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (savings and loan association and other plaintiffs sued Director of
California Department of Fair Employment and Housing to enjoin enforcement of state employment
discrimination statute that was allegedly preempted by Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964); Brown v.
Hotel & Restaurant Employees Int'l Union Local 54,468 U.S. 491 (1984) (union and its president sued
New Jersey state officials to enjoin enforcement of certain provisions of state's Casino Control Act that
were allegedly preempted by NLRA); Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984) (cable
television operators sued Director of Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Board to enjoin
enforcement of state ban on broadcast advertising of alcoholic beverages that was allegedly preempted
by Federal Communications Commission regulations).
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cases even mentions the Eleventh Amendment;275 one other case mentions
Young.276 However, all seventeen implicitly rely on Young to overcome
what would otherwise be a valid Eleventh Amendment bar to the exercise of
federal jurisdiction.277
Preemption cases aside, the U.S. Supreme Court's major Young decisions
also support the application of the Eleventh Amendment aspect of the
Young doctrine to federal statutory claims. In the past three decades, the
U.S. Supreme Court has decided four key cases limiting the scope of the
Young doctrine: Edelman v. Jordan,278 Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
Halderman,279 Seminole Tribe v. Florida,280 and Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene
Tribe.2 "' None of these four cases, as presented to the U.S. Supreme Court,
involved federal constitutional claims.282
In Edelman, the Court left undisturbed the lower court's injunction
against Illinois state officials mandating future compliance with federal
regulations but held that the Eleventh Amendment barred an award of
retroactive benefits. 283 In Pennhurst, the Court held Young inapplicable to
state law claims against state officials but remanded the case for lower
courts to consider whether a grant of relief could be upheld on the basis of a
federal statutory claim that the Court of Appeals had not addressed.2' In
275. Livadas, 512 U.S. at 115 n.9 (noting that "the portion of the District Court's order awarding
monetary relief against the Commissioner in her official capacity was likely barred by the Eleventh
Amendment").
276. Morales, 504 U.S. at 381 (concluding that "Young establishes that injunctive reliefwas available
here").
277. There is no suggestion in any of the 17 cases that Congress abrogated the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity when it enacted the federal statutes at issue in those cases.
278. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
279. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
280. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
281. 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
282. But see infra notes 283-84.
283. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 664-71. The plaintiffs in Edelman alleged that the defendants had violated
both the Fourteenth Amendment and federal regulations. Id. at 653. However, the district court judgment
was based entirely on Illinois' failure to comply with federal regulations, see id. at 656, and the
Fourteenth Amendment claims were not contested on appeal, see id. at 657-58. Thus, the U.S. Supreme
Court's Eleventh Amendment holding was based squarely on the regulatory violation, not on the
Fourteenth Amendment.
284. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 124-25. In the initial case, the District Court found violations of the
Eighth Amendment and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, as well as two federal statutes.
See id. at 92-93. It awarded injunctive relief. See id. at 93. The Third Circuit affirmed on the basis of the
federal Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, without reaching any of the
constitutional issues. See id. at 93-94. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit's statutory
holding and remanded for the court of appeals to determine whether the district court injunction could be
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Seminole Tribe, a case in which plaintiffs' claims were based entirely on a
single federal statute, the Court assumed that Young applied to federal
statutory claims generally, but held that "where Congress has prescribed a
detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement against a State of a statutorily
created right, a court should hesitate before... permitting an action against
a state officer based upon Exparte Young."285 Finally, in Coeur d'Alene, a
case in which the Couer D'Alene Indian Tribe claimed property rights on
the basis of an 1873 federal executive order, it was common ground among
all nine Justices that, absent countervailing considerations,286 the executive
order, being supreme federal law, would provide a sufficient basis to invoke
the Young doctrine.287 If the Court intended to limit the Eleventh
Amendment aspect of the Young doctrine to constitutional claims, it could
have decided these four cases on that basis. Instead, the Court decided all
four on narrower grounds, thereby implicitly affirming the principle that
Young applies to claims for prospective relief against state officers who
violate federal statutes, regulations, or executive orders.
In sum, both principle and precedent support the proposition that the
Young exception to the Eleventh Amendment applies not only to violations
of federal constitutional law, but also to statutory preemption claims and
other violations of federal statutes.
upheld on the basis of state law, the U.S. Constitution, or section 504 of the federal Rehabilitation Act.
See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981). On remand, the Third Circuit
once again upheld the injunction, on the basis of state law, without reaching any of the federal issues.
Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 95-96. The U.S. Supreme Court again reversed, holding that Young did not
authorize an injunction against state officials for violations of state law, see id. at 104-06, but once again
remanded for the court of appeals to determine whether the district court injunction could be upheld on
the basis of federal constitutional or statutory claims, see id. at 125.
285. 517 U.S. at 74.
286. As noted above, in light of the Court's splintered decision in Coeur d'Alene, it is difficult to
delineate the precise nature of the countervailing considerations that the Court relied on to support the
result it reached. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
287. Coeurd'Alene v. Idaho, 521 U.S. 261,281 (1997) ("An allegation of an on-going violation of
federal law where the requested relief is prospective is ordinarily sufficient to invoke the Young
fiction."); id. at 288 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Where a plaintiffseeks prospective relief to end a state
officer's ongoing violation of federal law, such a claim can ordinarily proceed in federal court."); id. at
298-99 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that Young applies to suits against state officers that seek
prospective relief to address ongoing violations of federal law).
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2. Statutory Preemption Claims and the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule
In Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,288 plaintiffs sued to enjoin the threatened
enforcement of a New York statute on the grounds that it was preempted by
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).2 9 Although the
plaintiffs did not raise any constitutional claims, the U.S. Supreme Court
explicitly relied on Young as a basis for the district court's exercise of
federal question jurisdiction. The Court said:
It is beyond dispute that federal courts have jurisdiction over suits to
enjoin state officials from interfering with federal rights [citing Ex
parte Young]. A plaintiff who seeks injunctive relief from state
regulation, on the ground that such regulation is pre-empted by a
federal statute which, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution, must prevail, thus presents a federal question which the
federal courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to resolve.290
Leaving aside the implications of this statement for the cause of action
element of the Young doctrine,291 the statement means, at a minimum, that
claims against state officers to enjoin enforcement of state laws that are
allegedly preempted by federal statutes are offensive for purposes of the
well-pleaded complaint rule. The plaintiffs' federal claim in Shaw was
offensive for precisely the same reason that the plaintiffs' claim in Young
was offensive: In both cases, plaintiffs threatened with a state enforcement
action sued state officials to enjoin enforcement of a state law that allegedly
conflicted with federal law.292 It would be absurd to claim that Young was
offensive, and Shaw was defensive, simply because Young raised a
constitutional claim and Shaw raised a statutory claim.
There is only one case in which the U.S. Supreme Court has explicitly
relied on Shaw as a basis for federal question jurisdiction. Lawrence Count),
v. Lead-Deadwood School District93 involved the Payment in Lieu of Taxes
288. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
289. Id. at 92-93 & n.9.
290. Id. at96 n.14.
291. See infra Part IV.C.3. for a discussion of Shaw and implied rights of action.
292. The conclusion that the federal claim is "offensive" in both Young and Shaw is bolstered by the
principle that "'the party who brings a suit is master to decide what law he will rely upon."' Bell v.
Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681 (1946) (quoting The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25
(1913)). In both Young and Shaw, the plaintiffs manifestly chose to rely upon federal law as a basis for
relief.
293. 469 U.S. 256 (1985).
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Act, a federal statute that compensates local governments for the loss of tax
revenues resulting from the tax-immune status of federal lands located in
their jurisdictions.2"4 South Dakota enacted a statute that, if enforced, would
have required counties to give sixty percent of their federal funding to
school districts. Lawrence County refused to comply with the state statute,
claiming that the federal Act gave it discretion to spend the funds "for any
governmental purpose." '295 The county filed suit in federal court, seeking a
declaratory judgment that the state statute conflicted with the federal Act
and was therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause.296 The district court
entered a declaratory judgment in favor of the county, but the Eighth Circuit
vacated the judgment, holding that the county's claim was "defensive" for
purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule, and therefore did not give rise
to federal subject matter jurisdiction.297 The U.S. Supreme Court stated that
the Eighth Circuit "ruling was erroneous" 98 because the claim was
offensive, not defensive.299
Since Shaw, the federal courts of appeals have consistently treated Shaw-
like statutory preemption claims00 as offensive claims for purposes of the
294. Id. at 258.
295. Id. at 258-59.
296. See id. at 259 n.6.
297. Lawrence County v. South Dakota, 668 F.2d 27,31 (8th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 469 U.S. 256 (1985)
("In effect, the county's complaint asserts a defense against a potential claim to the funds by the school
districts and special districts .... This defensive assertion of the preemption doctrine, however, cannot
convert the action into one arising under federal law within the meaning of28 U.S.C. § 1331.") After the
Eighth Circuit vacated the judgment, the county filed suit in state court. See Lawrence County, 469 U.S.
,t 259-60. The case eventually came to the U.S. Supreme Court after the South Dakota Supreme Court
held that the federal statute did not preempt the state statute. See id.
298. Lawrence County, 469 U.S. at 259 n.6.
299. See id. ("[A] plaintiff who seeks injunctive relief from state regulation on the ground that such
regulation is preempted by a federal statute which, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution, must prevail, thus presents a federal question which the federal courts have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to resolve.") (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 n.14
(1983)). Lawrence County is arguably an extension of Shaw, because the plaintiff sought only a
declaratory judgment, not injunctive relief.
300. Shaw-like statutory preemption claims include claims that satisfy the following criteria: (I)
plaintiffs file suit in federal court, (2) against state or local officers or government agencies, (3) for
prospective declaratory or injunctive relief, (4) to block enforcement of state or local laws, and (5) that
are allegedly preempted by federal statutes or regulations.
One could argue that claims against state government agencies should be excluded, because claims
against state agencies are generally treated as claims against the state, which are barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 116, at 1073 ("A suit nominally against an unconsenting
state itself(rather than an officer) is barred regardless of the kind of relief sought."). However, there are
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well-pleaded complaint rule. In cases where plaintiffs sued state or local
government officers or agencies to obtain prospective relief from
enforcement of state or local laws that were allegedly preempted by federal
statutes or regulations, the First,301 Second,30 2 Third,3
03 Fifth,3 4 Sixth,305
several cases in which courts of appeals have relied on Shaw to establish federal question jurisdiction
over claims for prospective reliefagainst state government agencies. See Freehold Cogeneration Assocs.
v. Board of Regulatory Comms., 44 F.3d 1178, 1184-85 (3rd Cir. 1995); Bunning v. Kentucky, 42 F.3d
1008, 1011 (6th Cir. 1994); Bristol Energy Corp. v. State of New Hampshire Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 13
F.3d 471,474 (Ist Cir. 1994); Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 716 F.2d 1285, 1288
(9th Cir. 1983). One possible explanation ofthese cases is that the plaintiffs also named state officers as
defendants, but the published opinions fail to mention that fact. At any rate, this Article includes
discussion of these cases because the courts of appeals relied on Shaw to establish federal question
jurisdiction.
One could also argue that declaratory judgment actions, in which plaintiffs do not seek injunctive
relief, should be excluded. In Public Service Commission v. WycoffCo., 344 U.S. 237 (1952), the Court
stated in dicta that a declaratory judgment action against state government officers to forestall a state
enforcement action did not give rise to federal question jurisdiction:
Where the complaint in an action for declaratory judgment seeks in essence to assert a defense to an
impending state court action, it is the character of the threatened action, and not of the defense,
which will determine whether there is federal question jurisdiction in the District Court. Ifthe cause
of action, which the declaratory defendant threatens to assert, does not involve a claim under federal
law, it is doubtful ifa federal court may entertain an action for a declaratory judgment establishing a
defense to that claim.
See id. at 248. Thus, commentators have noted that the extension of Shaiv to declaratory judgment
actions is inconsistent with the Wycoff dicta. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 116, at 947-48;
Monaghan, supra note 6, at 237-41.
Other commentators have argued that there is no principled basis for barring jurisdiction over suits for
declaratory relief against state officers, while allowing federal jurisdiction over suits for injunctive relief.
See 13B Wright & Miller, supra note 7, § 3566 ("But to hold that a federal court would have jurisdiction
of a suit to enjoin enforcement of a state statute, but not of a suit for a declaration that the statute cannot
be enforced, would be to turn somersaults with both history and logic."). Moreover, there are at least
three U.S. Supreme Court decisions that could be construed to support the extension of Shaw's
jurisdictional principle to claims for declaratory relief. See Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67 (1997);
California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., Inc. 519 U.S. 316 (1997);
Lawrence County, 469 U.S. 256. It is beyond the scope of this Article to explore in detail the
jurisdictional significance of the distinction between claims for declaratory relief and claims for
injunctive relief in suits against state officers. The remainder of this Article assumes that the distinction
lacks jurisdictional significance, although this author admits that a plausible argument could be made for
limiting the Shaw principle to claims for injunctive relief only.
301. See Bristol Energy, 13 F.3d at 474 (non-utility power producers sued state regulatory agency to
enjoin enforcement of agency order that was allegedly preempted by Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission regulations promulgated under the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act); Playboy Enters.,
Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 906 F.2d 25, 29-31 (1st Cir. 1990) (Playboy Enterprises and cable
television trade association sued Puerto Rican prosecutor to enjoin enforcement of Puerto Rican
obscenity law that was allegedly preempted by Cable Communications Policy Act). But see Nashoba
Communications v. Town of Danvers, 893 F.2d 435, 440-41 (1st Cir. 1990) (distinguishing Shaw on
grounds that plaintiff here was suing to enjoin town from enforcing contract provision, not local
ordinance or regulation).
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Seventh,30 6 Eighth, °7 Ninth,3"8 Tenth,"0 9 and Eleventh"0 Circuit Courts of
Appeals have relied on Shaw to establish federal question jurisdiction. The
302. See Burgio & Campofelice v. NYS Dep't of Labor, 107 F.3d 1000, 1005-07 (2d Cir. 1997)
(involving public works contractor who sued New York officials to enjoin enforcement of state labor
statute allegedly preempted by ERISA); Cable Television Ass'n v. Finneran, 954 F.2d 91, 94-95 (2d Cir.
1992) (cable television association sued New York state officials to enjoin enforcement of New York
cable television regulations allegedly preempted by Cable Communications Policy Act). But see Fleet
Bank v. Burke, 160 F.3d 883, 889 (2d Cir. 1998) (distinguishing Shaw on grounds that plaintiff here
primarily sought favorable interpretation ofstate law, and sought to enjoin enforcement of state law only
if it lost on interpretive issue); Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. New York State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation,
127 F.3d 201,207 (2d Cir. 1997) ('Where state officials have no intention of enforcing state law against
a plaintiff, a suit against a private entity cannot be considered a suit 'for relief from state regulation'
within the meaning of Shaw.").
303. See Freehold, 44 F.3d at 1184-85 (non-utility power producer sued New Jersey state agency to
enjoin enforcement of state regulatory order that was allegedly preempted by Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act).
304. See Love, 90 F.3d 1032 n.8, afJ'd, 522 U.S. 67 (1997); Cigna Healthplan of Louisiana, Inc. v.
Louisiana, 82 F.3d 642,644 n.1 (5th Cir. 1996) (health maintenance organization and health insurer sued
Louisiana attorney general to enjoin enforcement of state health care statute that was allegedly
preempted by ERISA); New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 782 F.2d 1236, 1240-41
(5th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 491 U.S. 350 (1989).
305. See Associated Builders & Contractors v. Perry, 115 F.3d 386, 388-89 (6th Cir. 1997) (non-
union trade association of construction contractors sued Director of the Michigan Department of Labor
to enjoin enforcement of state labor law that was allegedly preempted by ERISA); Bunning v. Kentucky,
42 F.3d 1008, 1011 (6th Cir. 1994) (U.S. Congressman sued Kentucky Registry of Election Finance to
enjoin enforcement of state campaign finance statute that was allegedly preempted by Federal Election
Campaign Act).
306. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Vega, 174 F.3d 870,871-72 (7th Cir. 1999) (Commonwealth
Edison and its pension plan sued Illinois state official to enjoin enforcement of state unclaimed property
act that was allegedly preempted by ERISA); Forest County Potawatomi Community v. Norquist, 45
F.3d 1079, 1082 (7th Cir. 1995) (Indian tribe sued Mayor of Milwaukee to enjoin enforcement of state
and local gambling laws that were allegedly preempted by Indian Gaming Regulatory Act).
307. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner& Smith Inc. v. Nixon, 210 F.3d 814,816-17 (8th Cir. 2000)
(Merrill Lynch sued Missouri attorney general to enjoin state administrative action that was allegedly
preempted by Federal Arbitration Act).
308. See Hydrostorage, Inc. v. Northern Cal. Boilermakers, 891 F.2d 719, 724-25 (9th Cir. 1989)
(public works contractor who sued California officials to enjoin enforcement of state administrative
order that was allegedly preempted by ERISA and NLRA); Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Public Utils.
Comm'n, 716 F.2d 1285, 1288 (9th Cir. 1983) (railroad sued California Public Utilities Commission to
enjoin enforcement of agency order that was allegedly preempted by federal railroad statute).
309. See ANR Pipeline Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 860 F.2d 1571, 1575-77 (10th Cir. 1988)
(natural-gas pipeline companies sued Oklahoma officials to enjoin enforcement of state laws regulating
interstate pipeline companies that were allegedly preempted by the Natural Gas Act and Natural Gas
Policy Act).
310. See Barnett Bank v. Gallagher, 43 F.3d 631,633 (1Ith Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom., Barnett Bank
v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996); Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. Pegues, 904 F.2d 640,643 (1Ilth
1167
Washington Law Review
Courts of Appeals' explicit decisions concerning federal question
jurisdiction may or may not imply that plaintiffs had a valid federal cause of
action, but those decisions must mean, at a minimum, that plaintiffs' claims
satisfied the well-pleaded complaint rule.
There are four statutory preemption cases in which lower courts have
relied explicitly on Shaw as a basis for federal question jurisdiction and the
U.S. Supreme Court has reached the merits without questioning the lower
courts' jurisdiction to adjudicate the case.3t' In New Orleans Public Service,
Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans,3t2 a public utility (NOPSI) sued the
City of New Orleans to enjoin enforcement of a local regulatory order that
was allegedly preempted by a final order of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) issued pursuant to the Federal Power Act.313 The
district court dismissed NOPSI's claims for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, but the Fifth Circuit reversed, relying explicitly on Shaw as a
basis for federal question jurisdiction.1 4 On remand, the district court
abstained, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed the abstention decision.315 The U.S.
Supreme Court then reversed the lower courts' abstention decision, noting
that the district court's jurisdiction to decide NOPSI's preemption claim
was uncontested, and emphasizing that federal courts have a "virtually
unflagging" "obligation to adjudicate claims within their
jurisdiction ... "316
In Barnett Bank v. Gallagher,317 the Eleventh Circuit relied explicitly on
Shaw as a basis for federal question jurisdiction but ruled that federal
banking law did not preempt Florida's banking law.3t 8 The U.S. Supreme
Cir. 1990) (environmental protection group sued Director of Alabama Department of Environmental
Managment to enjoin issuance of permit that was allegedly prohibited by federal regulations).
311. See Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67 (1997); California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v.
Dillingham Constr., Inc., 519 U.S. 316 (1997); Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996); New
Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350 (1989).
312. 491 U.S. 350 (1989).
313. See id. at 353-55.
314. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 782 F.2d 1236, 1240-41 (5th Cir. 1986),
rev'd sub nom., New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350 (1989). It is
noteworthy that the Fifth Circuit expressly refused to decide whether federal question jurisdiction could
be based upon the Federal Power Act. See id. at 1240.
315. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 850 F.2d 1069, 1077-80 (5th Cir.
1988), rev'd, 491 U.S. 350 (1989).
316. 491 U.S. at 358-59 (quoting Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 203 (1988)).
317. 43 F.3d 631 (11th Cir. 1995).
318. See id. at 633, 637.
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Court reversed, holding that the state law was preempted, without explicitly
addressing the jurisdictional issue.319
In Dillingham Construction, Inc. v. County ofSonoma,32° where plaintiffs
sought only declaratory relief, not an injunction, the federal district court
relied explicitly on Shaw and Young as a basis for federal question
jurisdiction but held that the contested provision of the California Labor
Code was not preempted by either ERISA or the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA).32" ' The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's jurisdictional
ruling without analysis3" but reversed on preemption grounds, holding that
ERISA preempted the contested state law.3" Importantly, the Ninth Circuit
rejected the plaintiff's § 1983 claim, thus eliminating § 1983 as a possible
alternative jurisdictional ground.324 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed on
preemption grounds, without disturbing the lower courts' jurisdictional
rulings.3z
Finally, in Love v. Foster,326 the Fifth Circuit expressly relied on Shaw as
a basis for federal question jurisdiction327 and granted a declaratory
judgment (not an injunction) that the Louisiana open primary statute was
preempted by federal election statutes. 32' The Court expressly declined to
consider plaintiffs' constitutional claim, or their § 1983 claim. 329 The U.S.
Supreme Court affirmed in a unanimous opinion, without discussing the
jurisdictional basis of plaintiffs' claims.330
Given that the lower courts expressly relied on Shaw as a basis for
federal question jurisdiction in these four cases (Foster, Dillingham, Barnett
Bank, and New Orleans Public Service), the fact that the U.S. Supreme
319. See Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996).
320. 778 F. Supp. 1522 (N.D. Cal. 1991), rev'd, 57 F.3d 712, 716 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom.,
California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., Inc., 519 U.S. 316 (1997).
321. Id. at 1534.
322. Dillingham Constr., Inc. v. County of Sonoma, 57 F.3d 712,716 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'dsub nom.,
California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., Inc., 519 U.S. 316 (1997).
323. Seeid. at717-21.
324. See id. at 722.
325. California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., Inc., 519 U.S. 316
(1997).
326. 90 F.3d 1026 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'dsub nom., Foster v. Love ,522 U.S. 67 (1997).
327. Id. at 1032 n.8.
328. Id. at 1031.
329. See id. at 1032 n.8.
330. Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67 (1997).
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Court decided all four cases without challenging the lower courts'
jurisdiction supports Shaw's jurisdictional principle. New Orleans Public
Service, in particular, is significant in this regard, because the U.S. Supreme
Court overturned the lower courts' abstention decisions and insisted upon
the district court's obligation to adjudicate the case.
Since Shaw, there have been at least eleven other Shaw-like statutory
preemption cases, 3 in addition to the cases discussed above, where the
Court has implicitly relied upon Shaw as a basis for federal question
jurisdiction.32 A review of the U.S. Supreme Court decisions and published
lower court decisions3 33 in these eleven cases shows that none of the cases
expressly relies on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or its jurisdictional counterpart" as a
basis for federal question jurisdiction. Nor do any of the published decisions
indicate that the allegedly preemptive federal statute provides a basis for
federal question jurisdiction. Because jurisdiction does not appear to be
based either on the allegedly preemptive statute or on § 1983, the only other
331. See supra note 300 for a definition of the term "Shaw-like statutory preemption cases."
332. See United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000) (association of oil tanker owners sued Governor
of Washington to enjoin enforcement of oil tanker design, reporting, and operating regulations
promulgated by the state's Office of Marine Safety that were allegedly preempted by various federal
statutes and treaties), 148 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 1998), affig inpart, rev'g inpart947 F. Supp. 1484 (W.D.
Wash. 1996); DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806 (1997), rev'g NYSA-
ILA Med. & Clinical Serv. Fund v. Axelrod, 27 F.3d 823 (2d Cir. 1994); New York State Conference of
Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995), rev'g Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708 (2d Cir. 1993), aff'g in part, rev'g in part Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 813 F.
Supp. 996 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Anderson v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 143 (1995), rev'g Edwards v. Healy, 12
F.3d 154 (9th Cir. 1993); Building & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors, 507
U.S. 218 (1993) (suit by organization representing non-union construction industry employers against
Massachusetts Water Resources Authority to enjoin enforcement of state regulatory order that was
allegedly preempted by ERISA and NLRA) rev'g Associated Builders & Contractors of Mass./R.I. v.
Massachusetts Water Resource Auth., 935 F.2d 345 (1st Cir. 1991); Gade v. National Solid Wastes
Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992), afg National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n v. Killian, 918 F.2d 671
(7th Cir. 1990); Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293 (1988), aj'g 801 F.2d 228 (6th Cir.
1986), rev'g 627 F. Supp. 923 (W.D. Mich. 1985); California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480
U.S. 572 (1987), rev'g Granite Rock Co. v. California Coastal Comm'n, 768 F.2d 1077 (9th Cir. 1985),
rev'g Granite Rock Co. v. California Coastal Comm'n, 590 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D.Cal. 1984); California
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987), aff'g 758 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1985);
Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707 (1985) (operator of blood plasma
centers sued county to enjoin enforcement of local plasma collection ordinance that was allegedly
preempted by federal regulations promulgated by Food and Drug Administration), rev 'g Automated
Med. Labs., Inc. v. Hillsborough County, 722 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1984); Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v.
Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984) rev "g Oklahoma Telecasters Ass'n v. Crisp, 699 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1983).
333. See supra note 332.
334. See 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1994).
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plausible explanation is that the courts relied implicitly on Shaw as a basis
for federal question jurisdiction.335
In sum, Shaw-like statutory preemption claims are offensive within the
meaning of the well-pleaded complaint rule for precisely the same reason
that the plaintiffs' claim in Young was offensive: plaintiffs threatened with a
state or local government enforcement action sued government officers for
prospective relief to block enforcement of a state or local law that allegedly
conflicted with federal law. Analysis of U.S. Supreme Court and lower
federal court decisions since Shaw bolsters the conclusion that Shaw-like
statutory preemption claims are offensive for purposes of the well-pleaded
complaint rule.
C. Young Shaw, and an Implied Right ofAction Under the
Supremacy Clause
This section contends that Young, Shaw, and their progeny support the
proposition that the Supremacy Clause creates an implied right of action for
prospective relief against state and local government officers who violate,
or threaten to violate, federal constitutional, statutory, or regulatory laws.
335. Under the doctrine of "complete preemption," the preemptive force of certain federal statutes "is
so powerful as to displace entirely any state cause of action" within the scope of a federal statutory cause
of action, thereby transforming what would otherwise be a state law claim into a federal claim for
purposes of federal question jurisdiction. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64
(1987). To date, the U.S. Supreme Court has found only two federal statutes to exert a sufficiently
powerful pre-emptive force to warrant invoking the complete preemption doctrine: § 301 of the Labor-
Management. Relations Act (LMRA) and § 502(a) ofERISA. See Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S. at 63-67.
None of the 15 U.S. Supreme Court cases cited in supra notes 311-30 involves § 301 of the LMRA,
and none mentions complete preemption as a basis for federal question jurisdiction. However, three of
the cases did involve preemption claims under ERISA. See generally DeBuono, 520 U.S. 806 (1997)
(trustees of trust fund sued New York Commissioner of Health to enjoin enforcement of state tax law
that was allegedly preempted by ERISA); California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham
Constr., Inc. 519 U.S. 316 (1997) (contractor on public works project sued California state agencies and
officers for declaratory judgment that state labor law was preempted by ERISA); New York State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995) (commercial
insurers and trade associations sued New York state officials to enjoin enforcement ofNew York statute
that was allegedly preempted by ERISA). ERISA preemption cases do not give rise to "complete
preemption" unless the plaintiffhas a cause of action under § 502(a). See Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S. at
63-64. Although the Court did not rely on § 502(a), the plaintiffs in DeBuono and Travelers may have
had claims under § 502(a), in which case these could arguably be characterized as "complete
preemption" cases.
For a helpful discussion of the distinction between the Shaw jurisdictional rule and the complete
preemption doctrine, see Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. New York State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 127
F.3d 201,206-07 (2d Cir. 1997).
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However, in the case of statutory claims, Congress can override the
presumed availability of such an implied right of action by expressing its
intent to preclude such a cause of action.
The argument is divided into six sections. The first section discusses the
policy implications of recognizing such an implied right of action. The
second section demonstrates that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Young supports such an implied right of action. The third section
demonstrates that U.S. Supreme Court and lower court decisions in
statutory preemption cases support such an implied right of action. The
fourth section shows that, in accordance with the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Seminole Tribe, a Young right of action is not available in
federal statutory cases if Congress intended to preclude the availability of a
Young action for a particular statute. The final two sections address
counterarguments that are likely to be raised. The fifth section addresses the
counterargument that recognition of an implied right of action under the
Supremacy Clause for statutory claims is inconsistent with the Cort v. Ash336
line of cases. The final section addresses the counterargument that
recognition of such an implied right of action would be inconsistent with
the U.S. Supreme Court's § 1983 jurisprudence.
1. Policy Implications
As noted above, the Young doctrine is typically justified in terms of the
need to vindicate the supremacy of federal law and promote the rule of
law.337 If individuals cannot obtain a judicial remedy for constitutional
violations by state officers, the rule of law is undermined, and the
supremacy of federal law is threatened. The same principle applies to state
officers' attempts to enforce state laws that are preempted by federal
statutes and to other federal statutory violations by state officers.
However, there are two competing principles that weigh against an
excessively broad interpretation of the Young doctrine. First, in cases
limiting the scope of the Young doctrine, the U.S. Supreme Court has relied
heavily on the principle of state sovereign immunity, which is reflected in,
but not limited by, the text of the Eleventh Amendment.338 Second, creation
336. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
337. See supra notes 242-44 and accompanying text.
338. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 281 (1997) (holding that Young doctrine does
not apply to tribe's suit against Idaho due to Idaho's "special sovereignty interests" in controlling its
land and water); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105-06 (1984) (stating that
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of remedies is primarily a legislative, not ajudicial function.339 The second
principle has been relatively unimportant in cases raising constitutional
claims within the scope of the Young doctrine, but it assumes greater
significance in cases raising statutory claims where the plaintiff asserts an
implied right of action under the Young doctrine because courts have
generally been reluctant to imply rights of action for statutory claims.340
The argument for judicial deference to the legislature is quite powerful
when applied to claims for money damages against private parties because
such claims do not implicate the rule-of-law or federal supremacy concerns
underlying the Young doctrine. Although rule-of-law and federal supremacy
concerns are not wholly absent when plaintiffs sue state officers for money
damages, a failure to compensate victims for past harms has a far less
corrosive effect on the rule-of-law and federal supremacy interests than
does a failure to prevent threatened or ongoing violations.
In contrast, the need for a private cause of action is strongest in suits for
prospective equitable relief against state officers who violate federal law,
because that is where the rule-of-law and federal supremacy concerns
underlying the Young doctrine are presented in their most salient form.
Moreover, in cases where plaintiffs seek judicial remedies against
government officers in the absence of an express cause of action, courts
have historically had broader powers to grant equitable remedies than legal
remedies.34' Recognition of an implied right of action for prospective
equitable relief against state officers who violate federal law is not an
affront to state sovereignty because the Supremacy Clause requires state
officers to comply with supreme federal law. Finally, the principle of
judicial deference to the legislature does not preclude judicial recognition of
an implied right of action in such cases because all statutes are enacted
against a background of traditional legal principles, including the principle
that the federal judiciary is expected to enforce state officers' prospective
"the need to promote the supremacy of federal law must be accommodated to the constitutional
immunity of the States").
339. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388-90 (1983) (rejecting argument for judicial creation of
Bivens remedy for alleged First Amendment violation because "Congress is in a better position to decide
whether or not the public interest would be served by creating" such remedy).
340. See infra Part IV.C.5. Courts are more reluctant to recognize an implied right of action in
statutory cases than in constitutional cases, because Congress has the opportunity to create an express
private cause of action when it enacts a statute, whereas constitutional provisions rarely include an
express cause of action.
341. See infra note 349 and accompanying text; see also supra note 221.
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compliance with federal law,342 absent evidence of legislative intent to
preclude prospective relief. Thus, in suits for prospective equitable relief
against state officers who violate federal law, the balance of competing
policy interests tips in favor of an implied private cause of action.
A review of U.S. Supreme Court decisions indicates that the Court's
willingness to imply a private cause of action to enforce federal statutes
depends upon the identity of the defendant and the nature of the relief
sought. In cases where plaintiffs sue private parties for violations of federal
statutes, the Court has generally refused to recognize a private cause of
action absent affirmative evidence of congressional intent to create a private
right of action.343 In cases where plaintiffs seek prospective equitable relief
against state or local government officers for alleged violations of federal
statutes, the Court has generally presumed the availability of a private cause
of action, unless there is affirmative evidence of congressional intent to
preclude a private right of action.3" In cases where plaintiffs seek money
damages against state or local government officers for alleged violations of
federal statutes, the Court has generally refrained from adopting a strong
presumption either for or against the availability of a private cause of
action. 345 There are some exceptions to the broad generalizations stated
above, but the following analysis shows that the exceptions reinforce the
soundness of these basic rules.
2. Ex parte Young
In Young, the Court's decision to grant injunctive relief necessarily
implies that the plaintiffs had a valid cause of action. But was it a state
cause of action or a federal cause of action? One could argue that Young
was effectively a precursor to Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co.,346
where state law created the cause of action, but where the case arose under
342. The principle that the federal judiciary is expected to enforce state officers' prospective
compliance with federal law is the core of the Young doctrine. See Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 288
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). That principle "is not an
example of a novel rule that a proponent has a burden to justify affirmatively on policy grounds in every
context in which it might arguably be recognized; it is a general principle of federal equity jurisdiction
that has been recognized throughout our history and for centuries before our own history began."
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 177 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).
343. See infra Part IV.C.5.
344. See infra Parts IV.C.3-4.
345. See infra Part IV.C.6.
346. 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
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federal law for purposes of federal question jurisdiction because "the right
to relief depend[ed] upon the construction or application of the Constitution
or laws of the United States."347 However, this argument is at odds with
Justice Peckham's opinion in Young, which made no attempt to identify a
state law cause of action, and which appeared to assume that the plaintiffs'
cause of action arose directly from federal law.348 Moreover, U.S. Supreme
Court decisions in the Bivens line of cases generally assume the availability
of an implied federal cause of action for injunctive relief against both state
and federal government officers who violate the Constitution."' Although
the U.S. Supreme Court has never explicitly decided whether Young created
(or recognized) an implied federal cause of action, several commentators
have stated that an implied federal cause of action can be inferred from the
Court's Young decisions.350
347. Id. at 199; see also supra note 254.
348. Young, 209 U.S. at 143-45 (holding that lower court had jurisdiction because case "involved the
decision of Federal questions arising under the Constitution ofthe United States," and stating that federal
questions raised by case included: "whether the acts of the legislature and the orders of the railroad
commission, if enforced, would take property without due process of law"; "[t]he sufficiency of rates
with reference to the Federal Constitution"; and "the alleged unconstitutionality of these [state laws]
because of the enormous penalties denounced for their violation").
349. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau ofNarcotics, 403 U.S. 388,404-
05, (1971) (Harlan, I., concurring) (referring to "the presumed availability of federal equitable relief
against threatened invasions of constitutional interests" and stating that "a general grant ofjurisdiction to
the federal courts by Congress is thought adequate to empower a federal court to grant equitable relief
for all areas of subject-matterjurisdiction enumerated therein."); see also Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 361,
373-74 (1983) ("This Court has fashioned a wide variety of nonstatutory remedies for violations of the
Constitution by federal and state officials."); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14,42-44 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (contending that "federal courts have historically had broad authority to fashion equitable
remedies," including injunctive relief against state officers who violate federal law, but that federal
courts should not imply damages remedies for constitutional violations); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S.
228, 242 (1979) ("[I]t is established practice for this Court to sustain the jurisdiction of federal courts to
issue injunctions to protect rights safeguarded by the Constitution and to restrain individual state officers
from doing what the 14th Amendment forbids the State to do.").
350. See supra note 234; see also Collins, supra note 258, at 1510-17 (discussing historical origins of
implied rights of action for equitable relief against state and federal officers to vindicate constitutional
rights); Hart, supra note 258, at 524 & n.124 (stating that Young was "crucial advance" in process
whereby U.S. Supreme Court came "to treat the remedy of injunction as conferred directly by federal
law for any abuse of state authority which in the view of federal law ought to be remediable"); Hart &
Wechsler, supra note 116, at 1065 ("Moreover, isn't it clear that in Young, the Court recognized a
judicially impliedfederal cause of action for injunctive relief under the Fourteenth Amendment?"); Hill,
supra note 258, at 1126-27 (stating that argument that state law provided right of action in Young
"collapses of its own weight"); Meltzer, supra note 4, at38 (stating that Young"recognized an implied
federal cause of action for an injunctive remedy against state officials whose conduct violates the
Fourteenth Amendment"); Monaghan, supra note 4, at 130 (stating that Young "necessarily assumed the
existence of an implied right of action for equitable relief against state officials").
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Commentators disagree, however, about the source of that implied cause
of action. Some commentators have suggested that the Fourteenth
Amendment is the source of the Young cause of action."' Under this view,
Young cannot provide a cause of action for violations of federal statutory or
treaty rights because those rights are not derived from the Fourteenth
Amendment.352 Other commentators have explicitly linked the Young right
of action to the Supremacy Clause.3 Several lower federal courts have also
endorsed this view.354 The next section contends that the U.S. Supreme
Court's decisions in Shaw and post-Shaw statutory preemption cases
support the view that the Young right of action derives from the Supremacy
Clause.
351. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 116, at 1065 (declaring that Young "recognized a judicially
implied federal cause of action for injunctive relief under the Fourteenth Amendment"); Meltzer, supra
note 4, at 38 (asserting that Young "recognized an implied federal cause of action for an injunctive
remedy against state officials whose conduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment").
352. See Monaghan, supra note 4, at 131 (stating that implied right of action recognized by Young "is
not relevant when a suit is based on a federal statute"). An implied right of action derived from the
Fourteenth Amendment might be applicable to statutory violations where the statute is enacted pursuant
to Congress' power under the Fourteenth Amendment. However, such a right of action would not be
generally applicable to statutes, and would not apply to treaties at all.
353. See Wright & Miller, supra note 7 ("The best explanation of Exparte Young and its progeny is
that the Supremacy Clause creates an implied right of action for injunctive relief against state officers
who are threatening to violate the federal Constitution and laws."); see also supra note 234.
354. See Burgio & Campofelice, Inc. v. NYS Dep't of Labor, 107 F.3d 1000, 1006 (2d Cir. 1997)
("[T]he Supremacy Clause creates an implied right of action for injunctive relief against state officers
who are threatening to violate the federal Constitution or laws.") (quoting Wright & Miller, supra note 7
§ 3566); Indian Oasis-Baboquivari Unified Sch. Dist. v. Kirk, 91 F.3d 1240, 1256 (9th Cir. 1996)
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting on other grounds) (stating, in case where plaintiffs sought injunctive relief
against enforcement of state law that was allegedly preempted by federal statute, that "it is the
Supremacy Clause itself that provides plaintiffs with the right to sue .... Moreover, a plaintiff may sue
directly under the Supremacy Clause even if the assertedly preemptive federal statute does not provide a
cause of action or give rise to enforceable rights that could serve as the basis for a § 1983 suit on
preemption grounds."); Guaranty Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Gates, 916 F.2d 508, 512 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[T]he
Supremacy Clause creates an implied right of action for injunctive relief against state officers who are
threatening to violate the federal Constitution or laws.") (quoting Wright & Miller, supra note 7,
§ 3566); Sprint Corp. v. Evans, 818 F. Supp. 1447, 1453 (M.D. Ala. 1993) (discussing preemption
claims and Supremacy Clause, and concluding that "the U.S. Supreme Court has not questioned the
propriety of allowing a cause of action for preemption claims even when the federal statute whose
preemptive power is at issue cannot be the source of the plaintiffs cause of action"); Storer Cable
Communications v. City of Montgomery, 806 F. Supp. 1518, 1529-30 (M.D. Ala. 1992) (same). But see
Legal Envtl. Assistance Found. v. Pegues, 904 F.2d 640, 643-44 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding, in suit
against state official to enjoin state regulatory action that was allegedly preempted by a federal statute,
that it had subject matterjurisdiction under Young and Shaw, but that no private cause of action could be
implied from Supremacy Clause).
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3. Statutory Preemption Cases
The plaintiffs in Shaw were a group of employers who provided their
employees with medical and disability benefits through employee benefit
plans governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) 5 Their plans did not provide pregnancy-related disability
benefits, as required by New York law. The employers filed suit in federal
court against various New York officials, alleging that the New York statute
that obligated them to provide pregnancy-related disability benefits was
preempted by ERISA" 6 The U.S. Supreme Court agreed that ERISA
preempted the state law "insofar as it [the state law] prohibits practices that
are lawful under federal law." '357 The Court affirmed in part the injunctive
relief awarded by the district court.358
The award of injunctive relief in Shaw necessarily implies that the
plaintiffs had a valid cause of action, but the U.S. Supreme Court did not
identify the source of that cause of action. Section 502(a) of ERISA created
an express private cause of action for "participants," "beneficiaries," and
"fiduciaries."3"9 The Shaw plaintiffs were not "participants," or
"beneficiaries," within the meaning of the statute,36 nor does it appear that
they were "fiduciaries.""36 Hence, their cause of action was not based on
355. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 92 (1983).
356. See id.
357. Id. at 108. At the time, it was lawful under federal law for employers to choose not to provide
pregnancy-related disability benefits. See id. at 88-89. New York law was preempted insofar as it made
that choice unlawful. See id. at 108.
358. See id. at 93 n.9, 108-09.
359. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1982) (specifying who is permitted to bring civil action under ERISA
and for what types of claims).
360. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (1982) (defining "participant" as employee or former employee "who is or
may become eligible to receive a benefit ... from an employee benefit plan"); 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8)
(1982) (defining "beneficiary" as person "who is or may become entitled to a benefit").
361. The statute defines the term "fiduciary" to include, inter alia, a person who "exercises any
discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting mgmt. of such [employee benefit] plan." 29
U.S.C. § 1002(21) (1982). On its face, the statutory language could be construed to include employers,
such as the plaintiffs in Shaw. However, neither the U.S. Supreme Court decision nor any of the
published lower court decisions indicates that the Shawplaintiffs were "fiduciaries" within the meaning
of ERISA. See Shaw, 463 U.S. 85, afg in part, rev'g in part Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Kramarsky, 666
F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1981), ajfg inpart, vac'g inpart Delta AirLines, Inc. v. Kramarsky, 650 F.2d 1287 (2d
Cir. 198 1), afl'g in part, vacg in part Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Kramarsky, 485 F. Supp. 300 (S.D.N.Y.
1980). Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court's reliance on Young as a basis for federal question
jurisdiction, see supra note 290 and accompanying text, strongly suggests that the Court didnot consider
the Shaw plaintiffs to be fiduciaries, because fiduciaries have an express cause of action under section
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§ 502(a).362 The Court's preemption holding in Shaw relied principally on
§ 514(a) of ERISA.363 Although § 514(a) expressly preempts state law, it
does not create an express private cause of action, and there is no indication
in the U.S. Supreme Court opinion that the Court was deriving an implied
cause of action from § 514(a). Thus, the Shaw plaintiffs' cause of action
was not based on ERISA. 6
The Shaw plaintiffs' cause of action could not have derived from the
Fourteenth Amendment, because they did not assert any substantive rights
arising under the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor did their cause of action arise
under state law; they were asserting federal rights under ERISA to
overcome what would otherwise have been binding state law obligations.
3 65
Since the plaintiffs' cause of action did not derive from ERISA, the
Fourteenth Amendment, or state law, the best explanation is that their cause
of action derived from the Supremacy Clause. This explanation finds
support in footnote fourteen of Shaw,366 which explicitly ties federal
502(a) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1982). If the Shaw plaintiffs had an express cause of action under
section 502(a), then federal jurisdiction would have been based on an express federal cause of action,
and the Court's reliance on Young for jurisdiction would have been superfluous.
362. This conclusion is buttressed by subsequent lower court decisions in ERISA preemption cases,
where courts have permitted plaintiffs to assert a Shaw cause of action, while holding expressly that
plaintiffs lacked a cause of action under section 502(a). See, e.g., Associated Builders & Contractors v.
Perry, 115 F.3d 386, 388-89 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating that plaintiffs "cause of action does not request
relief under 29 U.S.C. § 1132 ... which is available only to participants, beneficiaries and fiduciaries"
but concluding, based on Shaw, that plaintiffs could assert preemption claim); Burgio & Campofelice v.
New York Dep't of Labor, 107 F.3d 1000, 1005-07 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that plaintiff's claim is "not
one commenced directly under" section 502(a), but relying on Young and Shaw to support the
conclusion that plaintiff had implied cause of action under Supremacy Clause); Cigna Healthplan v.
Louisiana, 82 F.3d 642, 644 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that plaintiffs "do not seek to enforce against
Louisiana any cause of action created by Congress," and citing Shaw in support of conclusion that
plaintiffs had valid ERISA preemption claim).
363. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982) (stating that ERISA's provisions "shall supersede any and all
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan" covered by
ERISA); Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-100.
364. This conclusion is reinforced by the Court's decision in Franchise Tax Board v. Construction
Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983), decided the same day as Shaw. See 463 U.S. at 24-27
(holding that where defendant in state court action raises federal preemption defense based on section
514(a) of ERISA, and state court plaintifflacks cause of action under section 502(a) of ERISA, claim
does not present federal question); cf Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 64-67 (1987)
(holding that where defendant in state court action raises federal preemption defense based on section
514(a) of ERISA, and state court plaintiffhas cause of action under section 502(a), claim does present
federal question).
365. See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 88-92.
366. See id. at 96 n.14.
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question jurisdiction to the Supremacy Clause and implicitly links the
plaintiffs' cause of action to that Clause.
The thesis that the Shaw plaintiffs had an implied right of action under
the Supremacy Clause is also supported by several post-Shaw statutory
preemption cases. For example, in Foster v. Love,367 a group of Louisiana
voters sued the Governor of Louisiana, alleging that the state's "open
primary" statute was preempted by federal election statutes.36s Their central
theory was that 2 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 7 require elections of U.S. Senators and
Congressmen to take place in November,369 whereas the Louisiana statute
effectively advanced the date for some elections to October.3 70 The Fifth
Circuit held that the Louisiana statute was preempted and awarded the
plaintiffs a declaratory judgment.37' The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the
Fifth Circuit's judgment, without discussing the source of the plaintiffs'
cause of action.372
The declaratory judgment in Foster necessarily implies that the plaintiffs
had a valid cause of action, but the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion does not
identify the source of that cause of action. A single sentence in the Fifth
Circuit opinion in Foster provides the only clue concerning the source of
the plaintiffs' cause of action. The Fifth Circuit majority cited Shaw and
stated that "[w]e decide this case under our federal question jurisdiction to
resolve a claim under the Supremacy Clause."373 This statement suggests
that the plaintiffs' cause of action sprang directly from the Supremacy
Clause.
The preemptive federal statutes cannot be the source of plaintiffs' cause
of action in Foster because those statutes do not create an express private
367. 522 U.S. 67(1997).
368. M at70.
369. United States Code, title 2, section 1 provides, "At the regular election held in any State next
preceding the expiration of the term for which any Senator was elected to represent such State in
Congress, at which election a Representative to Congress is regularly by law to be chosen, a United
States Senator from said State shall be elected by the people thereof for the term commencing on the 3d
day ofJanuary next thereafter." 2 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). United States Code, title 2, section 7 provides, "The
Tuesday next after the Ist Monday in November, in every even numbered year, is established as the day
for the election, in each of the States and Territories of the United States, of Representatives and
Delegates to the Congress commencing on the 3d day ofJanuary next thereafter." 2 U.S.C. § 7 (1994).
370. See Foster, 522 U.S. at 69-70.
371. Love v. Foster, 90 F.3d 1026, 1031-32 (5th Cir. 1996), afJ'd, Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67
(1997).
372. See Foster, 522 U.S. 67.
373. Foster, 90 F.3d at 1032 n.8.
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right of action,3 74 and there is no suggestion in either the Fifth Circuit or the
U.S. Supreme Court opinion that the plaintiffs' right of action could be
implied from those statutes. The Foster plaintiffs also presented claims
under § 1983 and the Privileges and Immunities Clause. However, the Fifth
Circuit expressly declined to consider either the § 1983 claim or the
privileges and immunities claim. 7 Therefore, the plaintiffs' cause of action
was not based on either § 1983 or the Fourteenth Amendment.376 Therefore,
the best explanation of Foster is that the plaintiffs' cause of action was
implied from the Supremacy Clause.377
In Morales v. Trans WorldAirlines,37t TWA, Continental, and British Air
sued the Attorney General of Texas to enjoin enforcement of the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, as applied to the airlines' fare advertising.379
The litigation later expanded to include eleven other airlines and the
attorneys general of thirty-three other states. 380 The airlines' preemption
claim relied on an express preemption clause in the Airline Deregulation
Act (ADA), which provides in part: "[N]o State or political subdivision
thereof.., shall enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard, or
374. See supra note 369.
375. 90 F.3d at 1032 n.8 ("The issues not considered in this opinion include whether plaintiffs have
stated a claim for violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
whether plaintiffs have stated a claim enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.").
376. Although the Fifth Circuit avoided the § 1983 claim, it is clear that the plaintiffs did not have a
valid § 1983 claim, because plaintiffs who assert federal statutory claims under § 1983 must show that
they are "intended beneficiaries" of the statute, see supra notes 207-215 and accompanying text, and the
federal election statutes, on their face, do not manifest an intent to benefit voters, see supra note 369.
377. An alternative explanation is that the plaintiffs' cause of action in both Shaw and Foster derived
from the Declaratory Judgment Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994) ("In a case of actual controversy
within its jurisdiction ... any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may
declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration ...."); 28
U.S.C. § 2202 (1994) ("Further necessary or proper relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree
may be granted ...."). If one agrees that the Shaw jurisdictional principle applies to claims for
declaratory relief, see supra note 300, then one could explain Shaw and its progeny as cases where
Young and Shaw provide the basis for federal question jurisdiction, and the Declaratory Judgment Act
provides the cause of action.
This author does not, in principle, reject this alternative explanation. However, it is well established
that the Declaratory Judgment Act does not provide an independent basis of federal questionjurisdiction.
See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 15-20 (1983). Therefore,
even under the alternative explanation, federal jurisdiction ultimately relies on the Supremacy Clause,
because that is the constitutional basis for the jurisdictional doctrine embodied in Young and Shaw.
378. 504 U.S. 374 (1992).
379. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Mattox, 897 F.2d 773,776 (5th Cir. 1990), affd inpart, rev'd
in part, 504 U.S. 374 (1992).
380. See id. at 775-76.
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other provision having the force and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or
services of any" airline governed by the ADA.38 On the basis of this
preemption provision, the Fifth Circuit upheld a district court order
enjoining the state attorneys general from enforcing state deceptive
advertising laws against advertising of fares by airlines," 2 and the U.S.
Supreme Court affirmed.383
The award of injunctive relief in Morales necessarily implies that the
plaintiffs had a valid cause of action. The published lower court opinions do
not explicitly identify the source of that cause of action,384 but the U.S.
Supreme Court's opinion does shed some light on the issue. Justice Scalia,
writing for the Court, raised the question of whether "the District Court
could properly award respondents injunctive relief."385 He noted that "[i]t is
a 'basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence that courts of equity should not
act ... when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not
suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief."' 386 He continued:
In Exparte Young, we held that this doctrine does not prevent federal
courts from enjoining state officers "who threaten and are about to
commence proceedings, either of a civil or criminal nature, to enforce
against parties affected an unconstitutional act, violating the Federal
Constitution." When enforcement actions are imminent-and at least
when repetitive penalties attach to continuing or repeated violations
and the moving party lacks the realistic option of violating the law
once and raising its federal defenses-there is no adequate remedy at
law. We think Young establishes that injunctive relief was available
here .... Like the plaintiff in Young, then, respondents were faced
with a Hobson's choice: continually violate the Texas law and expose
themselves to potentially huge liability; or violate the law once as a
381. 49 U.S.C. App. § 1305(a)(1) (1988).
382. See generally Mattox, 897 F.2d at 780 ("We conclude that state laws proscribing deceptive
advertising are preempted by § 1305(a)(1) when a state attempts to enforce such laws against the
advertising of fares by interstate and international airlines."); see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Morales, 949 F.2d 141, 143-45 (5th Cir. 1991) (upholding award of permanent injunction against 34
state attorneys general).
383. Morales, 504 U.S. at 383-91.
384. See generally Morales, 949 F.2d 141; Mattox, 897 F.2d 773; Trans World Airlines v. Mattox,
712 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Tex. 1989).
385. Morales, 504 U.S. at 381.
386. Id. (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488,499 (1974)).
1181
Washington Law Review
test case and suffer the injury of obeying the law during the pendency
of the proceedings and any further review.387
The statement that "Young establishes that injunctive relief was available
here" is tantamount to saying that the plaintiffs had an implied right of
action under the Young doctrine.388 In Morales, that right of action could not
be derived from the Fourteenth Amendment, because the only substantive
right at issue was a statutory right rooted in the ADA. 89 The ADA's
preemption clause does not create an express private cause of action."9
None of the published opinions in Morales state that a right of action can be
implied from the ADA, or that the plaintiffs' right of action is based on
§ 1983. Thus, the only plausible explanation of Morales is that the plaintiffs
had an implied right of action under the Supremacy Clause.
In addition to Foster and Morales, the U.S. Supreme Court has decided
at least ten other cases since Shaw in which it granted declaratory or
injunctive relief to plaintiffs who raised statutory preemption claims against
state or local government officers.' In two of these cases, the plaintiffs
cause of action derived from § 1983392 In one case, the preemptive federal
statute gave the plaintiffs a private right of action.3 93 In the other seven
cases, though, neither the U.S. Supreme Court opinions, nor the published
lower court opinions rely on either § 1983 or the preemptive federal statute
to establish plaintiffs' private right of action.9
387. Id. (quoting Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 156 (1908)) (emphasis added).
388. Moreover, the above-quoted language suggests that the elements of a Young cause of action are:
(1) plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law, (2) plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if equitable relief is
denied, and (3) plaintiff is suing a state government officer to enjoin a threatened or ongoing violation of
federal law. See Morales, 504 U.S. at 381. Additionally, Justice Scalia's opinion suggests that the first
element is satisfied if enforcement actions are imminent, repetitive penalties attach to continuing or
repeated violations, and the moving party lacks the realistic option of violating the law once and raising
its federal defenses. See id.
389. The plaintiffs in Morales did raise both First Amendment and Commerce Clause claims;
however, neither the district court nor the court of appeals addressed those claims. See Morales, 949
F.2d 141; Mattox, 897 F.2d 773; Mattox, 712 F. Supp. 99.
390. See supra note 381 and accompanying text.
391. See infra notes 392-395.
392. See Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1994) (holding that ruling by California Labor
Commissioner was preempted by National Labor Relations Act); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of
Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103 (1989) (holding that plaintiffs had valid claim under § 1983); Golden State
Transit Corp. v. City of L.A., 475 U.S. 608 (1986) (affirming lower court's preemption holding).
393. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988) (holding that local school board order was preempted by
Education of the Handicapped Act).
394. See Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S.Ct. 2288, 2302 (2000) (holding that
Massachusetts law restricting trade with Burma was preempted by federal statute restricting trade with
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As with Shaw and Young, the grant of relief in these seven cases
necessarily implies that the plaintiffs had a valid cause of action. In each
case, the fact that the courts did not mention § 1983 suggests that the
plaintiffs were not relying on § 1983 to establish a private right of action.
Similarly, the fact that the courts did not identify any cause of action under
the preemptive federal statute suggests that the statute did not provide a
cause of action. The Fourteenth Amendment cannot supply a right of action
in any of these cases because the Court did not grant relief on the basis of
Fourteenth Amendment rights.395 Nor can state law supply the necessary
private cause of action because the plaintiffs in every case asserted federal
rights to block enforcement of state laws. The only remaining possibility is
that the Supremacy Clause creates a right of action against state officers to
enjoin enforcement of state laws that are preempted by federal statutes.
4. Seminole Tribe
Seminole Tribe96 involved a suit by an Indian tribe against the State of
Florida and its Governor, Lawton Chiles.3 97 The tribe's principal allegation
Burma); National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (Ist Cir. 1999), aff'g National Foreign
Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287 (D. Mass. 1998)); United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89
(2000) (holding that Washington state laws related to oil tankers were preempted by Oil Pollution Act of
1990 and otherfederal statutes), rev'gIntertanko v. Locke, 148 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 1998), afl'g inpart,
rev'ginpartIntertanko v. Lowry, 947 F. Supp. 1484 (W.D. Wash. 1996); Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517
U.S. 25 (1996) (holding that Florida law that prohibited banks from selling insurance was preempted by
12 U.S.C. § 92 (1994)), rev'gBamett Bank v. Gallagher, 43 F.3d 631 (I th Cir. 1995); Gadev. National
Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992) (holding that Illinois health and safety statute was
preempted by Occupational Safety and Health Act), affgNational Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n v. Killian,
918 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1990); Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293 (1988) (holding that
Michigan statute regulating public utilities was preempted by Natural Gas Act), affg ANR Pipeline v.
Schneidewind, 801 F.2d 228 (6th Cir. 1986), rev'g ANR Pipeline Co. v. Schneidewind, 627 F. Supp.
923 (W.D. Mich. 1985); Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist., 469 U.S. 256 (1985) (holding
that state statute regulating distribution of federal funds was preempted by Payment in Lieu of Taxes
Act), rev'gLawrence County v. South Dakota, 668 F.2d 27 (Sth Cir. 1982), vac 'gLawrence County v.
South Dakota, 513 F. Supp. 1040 (D.S.D. 1981); Capital Cities Cable v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984)
(holding that Oklahoma law prohibiting advertising of alcoholic beverages on cable television was
preempted by FCC regulations), revg Oklahoma Telecasters Ass'n v. Crisp, 699 F.2d 490 (10th Cir.
1983).
395. In Crisp, the District Court held that Oklahoma's ban on cable television advertising ofalcoholic
beverages violated theFirst Amendment (as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment), and the
Tenth Circuit reversed. Crisp, 699 F.2d at 498-502. The U.S. Supreme Court, though, held that
Oklahoma's cable television advertising ban was preempted by FCC regulations. See Crisp, 467 U.S. at
705-09. The U.S. Supreme Court did not reach the First Amendment issue.
396. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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was that the defendants had violated, and were continuing to violate, a
provision of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) that obligated
Florida to negotiate in good faith with Indian tribes toward the formation of
a compact to regulate Indian gaming activities in the state.398 The IGRA,
which Congress enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause,399
specifically authorized tribes to bring suit in federal court to compel a state
to perform its duty to negotiate in good faith.4"0 The Court's central holding
was "that notwithstanding Congress' clear intent to abrogate the States'
sovereign immunity, the Indian Commerce Clause does not grant Congress
that power, and therefore [IGRA] cannot grant jurisdiction over a State that
does not consent to be sued."40
Having disposed of the tribe's claim against Florida on sovereign
immunity grounds, the majority next considered whether the Young doctrine
authorized the tribe's claim against the Governor. In the majority's opinion,
the express cause of action against the State created by § 271 0(d)(7)(A)(i) 402
did not authorize a Young action against the Governor.40 3 Therefore, the
only way that a suit against the Governor could have proceeded would have
been on the basis of an implied federal cause of action. The majority did not
explicitly reach the implied cause of action issue. 4° Instead, it decided that
397. See id. at 51.
398. See id. at 48-52.
399. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
400. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47.
401. Id.
402. The United States Code provides:
The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction over any cause of action initiated by an
Indian tribe arising from the failure of a State to enter into negotiations with the Indian tribe for the
purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact under paragraph (3) or to conduct such negotiations
in good faith ....
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) (1994).
403. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 74-75 & n. 17.
404. Even so, implicit in the majority's rationale is the assumption that the tribe would have had a
valid implied cause of action against the governor if the case had fallen within the Young exception to
Eleventh Amendment immunity. For example, in Seminole Tribe Chief Justice Rehnquist contended that
the express cause of action under section 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) "would have been superfluous" if the duty to
negotiate in good faith "could be enforced in a suit under Exparte Young." Id. at 75. This statement
makes sense only if one assumes that the Young doctrine supplies both an implied cause of action and an
exception to sovereign immunity. If the Young doctrine supplies the latter, but not the former, then the
express statutory cause of action would not have been superfluous.
Similarly, in Seminole Tribe the Chief Justice claimed that "an action brought against a state official
under Exparte Young would expose that official to the full remedial powers of a federal court." Id. This
statement implies that, once a court decides that an action falls within the scope of the Young exception
1184
Vol. 75:1103, 2000
Federal Remedies for Human Rights Treaty Violations
the tribe's claim against the Governor did not fall within the Young
exception to state sovereign immunity, because Congress had manifested its
intent to preclude a Young action against the Governor by creating a
detailed remedial scheme that imposed "upon the State a liability that is
significantly more limited than would be the liability imposed upon the state
officer under Exparte Young."'' 5
In short, Seminole Tribe makes it clear that Congress has the power,
when it enacts a statute, to foreclose the availability of a Young remedy for
violations of that statute." 6 Therefore, in deciding whether to imply a Young
remedy for a federal statutory violation, a court must ascertain whether
Congress intended to foreclose the availability of such a remedy. Justice
Souter, writing for the dissent in Seminole Tribe, would have courts insist
"on a clear statement before assuming a congressional purpose" to foreclose
the availability of a Young remedy." 7 The majority would not impose such a
clear statement requirement.4" However, it bears emphasis that the majority
would not require a clear statement of an affirmative congressional intent to
create a private right of action.4" 9 Rather, the majority opinion suggests that
courts should adopt a presumption in favor of the availability of a Young
remedy for prospective relief against state officers who violate federal
statutes, but that presumption can be rebutted either by an explicit statement
of congressional intent to preclude the remedy, or by showing that Congress
"prescribed a detailed remedial scheme""'0 that gives rise to an inference
that Congress intended to preclude the remedy.""
to sovereign immunity, the court's general equitable powers enable it to grant any remedy that is
consistent with the Young doctrine (including the bar against retroactive relief). It goes without saying,
however, that a court cannot grant a remedy to a plaintiffwho lacks a valid cause of action. Therefore,
implicit in the Chief Justice's assertion is the proposition that the general equitable powers of the federal
courts authorize them to imply a right ofaction for prospective reliefwhenever a plaintiffstates a claim
that falls within the Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
405. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 75-76.
406. The dissent in Seminole Tribe agreed with this proposition. See id. at 174 (Souter, J., dissenting)
("I do not in theory reject the Court's assumption that Congress may bar enforcement by suit even
against a state official.").
407. Id. at 175.
408. See id. at 73-76.
409. See id.
410. Id. at 74.
411. TheU.S. SupremeCourthas applied essentially thesame criterion in § 1983 cases raising federal
statutory claims against state officers, see supra notes 189-92 and accompanying text, and in APA suits
for injunctive relief against federal officers, see supra notes 143-50 and accompanying text. There is a
subtle distinction, however, between the application of this criterion in the APA context, and its
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5. The Cort v. Ash Cases
When viewed together, Seminole Tribe and the statutory preemption
cases support two conclusions. First, the Supremacy Clause creates an
implied right of action for injunctive relief against state officers who violate
federal statutes. This includes a right of action against state officers to
enjoin enforcement of state laws that are preempted by federal statutes.
Second, Congress can foreclose the availability of such an implied right of
action by manifesting its intent to preclude that remedy.
One possible objection to the first conclusion is that it is inconsistent
with the Cort v. Ash4 12 line of cases. In Cort v. Ash, the U.S. Supreme Court
established a four-part test for determining whether to imply a private right
of action from a federal statute that does not create an express private cause
of action.4" Subsequent cases, while frequently invoking the formula of the
four-part test, generally refuse to imply a private right of action from federal
statutes absent affirmative evidence of congressional intent to create a
private cause of action.4"4
application in the § 1983 context. In the APA context, there is a strong presumption that Congress did
not intend to preclude judicial relief, and the Court requires clear and convincing evidence to overcome
that presumption. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text. In the context of § 1983 suits for
retroactive relief, the Court has been more willing to imply a legislative intent to foreclose a remedy. See
Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1009-13 (1984) (noting "Congress intended the EHA [Education of
the Handicapped Act] to be the exclusive avenue through which a plaintiff may assert an equal
protection claim to a publicly financed special education," because the EHA includes a comprehensive
remedial scheme); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 20
(1981) ("When the remedial devices provided in a particular Act are sufficiently comprehensive, they
may suffice to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under § 1983.").
In Seminole Tribe, Justice Souter contended that an APA-like approach should apply to Young suits
for prospective relief against state officers. Seminole Tribe, 5 17 U.S. at 174-75 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(contending that Court should not "recognize an intent to block the customary application of Exparte
Young without applying the rule recognized in our previous cases, which have insisted on a clear
statement before assuming a congressional purpose to" foreclose remedy). In contrast, the majority
opinion in Seminole Tribe adopted something closer to the § 1983 approach. Id. at 73-76.
412. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
413. Id. at 78. The Court stated:
In determining whethera private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one, several
factors are relevant. First, is the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was
enacted... ? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create
such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative
scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally
relegated to state law... ?
Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
414. See Karahalios v. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, 489 U.S. 527, 532-33 (1989) ("The
'ultimate issue is whether Congress intended to create a private cause of action.' Unless such
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The cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to imply a
private cause of action absent affirmative evidence of congressional intent
typically involve claims against private parties.415 In claims against private
parties, it makes sense for courts to insist upon affirmative evidence of
congressional intent to create a private cause of action for federal statutory
violations, because the rule-of-law and federal supremacy concerns that
support creation of a private remedy in Young cases are not present.
Moreover, implication of a private cause of action in such cases would be
contrary to principles of judicial deference to the legislative branch.416
California v. Sierra Club417 is apparently the only case involving claims
for prospective relief against state government officers in which the Court
has applied the Cort v. Ash test.4t8 In Sierra Club, an environmental
organization and private citizens sought injunctive relief against state
officers to prevent operation of certain water diversion facilities in
California.419 Plaintiffs alleged that operation of the facilities would violate
'congressional intent can be inferred from the language of the statute, the statutory structure, or some
other source, the essential predicate for implication of a private remedy simply does not exist."')
(citations omitted); Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 770 (1981) ("[T]he question
whether a statute creates a private right of action is ultimately 'one of congressional intent.') (citation
omitted); TransAmerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979) ("[W]hat must
ultimately be determined is whether Congress intended to create the private remedy asserted."); Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560,578 (1979) ("I]n a series of cases sinceBorakwe have adhered
to a stricter standard for the implication of private causes of action, and we follow that stricter standard
today. The ultimate question is one of congressional intent... "); see also Hart & Wechsler, supra note
116, at 839-46.
415. See Karahaios, 489 U.S. 527, 529 (holding, in suit formoney damages against laborunion, that
Title VII of Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 did not confer private cause of action on plaintiff);
Universities Research, 450 U.S. 754, 768-70 (holding, in suit by former employee against non-profit
consortium of universities, that Davis-Bacon Act did not confer private cause of action for damages on
plaintiff); TransAmerica Mortgage Advisors, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (holding, in shareholder derivative action,
that Investment Advisers Act of 1940 did not create private cause of action for damages); Touche Ross,
442 U.S. 560, 579 (holding, in suit for money damages against accountants, that Securities Exchange
Act did not confer private cause of action on plaintiffs); Cor, 422 U.S. 66, 68-69 (refusing, in case
where stockholder sued corporate directors for violation of federal criminal statute, to imply private
cause of action for damages).
416. For a discussion uf the application of Cort v. Ash to treaty-based claims against private parties,
see Vfzquez, supra note 8, at 1155-57.
417. 451 U.S. 287 (1981).
418. A portion of the Court's opinion in Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992), also applies the Cor
v. Ash test to a claim for prospective relief against a state government officer. Id. at 363-64. However,
most of the Court's opinion is devoted to plaintiffs' § 1983 claims. See id. at 355-63. Accordingly, this
Article treats Suter as a § 1983 case. See infra notes 433-35 and accompanying text.
419. See Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 289. The complaint also named certain federal officers as
defendants, see id. at 291, but the analysis here will focus on the claims against the state officers.
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Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 because
the responsible state officials had failed to obtain a permit from the Corps of
Engineers, which the Act required.4 2' The Ninth Circuit, addressing the
merits of the issue, concluded that operation of the facilities without the
requisite permit might be a violation of federal law, depending upon the
resolution of certain factual issues, which it remanded to the district court.42
The U.S. Supreme Court never reached the merits of the issue. It framed
the question as whether "a private right of action can be implied on behalf
of those allegedly injured by a claimed violation of § 10.''422 The Court
emphasized that "the focus of the inquiry is on whether Congress intended
to create a remedy. The federal judiciary will not engraft a remedy on a
statute, no matter how salutary, that Congress did not intend to provide."423
Finding that there was no "evidence that Congress anticipated that there
would be a private remedy, 424 the Court refused to imply a private right of
action.
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Sierra Club was misguided
because the Court applied the Cort v. Ash test to a case that should have
been treated as a Young case. The plaintiffs' claim was clearly offensive for
purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule because the plaintiffs sought to
enjoin ongoing actions by state officers that allegedly violated federal
law.425 The Ninth Circuit determined that the plaintiffs had standing to raise
the claim,426 and the U.S. Supreme Court did not reverse that ruling. If the
U.S. Supreme Court had reached the merits and had found that the state
officers were indeed violating federal law, it would have been well within
the reach of the Court's traditional equitable powers to grant the requested
relief-in other words, to order California officials to obtain the necessary
federal permits.
The Court's apparent conclusion that issuance of such an injunction
would be contrary to congressional intent427 is bizarre. Assuming that the
420. See id. at 291-92.
421. Sierra Club v. Andrus, 610 F.2d 581, 605-07 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd, California v. Sierra Club,
451 U.S. 287 (1981).
422. 451 U.S. at 290.
423. Id. at 297.
424. Id. at 298.
425. See supra notes 256-62 and 288-93 and accompanying text.
426. Andrus, 610 F.2d at 592-93.
427. See Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 298 ("Nor is there any evidence that Congress anticipated that there
would be a private remedy .... [W]e cannot consider the merits of a claim which Congress has not
authorized respondents to raise.").
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statute at issue in Sierra Club required the states to obtain a federal permit
for state water projects, and assuming that the permit requirement applied to
the specific project at issue in that case, there is no reason to assume that
Congress would not want federal courts to enforce the permit requirement.
The U.S. Supreme Court's approach-refusing to enforce the permit
requirement without a specific congressional directive to do so-is
tantamount to a general presumption that Congress wants the federal courts
to acquiesce in ongoing violations of federal law by state officers. That
presumption is at odds with the Young doctrine and with the reality of the
legislative process."'
6. Section 1983 Cases
Another possible objection to the conclusion that the Supremacy Clause
creates an implied right of action for injunctive relief against state officers
who violate federal statutes is that judicial recognition of such an implied
right of action would be inconsistent with the legislative intent underlying
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because § 1983 provides an express right of action for
injunctive relief against state officers who violate federal statutes,429 one
could argue, courts should not supplement the congressionally created
remedy by creating ajudicial remedy for plaintiffs whose § 1983 claims are
barred.
One response to this objection is that the U.S. Supreme Court has
consistently upheld statutory preemption claims for injunctive relief against
state officers without reference to § 1983.430 Judicial recognition of implied
rights of action in statutory preemption cases is justified, in part, by the fact
that the plaintiffs in those cases sought only prospective equitable relief, not
damages. In contrast, most of the Court cases in which plaintiffs raised
federal statutory claims (as opposed to constitutional claims) pursuant to
428. In Seminole Tribe, Justice Souter stated in his dissent:
I do not in theory reject the Court's assumption that Congress may bar enforcement [ofa federal
law] by suit [for prospective relief] against a state official. But because in practice, in the real world
of congressional legislation, such an intent would be exceedingly odd, it would be equally odd for
this Court to recognize an intent to block the customary application of Exparte Young without... a
clear statement [of] congressional purpose [to preclude suits to enjoin ongoing violations of federal
law by state officers].
517 U.S. 44, 174-75 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).
429. See supra Part III.C.
430. See supra Part IV.C.3.
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§ 1983 have involved retroactive claims for money damages.43' Thus, the
criteria the Court has established for analyzing federal statutory claims
under § 1983432 were developed primarily in the context of cases that could
not have been brought under the Young doctrine.
However, there are two U.S. Supreme Court cases raising federal
statutory claims under § 1983 that fall within the scope of the Young
doctrine because the plaintiffs sought only prospective relief against state
officers.433 In both cases, the Court denied the requested relief. In Suter v.
Artist M, 434 the Court's opinion is so inscrutable that it is difficult to
determine the extent to which the Court relied on the established § 1983
criteria to justify its conclusion.435 Blessing v. Freestone,436 though, relied
431. See Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107,111-12 (1994) (involving plaintiffwho sought payment
of back wages); Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 504 (1990) (involving health care
provider who sought reimbursement for past expenses related to Medicaid Act); Golden State Transit
Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 104, 113 (1989) (reversing District Court decision that
plaintiffwas not entitled to compensatory damages); Wright v. City ofRoanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth.,
479 U.S. 418,421 (1987) (involving tenants who sought reimbursement for fees charged that exceeded
limit set by federal statute); Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 995-98 (1984) (involving handicapped
child who sought attorneys' fees and costs for suit to enforce federal right to educational assistance);
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 4 (198 1) (stating that
issue presented is "the availability of a damages remedy"); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1,3-4 (1980)
(affirming retroactive award of welfare benefits).
432. See supra notes 187-93 and accompanying text for a summary of these criteria.
433. See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 337 (1997) (involving mothers of children eligible to
receive child support services from State who sued director of Arizona's child support agency, seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief to mandate "affirmative measures sufficient to achieve as well as sustain
substantial compliance with federal law"); Suterv. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347,352 (1992) (involving class-
action suit against officers of Illinois Department of Children and Family Services by plaintiffs who
sought declaratory and injunctive relief to enforce compliance with federal law allegedly requiring state
officers to "make reasonable efforts to prevent removal of children from their homes and to facilitate
reunification of families where removal had occurred").
434. 503 U.S. 347 (1992).
435. Indeed, the dissent chides the majority because "the Court reaches its conclusion without even
stating, much less applying, the principles our precedents have used to determine whether a statute has
created a right enforceable under § 1983." Suter, 503 U.S. at 365 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Portions of
the majority opinion suggest that the case was decided on the ground that the defendants did not violate
any substantive provision of federal law. See id. at 358 (" [T]he Act does place a requirement on the
States, but that requirement only goes so far as to ensure that the State have a plan approved by the
Secretary which contains the 16 listed features. Respondents do not dispute that Illinois in fact has a plan
approved by the Secretary [that contains those features]"); id. at 361 ("The regulations promulgated by
the Secretary... do not evidence a view that § 671 (a) places any requirement for state receipt of federal
funds other than the requirement that the State submit a plan to be approved by the Secretary."). Insofar
as the Court's holding rests on the conclusion that the defendants did not violate any substantive federal
law, it is fully consistent with the Young doctrine. Other portions of the opinion suggest that the case was
decided on the ground that § 1983 did not provide a remedy for a violation of the federal statute at issue.
Id. at 356 (stating that statute "did not create enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities within the
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squarely on the established § 1983 criteria-in particular, the intended
beneficiary criterion437-as a basis for denying prospective relief to
plaintiffs who raised a Young-type claim.438 Inasmuch as Blessing rejected
plaintiffs' claim for prospective equitable relief against state officers on the
ground that plaintiffs failed to establish that they were intended
beneficiaries of the federal statute,439 Blessing is inconsistent with Shaw and
the other statutory preemption cases in which the Court has awarded
prospective equitable relief without regard to whether the plaintiffs were
intended beneficiaries of the federal statute. Thus, Blessing raises the issue
whether, as a policy matter, plaintiffs who seek injunctive relief against
state officers for federal statutory violations should be required to prove that
they are intended beneficiaries of the statute.
This Article has emphasized that the Young doctrine is justified by the
federal interest in promoting the supremacy of federal law and vindicating
the rule of law."' In cases where a state or local government officer has
violated a federal statute, but the violation has ended, and the plaintiff is
denied retroactive relief on the grounds that he or she is not an intended
beneficiary of the statute, the denial of relief does not raise significant
concerns about federal supremacy or the rule of law.44 Moreover, an award
of money damages in such a case would contravene Congressional intent by
conferring a private benefit on someone whom the statute was not intended
to benefit. Therefore, in § 1983 suits against state and local government
officers for money damages, it makes sense to limit the class of eligible
plaintiffs to intended beneficiaries of the statute.
In contrast, where a state or local government officer is engaged in an
ongoing violation of a federal statute, and a plaintiff with standing to sue
presents an actual controversy that is ripe for decision, if the court denies
meaning of § 1983"). Insofar as the Court's holding rests on its ostensible inability to provide
prospective relieffor an ongoing statutory violation, that holding is inconsistent with the Youngdoctrine.
436. 520 U.S. 329 (1997).
437. One key criterion limiting the availability of§ 1983 remedies for federal statutory violations is
that "Congress must have intended that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff." Blessing, 520
U.S. at 340; see also supra notes 207-14 and accompanying text.
438. See Blessing, 520 U.S. at 343-44.
439. See id.
440. Supra notes 242-44.
441. Fora contrary view, see Carlos Manuel Vkzquez, What is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106
Yale L.J. 1683, 1777-85 (1997) (contending that Supremacy Clause establishes implied right of action
for damages remedy against state officers who have committed past violations of federal law).
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prospective equitable relief on the grounds that the plaintiff is not an
intended beneficiary of the statute, the court's refusal to provide a remedy is
tantamount to judicial complicity in the government officer's ongoing
violation of federal law. That raises very serious concerns about the rule of
law and the supremacy of federal law. Therefore, a plaintiff's failure to
satisfy the intended beneficiary criterion applied in § 1983 suits for money
damages should not bar a Young action for injunctive relief."2
There may be cases in which the political branches clearly intended to
rely on the executive branch, and not private attorneys general, to remedy
ongoing violations of federal statutes by state officers. In such cases,
judicial refusal to provide prospective relief to a private plaintiff is not
complicity in an ongoing violation of federal law, but rather appropriate
judicial deference to the political branches. However, such cases are
effectively addressed by inquiring whether Congress specifically foreclosed
a private remedy-an inquiry that is doctrinally required in both § 1983 and
Young cases."4 In cases where the political branches did not foreclose a
private remedy, though, it would be an abdication ofjudicial responsibility
to deny prospective relief, in reliance on the intended beneficiary criterion,
to a plaintiff who alleges an ongoing violation of a federal statute by a state
or local government officer.
In sum, Young, Shaw, and the post-Shaw statutory preemption cases
demonstrate that there is an implied right of action under the Supremacy
Clause for claims for injunctive relief against state officers who violate
federal statutes. Seminole Tribe establishes that Congress can foreclose the
availability of such an implied right of action by manifesting its intent to
preclude that remedy. The Cort v. Ash line of cases is distinguishable
because the affirmative intent test utilized in those cases is properly applied
only to claims against private parties. Finally, the § 1983 statutory cases are
distinguishable because the intended beneficiary criterion applied in those
cases makes sense only in the context of claims for money damages.
442. There is an additional reason why application of the intended beneficiary requirement in suits for
injunctive relief is not justified. An award of injunctive relief against government officers frequently
benefits a wide class of people other than the nominal plaintiff. The U.S. Supreme Court's APA
jurisprudence effectively accounts for the public benefit aspect of suits for injunctive relief against
government officers by applying a fairly broad interpretation of the zone-of-interests test. See supra
notes 161-66 and accompanying text. In contrast, strict application of the intended-beneficiary criterion
in cases such as Blessing, where plaintiffs seek equitable relief against state or local government officers,
fails to account for the public benefit aspect of such suits.
443. See supra notes 189-92, 396-408 and accompanying text.
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D. Young, Shaw, and Treaty-Based Preemption Claims
Having established that the Supremacy Clause creates an implied right of
action against state officers to enjoin enforcement of state laws that are
preempted by federal statutes, this section contends that the implied right of
action also extends to some treaty-based preemption claims. The argument
is divided into three sections. The first section distinguishes between four
types of treaty provisions and shows that the question of implied rights of
action pertains only to one of those four types. The second section addresses
the applicability of Young and Shaw to treaty claims generally. The final
section focuses specifically on human rights treaties.
1. Four Types of Treaty Provisions
Part II of this Article distinguished three different meanings of the term
non self-executing, as applied to treaty provisions. Some non-self-executing
treaty provisions have no domestic legal effect in the absence of
implementing legislation.4' Other non-self-executing treaty provisions have
domestic legal effect, but separation of powers principles preclude U.S.
courts from providing judicial remedies for violations of treaty rights."5 A
third meaning of non-self-execution is that treaty provisions do not create
private rights of action; under this interpretation, judicial remedies are
available in some cases." 6
This distinction between three different meanings of the term non self-
executing leads to a four-fold classification of treaty provisions. Type I
treaty provisions are fully self-executing, meaning that they create private
rights of action. Type II treaty provisions are judicially enforceable in some
cases, but do not create private rights of action. Type III treaty provisions
have domestic legal effect, but are notjudicially enforceable. Finally, Type
IV treaty provisions have no domestic legal effect in the absence of
implementing legislation.
Assuming that the Supremacy Clause creates an implied right of action
against state officers to enjoin enforcement of state laws that are preempted
by treaty provisions, that right of action would not apply to Type IV treaty
provisions, because they are not the law of the land under the Supremacy
444. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text; see also Sloss, supra note 19, at 146-47.
445. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text; see also Sloss, supra note 19, at 147-49.
446. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text; see also Sloss, supra note 19, at 151-52.
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Clause."7 Nor would such an implied right of action apply to Type III treaty
provisions, because separation of powers principles preclude judicial
enforcement of such treaty provisions." 8 Moreover, an implied right of
action is not necessary for Type I treaty provisions, because Type I treaty
provisions contain their own right of action."9 Thus, the question of an
implied right of action under the Supremacy Clause pertains only to Type II
treaty provisions.45
2. Treaty-Based Preemption Claims Against State Officers
The U.S. Supreme Court has not explicitly decided whether the Young
exception to the Eleventh Amendment applies to cases alleging violations
of federal treaties by state officers. However, the courts of appeals that have
addressed the issue agree that the Young exception to state sovereign
immunity is broad enough to encompass violations of federal treaties by
447. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 115(3) (1987) ("A
rule of international law or a provision of an international agreement of the United States will not be
given effect as law in the United States if it is inconsistent with the United States Constitution."); id.
§ 111 cmt. i ("An intemational agreement cannot take effect as domestic law without implementation by
Congress if the agreement would achieve what lies within the exclusive law-making power of Congress
under the Constitution.").
448. For example, even though the Administrative Procedure Act creates a right of action for
injunctive relief against federal officers to enforce some treaty-based claims, seesupra Part II1.B, courts
probably would not entertain a claim against the Secretary of Defense alleging a violation of a U.S.-
Russian arms-control agreement because separation-of-powers principles dictate that the task of ensuring
U.S. compliance with its arms control treaty obligations is an executive branch function, not ajudicial
function. See Vazquez, supra note 74, at 717.
449. See ICCPR, supra note 12, art. 9, 9] 4 ("Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or
detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without
delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful.").
450. Some may contend that the class of Type II treaty provisions is a null set. According to this view,
courts distinguish between self-executing treaty provisions, which are judicially enforceable, and non-
self-executing treaty provisions, which are not judicially enforceable. Thus, one could argue, there is no
middle category of non-self-executing treaty provisions that are judicially enforceable.
A detailed response to this argument is beyond the scope of this Article. However, it is worth noting
that there are lower court decisions that support limited judicial enforcement of non-self-executing treaty
provisions. See, e.g., Ralk v. Lincoln County, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1380 (S.D. Ga. 2000) (stating "that
because the ICCPR is not self-executing, Ralk can advance no private right of action under that
document" but noting that "Ralk could bring a claim under the Alien Tort Claims Act for violations of
the ICCPR"); Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269, 1274 (E.D. Va. 1996) (noting that
Vienna Convention is not self-executing in sense that it does not confer "rights of action on private
individuals," but holding that "Paraguay has standing to seek redress for violations," and that "this Court
has the power to interpret the treaties and fashion an equitable remedy"). For a more detailed analysis of
judicial enforcement of treaties that do not create a private right of action, see Vhzquez, supra note 8, at
1143-57.
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state officers.45 Moreover, in one case where the Eighth Circuit explicitly
relied on Young to overcome an Eleventh Amendment defense to a treaty-
based claim, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the plaintiffs' treaty-based
claim for injunctive relief against state officers, without discussing the
lower court's resolution of the Eleventh Amendment issue.452 Even the
cases in which courts of appeals have invoked the Eleventh Amendment to
bar treaty-based claims against state officers have tacitly acknowledged the
general applicability of Young to such claims.453 Therefore, the Eleventh
Amendment does not bar claims against state officers to enjoin future
enforcement of state laws that are preempted by treaty provisions.
This author has not identified any published judicial decision that
explicitly addresses the precise question whether treaty-based preemption
claims for injunctive relief against state officers are offensive claims for
purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule. However, there is at least one
U.S. Supreme Court decision holding that a treaty-based claim for damages
451. See Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 124 F.3d 904, 913-14 (8th Cir. 1997)
aft'd, 526 U.S. 172 (1999) (holding, based on Exparte Young, that Eleventh Amendment does not bar
plaintiffs' treaty-based claims for prospective relief against Minnesota Commissioner of Natural
Resources); Fond du Lac Band of Chippewa Indians v. Carlson, 68 F.3d 253, 255-56 (8th Cir. 1995)
(holding that treaty-based claim against governorof Minnesota "falls squarely within the doctrine ofEx
parte Young"); Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Voigt, 700 F.2d 341,
365 (7th Cir. 1983) (relying implicitly on Young exception to sovereign immunity in action for
declaratory judgment against Wisconsin state officials to supportjudgment for Indian plaintiffs whose
treaty rights were violated); see also ChristopherL. Lafuse, Note, BeyondBlatchford v. Native Village
of Noatak. Permitting the Indian Tribes to Sue the States, 26 Val. U. L. Rev. 639, 653-54 (1992)
(contending that Young allows federal court to grant injunctive relief to force state official to comply
with terms of federal treaty).
452. Mille Lacs Band, 526 U.S. 172 (affirming lower court order in favor of Indian tribes who sought
declaratory and injunctive relief against Minnesota officials to enforce hunting and fishing rights based
on 1837 treaty). The U.S. Supreme Court opinion addressed two separate cases that were consolidated
on appeal. See id. at 185-87. In Fond du Lac, the Eight Circuit's Eleventh Amendment holding rested
exclusively on the Young doctrine, because the United States never intervened in that case. 68 F.3d at
255-57. The United States did intervene in the Mille Lacs case. 124 F.3d at 912-14. Accordingly, the
Eighth Circuit rejected Minnesota's Eleventh Amendment defense in the Mille Lacs case on two
independent grounds: (1) the Young doctrine and (2) the fact of U.S. intervention. See id.
453. See Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622, 627 (4th Cir. 1998) (deciding that, in action
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against GovemorofVirginia for alleged treaty violation, Young
exception to Eleventh Amendment did not apply because "the violation alleged here is not an ongoing
one for Exparte Young purposes and... the essential reliefsought is not prospective"); United Mexican
States v. Woods, 126 F.3d 1220, 1223 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that, in suit against Arizona attorney
general foralleged treaty violation, "request for a'declaration' that Arizona's past conduct violated the
treaties does not convert the action into one forprospective relief," and "Young exception is inapplicable
because Mexico alleges no continuing violations of federal or international law.").
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against a local government satisfied the well-pleaded complaint rule.454
Moreover, given that statutory preemption claims for injunctive relief
against state officers are offensive, the thesis that treaty-based preemption
claims for injunctive relief against state officers are defensive is
unsupportable as a matter of both logic and principle. Therefore, such
claims should be considered offensive for purposes of the well-pleaded
complaint rule.
The more difficult question is whether the Supremacy Clause creates an
implied right of action against state officers to enjoin enforcement of state
laws that are allegedly preempted by Type II treaty provisions. To some
extent, the policy implications of this question are similar to the policy
issues that pertain to statutory preemption claims.455 As with statutes, rule of
law and federal supremacy concerns, together with courts' general equitable
powers, support the implication of a right of action in appropriate cases. In
contrast, principles of state sovereignty and judicial deference to the
political branches weigh against judicial implication of remedies.
Apart from the above considerations, which apply to both statutes and
treaties, there is at least one additional factor that supports an implied cause
of action under the Supremacy Clause for treaty-based preemption claims
for injunctive relief against state officers. A judicial decision to dismiss a
treaty-based claim against a state officer, on the grounds that the plaintiff
lacks a private right of action, may in some cases result in U.S.
noncompliance with its treaty obligations. In such cases, the policy
objective of ensuring U.S. compliance with its treaty obligations supports
judicial recognition of an implied cause of action under the Supremacy
Clause, at least for Type II treaty provisions.456
454. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 667 (1974) (holding, in case where
Indian tribes who sued counties in federal court to recover damages representing fair rental value of land
in which they asserted property right, and where court of appeals dismissed for failure to satisfy well-
pleaded complaint rule, that "the complaint asserted a controversy arising under the Constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States.").
455. See supra Part IV.C. I.
456. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (1 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) ("[A]n act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
remains."). The U.S. Supreme Court has invoked this maxim not only to avoid conflicts with general
principles of international law, but also to avoid conflicts with specific provisions of international
agreements. See Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 36 (1982) (holding that employment discrimination
statute did not abrogate executive agreements between United States and foreign countries providing for
preferential hiring of local nationals on U.S. military bases overseas). Although the maxim is typically
applied in cases involving statutory construction, see Sloss, supra note 19, at 206 & n.368, the
underlying principle applies with equal force in cases where courts are determining the scope of a
1196
Vol. 75:1103, 2000
Federal Remedies for Human Rights Treaty Violations
One could argue that courts should be more hesitant to create implied
rights of action in treaty cases than in statutory cases, because treaties
generally regulate relations between nations, not relations between
individuals and governments. This argument is not without merit, but it is
best understood in terms of the distinction between Type II and III treaty
provisions. Treaty provisions that merely regulate relations between nations
are generally treated as Type III provisions, which are not judicially
enforceable.457 However, treaty provisions that regulate relations between
individuals and governments are generally treated as Type I or II treaty
provisions, which are judicially enforceable. 8 Thus, the fact that Type III
treaty provisions regulate relations between nations does not weigh against
judicial recognition of implied rights of action in cases where plaintiffs base
their claims on Type II treaty provisions.
3. Claims Based on Human Rights Treaties
Recall the previous hypothetical, in which Michael Hardwick was
arrested in 1999 for engaging in private consensual sexual activity with
another adult male.459 Assume that he was charged with violating the state
sodomy law, but the prosecutor dropped the charges.4" In this hypothetical
case, Hardwick sued the state attorney general in federal district court for
prospective injunctive relief, claiming a right of action under the Supremacy
Clause. He alleged that the state sodomy law is invalid, as applied to private
consensual sexual activity, because it conflicts with Article 17 of the
judicially created remedy. Therefore, ajudicially created remedy should not be construed to violate a
treaty if any other reasonable construction is possible.
457. See Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884) ("A treaty is primarily a compact between
independent nations. It depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and.., the honorof
the governments which are parties to it .... [W]ith all this the judicial courts have nothing to do and can
give no redress.").
458. In the Head Money Cases, the Court stated that
[some treaty] provisions prescribe a rule by which the rights of the private citizen or subject may be
determined. And when such rights are of a nature to be enforced in a court ofjustice, that court
resorts to the treaty for a rule of decision for the case before it as it would to a statute.
See id. at 598-99
459. See supra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
460. In the actual case, Hardwick was arrested and charged, but "the District Attorney's office
decided not to present the case to the grand jury unless further evidence developed." Hardwick v.
Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1204 (11th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986).
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ICCPR.46' Assume that Hardwick's past arrest is sufficient to give him
standing,462 and that his claim presents an actual controversy that is ripe for
adjudication.
The preceding analysis establishes that the Eleventh Amendment does
not bar Hardwick's claim and that his claim satisfies the well-pleaded
complaint rule.463 The issue, therefore, is whether the implied right of action
under the Supremacy Clause is sufficiently broad to permit the court to
entertain Hardwick's claim. The argument in favor of an implied right of
action is essentially as follows. Article 17 of the ICCPR is clearly intended
to confer rights on individuals and is therefore judicially enforceable (Type
II). Although the ICCPR itself does not create a private cause of action, the
court's traditional equitable powers enable it to fashion an equitable remedy
for injunctive relief against state government officers who violate treaty
rights.4" Failure to provide such a remedy would be contrary to the rule-of-
law and federal supremacy principles underlying the Young doctrine.
Judicial refusal to reach the merits of Hardwick's claim would constitute a
breach of the U.S. treaty obligation under Article 2(3) of the ICCPR to
ensure that a "competent authority" determines Hardwick's right to a
remedy;465 it would also be contrary to the treaty makers' intent to comply
with the United States's obligation under Article 2(3).466
461. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text (discussing Article 17 and state sodomy laws).
462. In the actual case, the Eleventh Circuit held that Hardwick's past arrest, "combined with the
continuing resolve on the part of the State to enforce the sodomy statute against homosexuals and the
authenticity of Hardwick's desire to engage in the proscribed activity in the future" was sufficient to
establish Hardwick's standing to bring the claim. See Hardwick, 706 F.2d at 1206.
463. See supra notes 451-54 and accompanying text.
464. See supra notes 221, 349, & 384-89 and accompanying text.
465. The ICCPR obligates the United States "[t]o ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as
herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy" and "[t]o ensure that any person claiming
such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by ... [a] competent authority provided for by the
legal system of the State." ICCPR, supra note 12, art. 2, T 3. This language, on its face, obligates the
United States to ensure that individual claimants receive an individual hearing before an impartial
tribunal. Therefore, a generalized determination by the political branches that Article 17 protects only
redundant rights is not sufficient to satisfy the U.S. obligation under Article 2(3). In the hypothetical
Hardwick case, the courts are the only "competent authority provided for by the legal system" of the
United States. Thus, if the court dismisses Hardwick's claim without deciding whether his treaty rights
have been violated, the United States would be in breach of its Article 2(3) obligation to ensure that
Hardwick's right to a remedy is determined by a competent authority.
466. The fact that the United States did not adopt a reservation with respect to Article 2(3) shows that
the treaty makers intended for the United States to comply with Article 2(3). Hence, the court's failure to
reach the merits of Hardwick's claim would be contrary to the intent of the treaty makers.
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The non-self-executing (NSE) declaration attached to the ICCPR does
not preclude judicial enforcement of the treaty; it merely signifies that the
treaty does not create a private right of action. Hardwick would be relying
on the Supremacy Clause, not the treaty, to establish a private right of
action. Therefore, the NSE declaration would not bar Hardwick's claim.
Moreover, the Seminole Tribe limitation on the implied right of action
under the Supremacy Clause is analogous to the bar on § 1983 actions
where Congress has foreclosed such enforcement,467 and to the bar on APA
actions where "statutes preclude judicial review.""68 This Article has already
established that the treaty makers did not foreclose enforcement of the
ICCPR pursuant to § 1983,469 nor did they preclude judicial review of
ICCPR claims brought pursuant to the APA."7° The same rationale
demonstrates that Seminole Tribe would not be a bar to Hardwick's claim.
One objection to this line of argument is that the NSE declaration
effectively converted Article 17 of the ICCPR from a Type II (or Type I)
treaty provision into a Type III treaty provision, thereby precluding judicial
enforcement altogether. This argument was rejected above,"7' and does not
merit further discussion.
A more subtle objection to the preceding argument is as follows.
Assuming that Article 17 of the ICCPR, as modified by the NSE
declaration, is a Type II treaty provision, there are at least three possible
ways to draw the line between permissible and impermissible judicial
remedies for violations of Article 17. The conservative approach would
permit defensive remedies for Article 17 violations but prohibit offensive
remedies. 72 The moderate approach would permit remedies based upon
express rights of action, such as the APA, but prohibit remedies based upon
implied rights of action. The liberal approach would permit claims for
467. See supra note 411.
468. 5 U.S.C. §701(a)(1) (1994).
469. See supra notes 189-92 and accompanying text. The preceding analysis showed that § 1983
claims for human rights treaty violations are barred because ofthe "intended beneficiary" criterion, not
because Congress foreclosed enforcement. See supra part II.C. Seminole Tribe does not say that the
plaintiff must be an intended beneficiary of the statute in order to bring a Young claim for a federal
statutory violation. Seminole Tribe merely says that a Young claim is barred if Congress intended to
foreclose the availability of a Young remedy. See supra part IV.C.
470. See supra notes 143-50 and accompanying text.
471. See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
472. In other words, Hardwick could invoke Article 17 as a defense to a state criminal prosecution,
but he could not initiate a civil action against the state or its officers.
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prospective equitable relief under Young and the APA, but prohibit claims
for money damages under the FTCA or § 1983. The preceding argument
effectively endorses the liberal approach, based on the premise that Article
17 is a Type II treaty provision, but fails to address the argument that the
moderate and conservative approaches are also consistent with the
classification of Article 17 as a Type II treaty provision. Moreover, one
could argue, the moderate and conservative approaches are preferable to the
liberal approach, because the liberal approach is inconsistent with the plain
meaning of the NSE declarations and with the treaty makers' intent to
minimize the domestic legal impact of treaty ratification.
All three approaches are consistent with the classification of Article 17 as
a Type II treaty provision. However, the conservative approach is
problematic because it would deny plaintiffs a right of action under the
APA for injunctive relief against federal officers who violate unique treaty
rights. This result is inconsistent with established APA jurisprudence.473 The
moderate approach is also problematic because it would create an
unjustified disparity between victims of human rights violations committed
by federal government officers and victims of human rights violations
committed by state and local government officers. Under the moderate
approach, the former group could obtain injunctive relief against federal
officers pursuant to the APA. However, the latter group could not obtain
relief at all: § 1983 claims would be barred by the intended beneficiary
criterion474 and Young claims would be barred by the moderate approach's
arbitrary exclusion of claims based on implied rights of action. There is no
persuasive policy justification for this disparity.475
With respect to the plain meaning argument, it is instructive to compare
the NSE declarations to a statutory provision in the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, which states: "No Federal civil action may be brought by a
prisoner confined in jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or
emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of
physical injury. 47 6 Despite the clear statutory command that no "Federal
473. See supra Part III.B.
474. See supra notes 207-14 and accompanying text.
475. It is no answer to say that courts should prefer express rights of action over implied rights of
action. One could as easily argue that courts should prefer a constitutionally created implied right of
action (under the Supremacy Clause) to a statutorily created express right of action, because the former
is constitutional, whereas the latter is statutory.
476. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (Supp. IV 1998).
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civil action may be brought," every federal appellate court that has
addressed the issue has concluded that this provision limits damages
remedies, but does not impair a prisoner's right to seek declaratory or
injunctive relief.477 The rationale for this result is straightforward: "Absent
the clearest command to the contrary from Congress, federal courts retain
their equitable power to issue injunctions in suits over which they have
jurisdiction."478 Inasmuch as a statutory provision that bars any federal civil
action has been uniformly construed to permit actions for injunctive relief,
it is unpersuasive to suggest that the plain meaning of the NSE declarations
bars suits for injunctive relief.
More fundamentally, the above objection highlights the problem created
by the treaty makers' refusal to confront the difficult trade-offs between the
twin policy goals of ensuring compliance with U.S. treaty obligations and
avoiding changes in domestic law.479 In cases where plaintiffs assert rights
that are, in fact, unique treaty rights, any decision that the court makes will
inevitably be inconsistent with at least one of the treaty makers' policy
goals. A decision to grant relief would be inconsistent with the goal of
avoiding changes in domestic law. A decision to deny relief would be
inconsistent with the goal of treaty compliance.
Even so, the liberal approach comes closest to harmonizing these
conflicting policy goals. Under the conservative or moderate approach,
every case in which a court refused to reach the merits of a treaty-based
human rights claim on the grounds that the plaintiff lacked a private right of
action would be a separate violation of the United States's obligation to
ensure that a competent authority determines the plaintiff's right to a
remedy.48 ° Moreover, every such judicial decision (or non-decision) would
be contrary to the policy goal of treaty compliance.
477. See Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1288 (1 lth Cir. 1999), vacated, reh 'ggranteden banc, 197
F.3d 1059 (1Ith Cir. 1999), reinstated in relevantpart, 216 F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Harper
v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716,719 (5th Cir. 1999); Perkins v. Kansas Dep't of Corrections, 165 F.3d 803,
808 (10th Cir. 1999); Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Zehnerv.
Trigg, 133 F.3d 459,462 (7th Cir. 1997).
478. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 705 (1979). The cases cited in the previous footnote rely
upon other arguments as well, but the principle articulated in Califano is an important part of the
rationale supporting the courts' narrow interpretation of the no "Federal civil action" provision of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act.
479. See supra notes 64-66, 102-03, and accompanying text.
480. This statement is subject to two caveats. First, if the court grants complete relief on the basis of
some other provision of domestic law, there is no international obligation to reach the merits of the treaty
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In contrast, suppose that courts uniformly adopted the liberal approach
and recognized an implied private right of action under the Supremacy
Clause. In some cases, courts would hold that defendants had violated
plaintiffs' treaty rights. But in other cases, courts would hold that there was
no treaty violation. In cases where courts found no treaty violation, their
decisions would be fully consistent with both policy goals. By addressing
the merits, they would be promoting the goal of treaty compliance and
fulfilling the United States's obligation to ensure that a competent authority
determines the plaintiff's right to a remedy.4"' But by holding that there was
no treaty violation, the court would avoid changes in domestic law.
Therefore, the liberal approach is consistent with both policy goals, at least
some of the time. In contrast, the conservative and moderate approaches
yield repeated judicial decisions that are inconsistent with the policy goal of
treaty compliance.
V. CONCLUSION
When the political branches create federal law, whether by statute or
treaty, injunctive relief is presumptively available against state or local
government officers who violate that federal law. That presumption flows
from the Supremacy Clause; it is necessary to preserve the rule of law and
to vindicate the federal interest in the supremacy of federal law. The
presumption can be rebutted by showing that Congress foreclosed the
availability of a Young remedy when it enacted a statute, or that the treaty
makers foreclosed the availability of a Young remedy when they adopted a
treaty. However, the burden of proof properly rests with the party who
seeks to preclude judicial enforcement of federal law to show that Congress,
or the treaty makers, specifically intended to foreclose the availability of a
Young remedy. It would be incompatible with the rule-of-law and federal
supremacy interests underlying the Young doctrine to shift the burden of
proof to the party seeking to enjoin a violation of federal law.
claim. See Sloss, supra note 19, at 204-07. Second, there is no international obligation to reach the
merits of frivolous treaty-based claims. See id. at 203-04.
481. One could argue that an incorrect judicial decision-holding that there was no treaty violation
when in fact the treaty had been violated-would be inconsistent with U.S. international obligations.
This argument fails to account for the fact that there is no international body with final authority to
decide whether particular conduct constitutes a treaty violation. In the absence ofany such international
body, a good-faith judicial effort to reach a fair decision on the merits of plaintiff's claim would satisfy
the United States's treaty obligation, regardless of the results of that decision.
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Most commentators have assumed that the NSE declarations attached to
human rights treaties manifest the treaty makers' intent generally to
preclude judicial enforcement of the treaties, and specifically to preclude
the availability of a Young remedy. However, careful analysis of the Senate
record associated with treaty ratification casts doubt on that assumption.
The NSE declarations are ambiguous on their face. They can plausibly be
construed narrowly to preclude offensive claims for money damages, but to
permit judicial enforcement of unique treaty rights when litigants invoke the
treaties defensively, or when plaintiffs invoke the APA or the Young
doctrine to supply a private cause of action for injunctive relief against
government officers who violate unique treaty rights. The Senate record
associated with treaty ratification, while not dispositive, is not inconsistent
with this narrow interpretation of the NSE declarations. Moreover, this
narrow interpretation is justified by the rule-of-law and federal supremacy
interests underlying the Young doctrine, and by the treaty makers' manifest
intention to ensure U.S. compliance with its treaty obligations.
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